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ABSTRACT
INTIMATE RECEPTION: READING ORDINARY QUEERNESS IN AMERICAN
WOMEN’S LITERATURE
Jess Shollenberger
Heather Love
This dissertation connects the aesthetic commitment to the ordinary world in
twentieth-century women’s literature to the invention and consolidation of modern
sexuality. Owing largely to a political antipathy between “the ordinary” and “the queer,”
scholars have not addressed the intersections of literary modernism, ordinary aesthetics,
and the emergence of queer sexualities. This project argues that the twentieth-century
preoccupation with the ordinary cannot be understood apart from representations of queer
figures, desires, and intimacies, which are themselves ordinary—neither hidden nor
extravagant. The representations I examine are attuned to the specific forms of gendered
insignificance that snag on feminine being, subjectivities, and intimacies. The
insignificance attached to feminine figures, this project claims, is not so easily redressed
by queer alterity defined as the potential to become something extraordinary and
different. What I call “ordinary queerness” is an insignificant feature of a changing sexual
landscape that required legible subjects and discernible identities. By rendering queerness
insignificant, the writer declines to represent a legible subject for discipline,
classification, and even description—in other words, interpretation. Through readings of
texts by Sarah Orne Jewett, Gertrude Stein, Gwendolyn Brooks, and Elizabeth Bishop,
this project finds that representations of an ordinary queerness raise specific interpretive
problems for queer literary studies. This project’s method of an “intimate reception” is
v

addressed to those queer figures (characters as well as authors) who might not seem queer
enough according to axiomatic frameworks within queer literary studies. This dissertation
offers intimate reception as a reading practice and a literary-historical method that is
motivated less by critical opposition or indeed by ardent attachments than it is by
ordinary affects, insignificant figures, and the distance that inevitably lies between the
reader and the queer worlds they desire in a literary text.
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Introduction
Ordinary Queerness, Insignificant Aesthetics
I think it’s important to have
your own grip on
things, however
that works and then you should
pursue that and spend the
rest of the time
doing the ordinary.
—Eileen Myles, “The Irony of the Leash”
I. The Trouble with the Ordinary
The ordinary is an object of both study and desire that has reliably embodied
everything that queerness isn’t. “Queer” and “ordinary” are antonyms, according to
common sense as well as our critical, cultural discourse. “Being queer,” according to
“Queers Read This” (a leaflet “published anonymously by queers” in 1990), “means
leading a different sort of life,” in opposition to “the mainstream, profit-margins,
patriotism, patriarchy or being assimilated.” “Queer” is a “rough word,” as the authors
note, and this is why they like it: “queer” does not mean “gay” as in happy, proud, and
carefree, it means angry, hurt, insulted, and united as an “army” that is fighting
homophobia, racism, misogyny, and AIDS. “Queer” is a weapon and a world of
possibility and power. To be “queer” is to define yourself in excess of, beyond, against
the ordinary world, its expectations and its rules. Aligning queerness with potential rather
than a state of being or a settled, familiar identity has been crucial to rejecting rightsbased frameworks for inclusion and imagining coalitions like the leaflet’s “army of
lovers.” If the “queer” is not yet present, still becoming, or emergent, then the ordinary is
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already here, routine, and observable.1 Ordinary life repeats. It is what is and what recurs.
A queer life swerves or turns away, disrupts, refuses, and transforms. The ordinary is
predictable; what’s queer is unpredictable. The engine of the ordinary life is reproduction.
Reproduction, in Silvia Federici’s definition, names the work that is required to sustain
life: cleaning, cooking, caring for others, doing the laundry.2 These things happen every
day; in other words, someone has to do them. Reproduction is not a possibility (a thing
that might or could occur) but a necessity. Queer potential is a force opposed to
normative existence understood as a necessity, the necessary maintenance of the world as
it has been. With few exceptions, queer political potential is aligned with a rejection or at
least the transformation of some “ordinary” structure, pattern, timeline, form, convention,
style, role, or expectation.
Narratives about queer theory’s emergence and institutionalization tend to focus
on its critique of heterosexual and cisgender normativity: the normal.3 Unlike what
Michael Warner termed “the trouble with normal,” which cohered into queer theory’s
most important analytic and political convention (antinormativity), the trouble with the
ordinary never assumed the shape of a legitimizing stance, method, or framework for the
field. Disavowals of the ordinary work in subtler ways. The ordinary and the normal are
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Muñoz (2009), for example, locates queerness in the future, in the “not yet here.” Muñoz
defines an orientation to the ordinary world that is “essentially about the rejection of a here and
now and an insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world” (1).
2
See “Wages Against Housework” (1975), “Why Sexuality is Work” (1975), and
“Counterplanning from the Kitchen” (1975), in Revolution at Point Zero.
3
In general, I use “queer theory” to name the set of concerns and concepts that emerged as a
response to and in dialogue with feminism; early queer theory. When I discuss another scholar’s
work, I use whatever term they use. “Queer studies,” in my usage, implies a broader range of
objects, methods, archives, and genealogies for queer work, as well as a wider circulation of the
word “queer” as a term that matters to many critical projects.
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distinct concepts and objects. However, as either term might name the world queer theory
would like to disrupt, the two concepts are often collapsed together. As Warner explains
in his book The Trouble with Normal (1999), “normal” connotes a state of rightness,
goodness, and health, an understanding that is premised “on a confusion between
statistical norms and evaluative norms” (56). “Normal” collapses what is most common
(averageness) with what is correct, meaning in short that ideas of normalcy define “what
people should be” (57). That people should not be something different follows from this
definition. “Ordinary” does not carry this prescriptive connotation, at least not to the
same degree. We might describe as “ordinary” all of the days that blur together. These
days lack distinctive features—they are not right or good or dutiful or what a day
“should” be. They are uninteresting, perhaps fine, perhaps awful, and predictable. A
troubling aspect of an ordinary life is that it repeats—the ordinary is the genre of the socalled world as it is or of the world just staying the same.4 The ordinary gets aligned with
a political quietism on the basis that we accept or acquiesce to what is predictable or what
we’ve been given before.
Rita Felski notes “a tendency” in studies of everyday life “to equate repetition
with domination” and in particular the oppression of women (“Invention” 84).5 An
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See Nichols, Same Old: Queer Theory, Literature and the Politics of Sameness (2020), for a
critique of the attachment to “difference” in queer theory and an exploration of “sameness” as a
queer aesthetic mode, which “queer theoretical frameworks have been less good at honouring or
recognising” (34).
5
Felski cites what Henri Lefebvre calls “the great problem of repetition,” which for Felski is a
distinctly modern problem tied to the rise of mass consumption. Women in particular are linked
to repetition as the reproducers of culture and as culture’s primary consumers, thus its prisoners
and victims. For Lefebvre, as Felski notes, the ordinary lives of women repeat according to
“natural bodily rhythms or the regimented cycles of industrial capitalism” (“Invention” 84).
Felski counters Lefebvre by framing repetition as the pattern that allows for one’s self-making.
See Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, vols. 1 and 2 (1991, 2002). Langbauer (1992) similarly
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ordinary life is arguably something that everyone has, yet it is fraught with gendered
meaning and a feminine implication—there is nothing more intensely ordinary than a
woman. Felski, like so many critics writing about the ordinary and the everyday, observes
that these essential concepts (for sociology and anthropology, history, cultural studies,
feminist theory, and affect theory) are resistant to precise and stable definitions. The
everyday is seemingly everywhere, so that nobody lives beyond it. We all have ordinary
lives. However, as I argue and as Felski also claims, the “ordinary” as a concept has
attached itself to women and to working-class people and culture with an especially
stubborn adhesion. “Ordinariness,” deployed in postwar British cultural studies, was a
concept that legitimized the study of working-class people and culture at the smallest
scales of analysis. Subsequent work revealed this scholarship’s presumption of a
universal subject that was white and male although not economically privileged (the
scholarship boy, for example, in Richard Hoggart’s 1957 book The Uses of Literacy),
which meant that certain people’s “ordinaries,” the lives of women and people of color,
“were simply too ordinary to capture the attention of researchers” (McCarthy 38, italics
in original). A similar story can be traced within the U.S. scholarly context: second-wave
feminist critiques of everyday life as problematic, as a domain of women’s oppression,
exposed the universal subject of experience and knowledge to be white, straight, middleor upper-class, and male. The presumed superiority of this white-male perspective meant
that other standpoints could be viewed (and dismissed) as niche, small-scale, and

offers a critique of Lefebvre’s thinking as invested in “the old logic that women cannot
understand something because they embody it” (51).
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limited—or merely personal. If, as Felski ventures, “every life contains an element of the
ordinary,” then we are all, as Federici puts it, housewives—reproducers.
This dissertation brings together work in queer and affect studies, twentiethcentury literary studies, and everyday life studies in order to show how women writers
represented and imagined forms of ordinary queerness: ways of being in a world, whether
fictional or poetic, that is not set up to marginalize, exclude, or injure queer figures but
rather to offer them protection. I endeavor to show the value in this queer world-making
gesture, which is often overlooked as apolitical or disengaged from histories of violence,
rather than as a response to them. As sexuality became a legible facet of one’s
personhood over the course of the twentieth century—became, moreover, one of the most
significant things to know about a person—the four writers whose work I explore
declined to render queerness significant. Sarah Orne Jewett, Gertrude Stein, Gwendolyn
Brooks, and Elizabeth Bishop were each in various ways responding to the emergence
and consolidation of modern sexuality: or to discourses that, in effect, transformed an
ordinary way of being odd or different or strange into a catalogued form of deviance, a
departure from both social norms and, in some cases, lawful behavior. Their work makes
queerness ordinary: present, possible, and repeatable. In other words, their work does not
conceal queer figures but rather constructs a world around them in which their presence is
unremarkable and sometimes even explicit. Jewett, Stein, Brooks, and Bishop were each
engaged in shifting the terms on which a queer and feminine subject could be rendered in
language at all. By rendering queerness insignificant, these writers declined to represent a
legible subject for discipline, classification, and even description—in other words, for
literary studies. Whereas significance exposes and calls out to readers (meaning!),
5

insignificance protects and seems to wave the reader away. What I call ordinary
queerness raises specific interpretive problems for queer literary studies, with which my
chapters are concerned.
In the first part of this introduction, I address the expectation that the “ordinary”
needs to be transformed by writers and poets in order to matter—to count as art. An
“insignificant aesthetic” is the result of writers declining to heed this normative
convention. Such a refusal is bound up with the particular needs of queer and women
writers seeking to dwell with (not escape) the insignificance of queer and feminized
figures, desires, and intimacies. I connect the aesthetic production of significance in
modernist literature, broadly conceived, to the discursive production of deviance or
pathology that underwrote the invention of the modern homosexual and the modern
lesbian. The latter sections are concerned with the enduring problem posed by
ordinariness specifically within queer theory. I revisit the origin stories or the critical
genealogies that position queer theory as coming after feminism and its failures. A theory
of ordinary queerness, I argue, renews the dialogue between these fields and even binds
them together. In the final section of this introduction, I define the reading practice I
develop across my chapters and explain my literary-historical method of “intimate
reception.”
The antipathy between the “ordinary” and the “queer” has been a powerful force
for queer critiques of heterosexual privilege and the damage that norms exact. At the
same time, this antipathy has also driven a wedge between the scholarship on queer and
modernist literature, on the one hand, and the twentieth-century aesthetic preoccupation
with the ordinary, on the other. Put another way, the scholarly work on modernism and
6

the ordinary has not been especially attentive to queerness and sexuality (in part because
it has been focused on the work of women writers), while the scholarship on queer
modernism has not been especially interested in ordinary aesthetics (in the work of
women writers). We presume that queerness disrupts the ordinary’s reproduction and
disturbs our sense of ordinary life as something “good,” such that the value of the
ordinary within queer representation lies in its capacity to highlight queer resistance.
Queer aesthetic objects, however, frequently disobey the reader’s critical categories like
“resistant,” landing somewhere in between the hegemonic and the subversive. Seeking to
heed my objects’ lessons, I describe the ordinary as a queer aesthetic resource whose
value extends beyond its function as a backdrop for the exposure of alterity and
resistance. The texts I read embrace the ordinary as a habitable space for queer desires
and relations. These texts do not reward being read through a resistant lens so much as
they do a lens attuned to that which turns away from the close reader: insignificance, the
figure in the landscape that does not seem to stand out, shine, or clash. Existing accounts
of modernist literature and ordinary aesthetics have yet to reckon with the presence of an
ordinary queerness. Ultimately, this project argues that the representation of ordinary
queerness in the work of Jewett, Stein, Brooks, and Bishop, among others, cannot be
understood apart from the much broader aesthetic commitment to the ordinary world in
twentieth-century American literature—and that by focusing on these authors, we
compose a different story about the ways in which the ordinary matters to queer
literature, queer politics, and queer life.

7

II. Doing Nothing in Two Bare Rooms: Insignificant Aesthetics
Sarah Orne Jewett, Gertrude Stein, Gwendolyn Brooks, and Elizabeth Bishop
forged new modes of representing queer and ordinary life, with implications for the
meaning of both “queer” and “ordinary.” Their work presents the ordinary
untransformed. Or, put another way, their work refuses to enact the requisite aesthetic
transformation of the ordinary into the spectacular, the insignificant into the meaningful.
By declining what poetics scholar Andrew Epstein calls the “transformation trope” (in
which an ordinary moment suddenly gives way to transcendence and the reader is invited
to behold the unexpected or even the sacred—to feel astonished), these authors dwell
with insignificance and vagueness, even dullness.6 Their work does not provoke
astonishment so much as stillness, pensiveness, and sometimes even boredom. Whereas
astonishment “helps one surpass the limitations of an alienating presentness and allows
one to see a different time and place,” a feeling of non-surprise enables one to pause, to
stay in place, to see what is (Cruising 5). And then, what? As both a writerly orientation
and a readerly response, a passive pensiveness is suspect as an affective ground from
which to make/encounter a queer world. In this section, I compare the poem “Having a
Coke with You” by Frank O’Hara (drawing on José Esteban Muñoz’s reading of it) with
Bishop’s poem “The End of March,” in order to clarify the insignificant as a queer
aesthetic that is rooted in the ordinary and not in the surpassing of it.
According to Muñoz, queerness exists as a “horizon” and an “excess” that can be
felt in the aesthetic encounter with something from the past such as a poem or a

6

See Attention Equals Life (2016).
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performance. Quotidian things like those we find in O’Hara’s “urban landscapes of
astonishment,” Muñoz proposes, hold and offer queer potential insofar as they exceed
their status as ordinary and present; they perform “a certain surplus” (5, 7). This aesthetic
surplus signifies a queerness that transcends and finally betters the present arrangements
for the world, for sociality and intimacy in particular. For Muñoz, O’Hara’s queer
aesthetic, rooted though it is in the banal and unremarkable moments of life (like sharing
a Coke), “promises a futurity, something that is not quite here” (7). This extraordinary
queerness has been widely embraced by scholars in queer studies and beyond as
queerness per se. Whatever its content, queer potential is aligned with an escape from
ordinary time and place, the here and now of reproduction, which is always already here.
My project is interested in writing that presents the queer desire to inhabit ordinariness
and “do” the ordinary. The doing of something is more complicated than either the
naming of it as normative or the naming of it as queer. In order to grasp why queer desire
has been severed from the doing of an ordinary life (to do: perform an action or task,
make something, provide or work on something, solve a problem, cook, attend to), we
have to recognize that doing the ordinary is what people marked as feminine have always
had to do.
O’Hara, in “Having a Coke with You” (1960), addresses a lover and insists that
the quotidian act of drinking a common commodity with him is more pleasurable than
visiting European cities or looking at fine art. The poem is playful: it includes “Bayonne”
(New Jersey) at the end of its list of European cities, and it makes the seemingly obvious
statement that having a Coke with you is “even more fun” than “being sick to my
stomach” in a Barcelona street. There is a knife’s edge of unpleasantness to “Having a
9

Coke with You” that marks the time of its composition, the very end of the 1950s. The
“secrecy” that was required of gay men during this time is named directly in the poem—
as a source of O’Hara’s pleasure. Having a Coke is “even more fun” than traveling the
world (or to New Jersey) and being in public (possibly getting sick to one’s stomach),
“partly because of the secrecy our smiles take on before people and statuary” (Selected
Poems 194). Coke is the same no matter where you are. The ability to pass freely and
safely through public spaces as a gay man, however, is not everywhere assured. O’Hara
embraces the commodity, its ubiquity and sameness, as a way to signal what Muñoz
understands as the expansiveness of queer relationality—as it could be, as it was.
O’Hara’s gay couple feels utopian now in part because the very fact of being a same-sex
couple at midcentury was transgressive. This is no longer the case today, a gain (and loss)
that partly explains queer culture’s nostalgic attachment to the 50s, which were awful but
not that bad. Having a secret is “even more fun,” in a way, than having a state-sanctioned
partnership, a legal union. The act of having a Coke with your gay lover could be
transgressive at midcentury—astonishing in its pleasure. It could transcend the
homophobic ordinary then, just as it transcends, as Muñoz points out, the homonormative
ordinary of our present, in which queer couples are no longer the signs of transgression
they once were.
Bishop’s “The End of March” presents a radically different dream for queerness
that is asocial and domestic. Its queer utopianism is murmured (rather than absent
altogether), delivered in references to cooking techniques and everyday household
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objects.7 Like O’Hara’s poem, Bishop’s “The End of March” is among her latest
(published in 1976 in her last book Geography III, a decade after O’Hara’s death).
Whereas O’Hara’s quotidian moment brings transcendence, or an aesthetic excess that
tops the world’s great artworks, Bishop’s moment of desire in the course of everyday life
invites a settling down and settling in: a dream of setting up home. Bishop’s desire is for
solitude and doing “nothing much,” the possibility contained in insignificance and
obscurity. As Bishop walks along a beach in cold, bleak weather with unnamed
companions, she imagines a dream house (likely inspired, knowing Bishop, by an actual
structure somewhere in the distance obscured by mist). Bishop remembers that she
“wanted to get as far as my proto-dream-house,” walking along on that cold day:
my crypto-dream-house, that crooked box
set up on pilings, shingled green,
a sort of artichoke of a house, but greener
(boiled with bicarbonate of soda?),
protected from spring tides by a palisade
of—are they railroad ties?
(Many things about this place are dubious.)
I’d like to retire there and do nothing,
or nothing much, forever, in two bare rooms:
look through binoculars, read boring books,
old, long, long books, and write down useless notes,
talk to myself, and, foggy days,
watch the droplets slipping, heavy with light.
At night, a grog à l’américaine.
I’d blaze it with a kitchen match
and lovely diaphanous blue flame
would waver, double in the window. (Geography III 43)

7

Bishop’s poetry might belong to what Brian Glavey calls the “wallflower avant-garde,” a strain
of queer modernism “defined in part by its reluctance to being ensnared in the sorts of
oppositional thinking that would pitch the antisocial and the utopian as opposites,” a binary that
much work in queer studies, including Muñoz’s in Cruising Utopia, depends upon (3). See The
Wallflower Avant-Garde: Modernism, Sexuality, and Queer Ekphrasis (2015).
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Bishop’s proto-/crypto-dream-house is a place for contemplation, rest, and doing nothing
much: the perfect house where Bishop can do whatever she wants and not be bothered,
never work or be of use. If the act of having a Coke with you exceeds the merely banal,
then Bishop’s solitary dream-housework invests the ordinary with the capacity to
structure and sustain a queer existence—not through radical transformation but through
ritual and repetition in a slanted (or “crooked”) household. Living here is not more fun
than traveling the world or seeing great art. The work of doing nothing, or what the poem
attempts to pass off as merely doing nothing, brings about another world, a “dubious”
house that is constructed on Bishop’s terms and from her position of relative obscurity.
The outside world—the secret smiles, getting sick to one’s stomach in Spain—is stripped
away so that she can live in two bare rooms with only the mundane and the useless things
like long, old, boring books, a life both “perfect” and “impossible.” Two bare rooms
become a place from which to make/encounter a queer world, using only what is
mundane: “A light to read by—,” Bishop concludes her dream-house inventory, “perfect!
But—impossible” (Geography III 44). That even impossible houses support life is the
dream of Bishop’s dream-house, green as an artichoke and armored, but with tender parts
within. Bishop is finally less attuned to secret smiles and being queer in public spaces
than she is to impossible houses, or the difficult task for women in particular of making
queer homes and sustaining intimate relationships within them. That Bishop’s dreamhouse is for her alone suggests that living together has been difficult, a job from which
she’d like to “retire.” The queer aesthetic of this poem lies in bareness rather than excess:
setting up home with all the dubious, hidden, yet far from useless things that ordinary life
affords.
12

For the authors in this project, each of whom relates in complex ways to norms of
“femininity” and “womanhood,” the ordinary’s highly gendered insignificance and
minor-ness affords a queer aesthetic that is distinctly unlike the surplus Muñoz locates in
O’Hara’s poem. Representation for these authors does not mean the revelation of an
overlooked significance or even “close” attention, which produces meaning in excess,
infinite detail, another world. Insignificance protects queer figures from a normative gaze
that says: you must become significant and legible, or, you must reveal yourself. This
project surveys texts produced during the years 1870-1980, a time during which
“modern” sexual identities emerged, cohered, and started to fracture. None of these texts
constructs a lesbian or queer identity per se, although they all engage in shifting and
rewriting the aesthetic terms on which an ordinary, queer, and feminine subject appears.
“Queer” and “feminine” are not opposing terms within my readings, although neither are
they fixed in any definite relation with respect to gender, sexual desire, race, and other
social factors. The representations I examine are attuned to the specific forms of gendered
insignificance that snag on feminine being, subjectivities, and intimacies. The
insignificance attached to feminine figures, this project suggests, is not so easily
redressed—redeemed, transformed—by queer alterity defined as the potential to become
something extraordinary. There is no space “beyond” the ordinary world for Jewett’s
widows, Stein’s intensely “regular” women who are also very “gay,” Brooks’ workingclass Black housewives, and Bishop’s proto-/crypto-lesbian lovers. For these authors,
there is no way of looking closely at the ordinary world—no means of observing both its
pleasures and its promise of insignificance for those lives marked as feminine—and then
transcending it entirely. To look closely is to discover that the ordinary world is both
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inadequate to queerness and attached to it for better or worse. For this reason, this
dissertation turns toward the ordinary as a problematic, deeply ambivalent, and sticky
object of study that queer studies (and queer literary studies, especially) cannot move
beyond.
A lot depends upon the ordinary’s aesthetic transformation. This is the lesson that
so many works of art and poems and novels “about” the ordinary world appear to teach or
reinforce. The ordinary world is arguably twentieth-century literature’s core
preoccupation, threading its way through every major “experimental” movement of the
century from modernism to postmodernism, imagism to the Language poets.8 When we
encounter ordinariness in literature and art, we are encountering the “becoming-noticed
of the unnoticed” (Highmore 52); the “inherent splendor to the insignificant,” as Jacques
Rancière put it (Solange 253); and perhaps “a blow from an enemy hidden behind the
cotton wool of daily life” (Woolf, Moments 72). As a reader or an observer, we expect
the sort of noticing that artists and writers engage in to reveal something important,
something previously unseen or inaccessible to people as we do our daily lives—a certain
surplus, in Muñoz’s terms. We expect the writer’s attention to be heightened and
transformative, not merely reproductive: “Literature’s heightened sensitivity to the
microscopic detail marks its difference from the casual inattentiveness that defines the
everyday experience of everyday life” (Felski, “Invention” 90). The seemingly
unremarkable objects that comprise an imagist poem, for example, are new objects,
which have been rendered new by selection, observation, and arrangement. These things
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shine with untapped meaning and the promise of its tapping. The act of noticing, which
the poem both performs and represents, transforms the shards of glass or plums or
chickens into other, less familiar things than those we take for granted as we live with,
use, dust, eat, break, save, or lose them—fail to notice them.
An insignificant aesthetic is ambivalent about the prospect of a transformation
that unearths inherent meaning. It neither transforms the insignificance of ordinary, queer
and feminine lives, nor does it reveal a hidden truth or splendor underneath the ordinary.
Even Stein, whose Tender Buttons (1914) is an exemplary text for thinking about the
defamiliarization of the ordinary world and Stein’s own bourgeois domestic space (and
even depicts the transformation or the “queering” of a household), maintains a
commitment to “supposing that there was no astonishment” (TB 14). What if even the
strangest, queerest object or figure did not shock? What if the strangest things were
boring? What if queer life could be as regular and necessary as “washing,” as “a
vegetable,” and yet consist of difference “spreading” in excess of what is expected, what
is normal, what is correct?
III. Supposing no Astonishment: Modernism’s Ordinary
The twentieth-century aesthetic and especially the literary modernist fascination
with the ordinary world cannot be understood apart from the invention of what I am
calling “ordinary queerness.” This term refers to representations of queer life (as opposed
to actual queer lives) that decline the transformation of the ordinary world in favor of
dwelling with its minor-ness: what sticks to feminized figures. Modernism’s
preoccupation with the ordinary world, this project argues, is not separate from its
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investment in depicting an emergent, newly “modern” sexual and gender landscape.
Sexual modernity and modernism’s ordinary are imbricated in ways that scholars of
modernism and, to a lesser extent, scholars of sexuality have tended to overlook. This
lack of attention registers the entrenched political, aesthetic, and theoretical antipathies
between the “ordinary” and the “queer” to which this project is responding. This situation
also lays bare the extent to which the “paranoid imperative” has guided foundational
scholarship on sexuality and literary modernism. Queerness is the open secret of the
Anglo-American modernist canon, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick famously argued.9
Sedgwick’s argument enabled scholars to understand a modernist text as one that might
reward or even “demand” suspicious reading and the pursuit of hidden meaning.
In “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading” (1997, 2003), Sedgwick observes
that reading with suspicion (or employing what Paul Ricoeur called “the hermeneutics of
suspicion”) is synonymous with critical reading and even critique itself. Critique exposes
what seems ordinary, straightforward, and unproblematic as a sign of hidden meaning, a
systemic or structural problem. Exposure is a procedure with which queer theory is all
too familiar, Sedgwick notes, because of its interest in discovering and combatting
homophobia (the insult that transforms an ordinary person into an extraordinary person, a
pervert, a queer). Sedgwick asks, how did the “object” of queer/antihomophobic theory
become the field’s “uniquely sanctioned methodology”? (Touching 126, italics in
original). Sedgwick questions the efficacy of exposure (and the critic’s seeming faith in
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Epistemology (1990) did much to cement symptomatic or paranoid reading, which Sedgwick
herself would later critique, as the most salient reading method for a range of modernist texts as
well as the most effective framework for queer (antihomophobic) theorizing. The stakes were
high when “hidden meaning” meant forbidden, repressed desire, the acknowledgement of which
meant nothing less than the production of a new, queer modernist canon.
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it) in contexts where systemic violence is neither hidden nor condemned but is instead
rendered visible, even “spectacular” (140). If violence, further, is mundane, then what is
there for critics to expose? The ordinary of contemporary critical, cultural theory is
synonymous with crises neither hidden nor narratable as ending or beginning; this is how
Christina Sharpe describes the “ongoing disaster” of transatlantic slavery: “a past that is
not past” (13); “the ground of our everyday Black existence” (15); the weather. If the
ordinary of modernity once presented itself as a network of symptoms or signs to be
interpreted, thus leading to “the detection of hidden patterns of violence and their
exposure,” then the ordinary of today, of our contemporary moment, offers itself less as a
surface to inspect and finally pierce than as the atmosphere or weather we inhabit and try
to feel (Sedgwick, Touching 143).
While scholars of modernism have shown that writers like Stein, Virginia Woolf,
and Dorothy Richardson, among others, were committed to representing women’s
ordinary lives, few scholars have focused on the place of sexuality within these
representations. While gender is often a key term, sexuality and queerness in particular
have been sidelined in such studies as Lorraine Sim’s Ordinary Matters (2016), Liesl
Olson’s Modernism and the Ordinary (2009), and Siobhan Phillips’ The Poetics of the
Everyday (2010), none of which has the word “sexuality” in its index. This recent turn in
modernist studies situates the ordinary as “a site of positive value” (Sim 17) and recovers
the centrality of moments and “experiences that are not heightened” or transcendent
(Olson 4, italics in original). A modernist style might give rise to unexpected or devalued
ways of feeling, thinking, and reading; in other words, a modernist text that is concerned
with boring time might also occasion readerly boredom. As an aesthetic, ordinariness
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makes way for a full roster of unruly, “ugly,” negative, “backward,” and “befuddled”
affects, which have opened up new modes of reading and theorizing modernism.10
Approaching the ordinary in a positive way, Hannah Freed-Thall notes, “requires
concepts sympathetic to insignificance” and its close cousin femininity (17).
Modernism’s ordinary is a genre for the unnoticed, Liesl Olson has proposed: a
genre for things “most frequently characterized by our inattention to them” (6).
Representations of the ordinary therefore contradict themselves, almost by definition: “If
the ordinary is the nonrepresented, the overlooked, then the writer’s objective is
paradoxical: How does a writer replicate what is overlooked, if the nature of literary
representation is to look closely at its subject? Modernist styles aim to embody this
difficulty” (Olson 7, italics in original). The reader of modernist work is always
implicated—a close reader—in the ordinary’s status, meaning, and texture. With the act
of looking closely or of paying close attention, for the writer and the reader, comes the
promise of unearthing hidden meaning or discovering, as Virginia Woolf would have it, a
“pattern” hidden behind the cotton wool of ordinary life. Woolf’s metaphor of cotton
wool, which Olson discusses in detail, suggests a genre of predictable and dulling daily
life from which we nonetheless expect something surprising or arresting, or what Woolf
calls “sudden shocks.”
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See Ngai (2005), Love (2007), and Freed-Thall (2015), each of whom explores the negative,
marginal, and politically dubious affects that arise in the aesthetic encounter with modernism; see
also the special issue of Modernism/Modernity, “Weak Theory, Weak Modernism” (2018), which
is addressed to some of the methods that incorporate post-critical and queer affects as a way of
“reacquainting modernist studies with weakness.” Activating this concept recovers the centrality
of “the everyday” within a broadened understanding of modernist literature.
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As a reader, I appreciate the sudden shock, its charge. (When writing, however, I
am liable to postpone the shock indefinitely and dwell with boring details, obscure
moments, and useless objects.) In my “Ordinary Life” creative writing class, for example,
although we spoke about the value of attending to what seems boring, I would always
invite my students to consider the effectiveness of shock, the big reveal. I found myself
encouraging students to throw back the curtain of cotton wool and show, or even just tell
me why their detailed meditations on eyeglasses, or the music that plays in cars, or that
old picture frame that still displays the stock image for “celebration” (or whatever it was),
are interesting and finally worth the effort of their attention. It is the unexpected note that
makes things shimmer, I explain—but with reluctance, as I only half believe what I am
saying.
For Woolf, the shock of an “exceptional” moment grants her ready access to the
important matters that cotton wool obscures or keeps us from sensing, ordinarily: “some
real thing behind appearances” (Moments 72). These shocks enable Woolf to write and
more precisely to write fiction that is addressed to “some real thing,” although she
explains that when she was young, the shocks would often bring “a peculiar horror and a
physical collapse; they seemed dominant; myself passive” (72). Writing proceeds by way
of a shock and then a desire to “explain” the shock or what, with a “peculiar horror,”
ruptures the consistency of ordinary life. The shock that rends the cotton wool could be a
memory of childhood, a world war, or a flower—an object noticed in a way that
translates ordinary looking into making “a discovery.” Woolf’s description of her process
of attention focalizes, first, the close association between the ordinary and its inevitable
disruption (on both large and minor, or historical and personal scales); second, the
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ambivalence—and even physical pain—that might attend the writer’s scrutiny of ordinary
life; and third, the idea that to represent the ordinary is to represent its transformation or
its yielding of significance beyond its mere appearance.
In a way, what Woolf is describing in her account of moments that shock is an
experience of modernity: an ordinary in flux, a world disturbed by interruption and in
need of heightened attention. There were unseen systems at work, distorting the plain
appearance of things, and they compelled new forms of scrutiny as well as representation.
Sensing “that something uncanny and strange had been exposed within the everyday,” as
Michael North hypothesizes, is perhaps modernity’s “quintessential experience” (203204). “During the twentieth century,” Andrew Epstein notes, “the everyday qua everyday
suddenly comes into question. It takes its place as both a central topos and a recurring
theme for poetry and aesthetics, and a philosophical and political problem to be worked
through in literary works” (5).11 Woolf, in short, was not alone in feeling that daily life
was punctuated—painfully and usefully, from her standpoint as a novelist—by
unexpected meaning. Woolf’s description lends itself as well to sexual modernity: to the
experience of finding one’s own previously ordinary way of being a person newly
observable and damning as a root cause for one’s actions (and a crime). Homosexual
desire became legible as one such pattern buried beneath the cotton wool of ordinary life.
The revelation of a pattern hidden within the ordinary is a process implicated in
the exposure of queer subjects and the violence of a required, state-mandated legibility.
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Epstein’s “suddenly” belies a longer history of everyday life literature that includes the
nineteenth-century realist novel, European and American naturalism, and New England
regionalism, among other modes and moments. See Fleissner (2004) and Brown (2003) on
American naturalism and Fetterley and Pryce (2003) on regionalism.
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“Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality,” Michel
Foucault writes of the homosexual who “was now a species” (43). Sexuality by this
definition imprints itself upon the subject’s “total composition,” leaving no aspect of their
personhood untouched and unintelligible. Foucault’s account of the invention of the
homosexual species activates the most mundane and the least obviously erotic aspects of
life in the becoming specifiable of homosexuality. The ordinary is not separate from the
domain of sexuality but is, instead, the composition in which the modern sexual subject
(either hetero “or” homo) was invented and made visible, describable, and significant.
The secret “that always gave itself away,” in Foucault’s words, is not just written on the
body that seems wrong or strange or queer; it is embedded in the boring stuff of ordinary
life: in everyday spaces, objects, moments, non-events and minor gestures, which might
not seem queer at all. “Ordinary” threatens queerness with becoming an identity that is all
too discoverable: a pattern that is lived-in and predictable and static and within the state’s
capacity to regulate and manage.
The anti-foundationalist critique of sexuality with which queer theory defined
itself as a distinct field of inquiry involved the exploration of what Sedgwick called the
“unpredictably varied and acute implications and consequences” of the emergence of the
heterosexual/homosexual divide (Epistemology 9). Laying the groundwork for much
subsequent work in the field, Sedgwick argues that alongside the “process of sexual
specification or species-formation” that Foucault lays out in The History of Sexuality
Volume 1, “less stable and identity-bound understandings of sexual choice also persisted
and developed” (9). Queer sexualities defy the progress narrative of sexual specification
and persist in opposition to identity-bound arrangements of erotic desire, sexual object
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choice, and gender identity or expression. Sedgwick’s formulations demonstrate the
nascent field’s commitment to defining “queer” as something that resists precise and
lasting definitions and descriptions. The new category “queer” would not delimit an
identity but “name,” instead, in Judith Butler’s memory of the field’s beginning,
“something of the uncapturable or unpredictable trajectory of a sexual life” (Ahmed,
“Interview” 489).
Revisiting Warner’s influential argument in The Trouble with the Normal, it is
clear that this uncapturable sexual trajectory did not include or even allow for swerves
and curves toward and through the home, the couple form, domestic life, and feminized
labor. When I read The Trouble with Normal as an undergraduate student, I was struck by
Warner’s stinging assessment of “gay people now” (the late 1990s) as politically
inanimate: “very little seems to have the power to animate gay people now. They’re
home, making dinner for their boyfriends, and that’s as united as they’re going to get”
(63). Warner’s apparent disdain for this domestic activity troubled me, as did his
(accidental?) conflation of “gay people” with gay men or with those queers who might
have “boyfriends.” Were all the lesbians at home too, making dinner for their girlfriends?
What’s so bad about making dinner? Further study in queer theory allowed me to reframe
and more fully understand the scene that Warner evokes with “making dinner for their
boyfriends”: a scene in which the cozy gay couple, happy to seek a normal life akin to
heterosexual marriage (not yet legal across the U.S.), has replaced the militant public or
the radical coalition of the marginalized and stigmatized that Warner ties to Stonewall
and the subsequent two decades of queer protest in the streets, in which “a crowd could
materialize with a common will at almost no notice” (63). It is important to note that
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Warner’s depoliticized gay subject is a white and upwardly mobile one for whom the
realm of “politics” has shrunk, becoming narrowly focused on the goals attainable within
state frameworks, namely marriage and military service.12 Warner predicts the rise of
what Lisa Duggan defined a few years later as the new homonormativity: “a politics that
does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and
sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a
privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (“New
Homonormativity” 179). Homonormativity, a concept Duggan derives from Warner’s
“heteronormativity,” describes the trouble with home and dinner on a larger—and more
explicitly political—scale, with none of the messy granularity of everyday existence for
particular queer people doing some version of life at home. Dinner at home and
“domesticity” exist on different scales as objects of study and desire; however, the most
mundane desire for the former (let’s make dinner) can be taken as an expression of a
homonormative desire for the latter (let’s be good neoliberal subjects). Warner dismisses
“making dinner” as if it were only an abstraction and a dominant institution and not, in
addition to this, an irreducibly particular and local act of maintenance or just getting on
with life. Somebody has to make dinner.
Warner presents gay men who cook or do domestic labor as symptoms of a
flagging public culture of gay sex and militant protest. But are they also lesbian
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Warner is justified in doubting that “gay people” who “prefer to stay home” have much
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see Ferguson (2019).
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feminists? Reimagining and redistributing cooking, among other household tasks, was an
important part of the lesbian-feminist project of communal, cooperative living. Dinner, in
a lesbian-feminist framework, does not always mean a couple. I am interested in how to
read the absence of a feminist framework for the home and dinner in Warner’s now
historic scene of queer and ordinary—and, for Warner, the wrong kind of political—life.
How do we read this scene as something other than a failure of queer politics defined as
“public manifestation?” Can we understand it as a scene of survival, of privileged
survival? How do we reconcile queer theory’s important critiques of domesticity and
coupled life with the realities of people’s desires for those very same (normative but
flexible) structures? And what might this dinner scene tell us about the origins of queer
theory and its relationship to feminism as a politics of ordinary, personal life? I return to
these questions in the section titled “Origin Stories.”
IV. Ordinary Queerness
So far, I have argued that canonical yet corrective accounts of modernism’s
ordinary sideline sexuality and queerness in particular because they fail to recognize that
queerness might be hiding in plain sight in ordinary—and, quite often, domestic—scenes.
What Warner fails to find in his disturbing scene of gay men who cook is of a piece with
what these prior studies of modernism fail to find in ordinary writing: the potential of the
feminine or the feminized life to be queer. In this section, I contend that our accounts of
ordinary queerness, both political and aesthetic, must be informed by feminist lessons.
According to certain of queer theory’s origin stories, the ordinary is the concept and the
object of desire at which queer theory and feminism are imagined to part ways. The
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feminist theory of the 1980s and 90s out of which queer theory emerged reframed the
ordinary as a site of women’s structural oppression (in the home, in heterosexual
marriage, in the workplace), even as it recovered the “personal” as political and valuable.
The feminist ordinary is a resource for survival. Queer theory, to simplify things
somewhat, rejects the ordinary as the heteronormative “normal” and is concerned with
moving beyond it and its limitations for intimacy, conceived as private life: the couple
form, the home and its habits. This distinction, to be clear, is part of a history of queer
theory whose lessons and ethical ideals endure, even though our present moment differs
in myriad ways from the 1980s and 90s.
Many queer people now have access to an ordinary life.13 Although this access is
by no means universal, straightforward, or equitably distributed, it has reshaped queer
culture, queer politics, and queer academic work in significant—and, as often,
unsettling—ways. The difference that “queer” might make to politics and current social
movements is uncertain. Meanwhile, the ways in which queer theory is a field like many
others—with conventions, norms, and methods, a contested genealogy, a mostly white
male canon, an overreliance on Foucault—have become increasingly clear. Queers can
now buy mugs and doormats with the words “homo sweet homo” emblazoned on them.14
Same-sex couples can get married. Queer theory’s commitment to “gay people” as a
minoritized community has waned, at times usefully so, as white and middle-class queers
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The “queer-identified” store Otherwild, which sells or has sold such products, caters to those
who seek to cultivate a certain queer lifestyle that, depending on the products, has little to do with
(homo)sexuality.
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are being hailed as normal (good) citizens and precarity and crisis have become defining
features of existence on the planet.
To pursue the ordinary is to question what has value, what is generic and what is
specific. Whose experience of life has been abstracted into theory and can pass as
universal, whether implicitly or openly? The “ordinary” as a concept is often conflated
with “the particular.” The degree to which particularity matters to the study of the
ordinary varies—more precisely, what “particularity” means within this work is not a
given, nor is it uniform. Particularity might signal a reluctance to rely on broad,
explanatory structures such as “advanced capitalism” for descriptions of the ordinary
world as it can be felt.15 Or it might register an investment in recovering “minor figures”
in a cultural revolution carried out in daily life, who have been overlooked because they
are poor, Black, female, and queer.16
Paying attention to the ordinary is a political act. It is to think through the
relationship between the so-called personal or private (I wake up, I read the headlines, I
make breakfast, I feel something) and the space of public action, collectivity, and
appearance known as politics. That I can speak of making breakfast as a practice with a
certain amount of potential to reshape the way I think about the world owes much to
feminist theory and practice and the insights of a range of late-twentieth-century feminist
thinkers who insisted that women’s everyday-life experiences are necessary and valuable
as sources of knowledge about the world. Assembling “theory in the flesh” or theory
woven from “the fibers of experience”; what Gloria Anzaldúa describes as reading “from
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the place one’s feet are planted, the ground one stands on”—these are crucial women of
color feminist methods that take seriously the work of daily living and acknowledge that
the home as well as the street can be the sites of strategizing and consciousness-raising.17
My work in literary studies as a queer and feminist reader is inspired by these practices.
At the same time, I am wary of romanticizing ordinary life as an authentic or unmediated
window onto experience and marginalization—or as a realm of lived complexity and
messiness and truth that lies beyond the grasp of academic theory (and is an alternative to
theory). Feminist scholarship has taught us not to idealize the ordinary and yet to keep in
view its many real affordances for survival. Heeding these lessons, I am invested in and
ambivalent about the ordinary as a space of possibility and radical transformation, in
particular for queer people.
It is important to acknowledge all of the ways in which ideas about an “ordinary
life” can be entrenched in normativity and privilege, even violence; and that neoliberal
subjects, queer and not, “are engulfed by processes linking the reproduction of the
ordinary and the extermination of various life-forms and forms of life” (Ahuja 367).
What new concepts are required to make sense of this condition? Is this state of being
swallowed up the same as being complicit with the ordinary’s violence? How do we get
ourselves unengulfed? As the ordinary has become synonymous with crisis,
microaggressions, and perpetual (slow, even atemporal) violence, there has been a
widespread reckoning in critical, cultural studies with the limits of utopic thinking,
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optimism, agency, and strong forms of resistance.18 Being engulfed is not a problem we
can solve or a room we can exit. Among critics of the present, there has been a
recognition that small acts of maintenance matter: doing the ordinary is also where and
how we do life otherwise.
An ordinary life is something many queer people want, pursue, and struggle to
sustain—not because it’s problematic but because it’s out of reach, materially and
structurally. As media studies scholar Andre Cavalcante argues in his book Struggling for
Ordinary: Media and Transgender Belonging in Everyday Life (2018), the ordinary is an
object of desire for trans people and a mode of self-formation made available though
“quieter, less heroic, and less politically conspicuous forms of media use, which typically
go unnoticed by researchers” (8). Cavalcante’s study is focused on the ways in which
transgender people in the American Midwest interacted with media at the turn of the
twenty-first century, before the so-called tipping point of transgender representation, and
is addressed to what Cavalcante calls “lived queerness” (175). Specifying “lived
queerness” as the object of an ethnographic study that uses fieldwork and participant
interviews might seem redundant; Cavalcante is concerned with actual people and their
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I am thinking not only of scholarship here but also of poetry, especially Rankine’s poems in
Don’t Let Me Be Lonely (2004) and Citizen (2014), Corfman’s in My Daily Actions (2020), and
many others. In Cruel Optimism (2011), Berlant proposes that “the present moment increasingly
imposes itself on consciousness as a moment in extended crisis” (7). This thesis allows for an
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quasi-intentional acts of “maintenance.” Berlant’s attention to the maintenance work that now
defines the ordinary (or: what it means to have a life) embodies the recent turn away from
theories of everyday life that hinge on binaries of resistance/complicity and
production/consumption. De Certeau, for example, in a book addressed and dedicated “To the
ordinary man,” The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), describes the user or consumer of an
ordinary product as an innovative maker in their own right, forging “tactics” that are intentional
and “calculated.”
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lives. This concept names, however, not just Cavalcante’s object of study but also the gap
between queer lives and queer ideals: or, “how the principles of queer theory are enacted,
negotiated, undermined, and/or ignored within daily experiences” (175). Queer theory’s
principles reject or undermine the norms of romance, love, and partnership—meanwhile,
queers make nice dinners for their partners, write love letters, buy economy size, raise
children, are domestic.19
Cavalcante draws attention to the gap between queer theory and the messes queer
lives make of any thesis, theory, or principle. His work invites queer scholars to strive for
better descriptions of queer life than (homo)normative or not. What new descriptions
have emerged that value ordinary queerness? Cavalcante’s Struggling for Ordinary joins
a number of critical projects that are attuned to the complexity of ordinary life and
ordinary objects of study. By “complexity,” I mean the unpredictable, at times unsettling
relationship between an oppositional and transformative politics (queer politics), on the
one hand, and the work of doing the ordinary (lived queerness), on the other.
Approaching ordinary life as being complex in this way requires a renewed, uncertain
sense of how an antinormative theory might be useful to the work of living otherwise and
imagining other worlds. Recent projects in queer studies by Kadji Amin, Matt Brim, Ann
Cvetkovich, Annemarie Jagose, and Benjamin Kahan, among others, do not pursue
transgressive objects as political or ethical goods; instead, these projects probe the limits
of an attachment to transgression, in order to rethink figures, scenes, events, and feelings
(the minor pervert, the queer studies classroom that produces workers, the orgasm,
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depression) that have been cast aside for being politically suspect, minor, or useless.20 I
would argue that these projects in their own ways disrespect what Robyn Wiegman and
Elizabeth A. Wilson deem “the most respected critical attachment” in queer studies,
namely antinormativity (4).
Amin, in Disturbing Attachments (2017), makes the case for understanding this
convention of queer studies as an idealizing framework and “a romance of the
alternative,” which produces an exceptional queer subject of transgression, marginality,
and shared non-normativity. This ideal subject is produced at the expense of an account
of “complex personhood,” a term that names the muddled nature of the average and the
subversive. Amin borrows the concept “complex personhood” from sociologist Avery
Gordon, who insists that “life is complicated”—a “profound theoretical statement” (3).
Gordon’s point is that experiences of marginalization produce multifaceted subjects who
are neither simply “victims” nor “superhuman agents” of resistance or world-making (4).
Gordon’s claim is one that feminist standpoint theory also makes about the subjugated
standpoint or perspective “from below.” Donna Haraway, for example, argues for an
embrace of “partial perspective” and “situated knowledge” as a feminist approach to
scientific objectivity. Dorothy Smith, in a similar vein, argues for a feminist sociology
that “begins with people as subjects active in the same world as we are situated in as
bodies” (141), explicitly claiming women as knowledge-producers for whom a concrete
social position in the everyday world can be a method and a mode of sociological
observation. (Haraway notes that her insights about a situated knowledge came to her
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while walking her dogs.) A universal or transcendent standpoint is a dangerous fiction
when it presumes a certain identity and experience of the world; the partial standpoint
reckons with the fact that no perspective is total or free from the pull of ideology, even
though it might seem to promise “something quite extraordinary, that is, knowledge
potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination” (Haraway 585). I
tend to think that while this usable knowledge itself might be extraordinary (uncommon
as well as special), the orientation toward desiring and imagining such worlds is
thoroughly woven through the ordinary lives that people do.
Amin proposes that queer studies examine its impulse to idealize queer bonds and
objects of study, as in the field’s implicit faith that queer relations “are not only better,
more authentic, and more pleasurable; they also actualize real-life alternatives to existing
relations of oppression” (6). Amin reminds us that political and scholarly desires run
aground of “real-life” desires, sexual and otherwise. Queer desire is “entwined with
normativity,” Amin observes (10). Being entwined means being complicit with and also
being damaged by the pressure to be normal, to pursue a normal life. Amin’s
“deidealization,” a “scholarly mood” with which to reckon with queer damage and the
mess of being an ordinary person (who is also, in some way, queer), is enabling for my
project. How do we make queer theory accountable to ordinary life and to what Biddy
Martin called “the dilemmas of the average people that we also are?”21 Martin’s critique
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Both Amin and Cavalcante cite “Extraordinary Homosexuals and the Fear of Being Ordinary”
(1994), Martin’s early critique of radical queer potential. Martin worries about overstating the
power of norms to govern and produce our subjectivities and psyches via a “stripped-down”
Foucauldian framework (122). Although the normalization of sexuality is very real, Martin notes,
“neither the psyche nor the body are direct or simple effects of internalized norms” (123). Martin
is prescient about where queer theory is headed, predicting the very kernel of the antisocial thesis
in queer theory, as it was called: “the very demise of current forms of societalization,” Martin
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of radical queerness as a fantasy of social and psychic disruption—a “romantic
celebration” of transgression and the “demise” of sociality itself—highlights the gap
between queer principles and everyday lived experiences that renders what I earlier called
“extraordinary queerness” an unlivable way of being. This gap was not a new
phenomenon, unique to queer conceptions of world-making and desire; it was the crux of
many feminist debates about erotic desire, gender presentation, and sexual practice
waged during the so-called sex wars. In a paper given at the Barnard College Scholar and
Feminist IX conference in 1982 (known for being picketed by anti-pornography
feminists), Esther Newton and Shirley Walton conclude that feminist scholars “need to
know more about sex” in order to understand and theorize a liberated sexuality (250). In a
1981 conversation, “What We’re Rollin Around in Bed With,” Amber Hollibaugh and
Cherríe Moraga address the absence of a feminist discourse about “power in bed,” as they
explore their own experiences of butch/femme sexual roles. In “The Fem Question,”
another Barnard conference paper, Joan Nestle defends “fem” sexuality against the
feminist claim that “butch-fem” couples reproduce oppressive heterosexual dynamics,
drawing on her own experience as a fem woman and lesbian: “Living a butch-fem life
was not an intellectual exercise; it was not a set of theories” (232).
Cavalcante and Amin confront this gap between lived queerness and the
“intellectual exercise” of theorizing queerness as a condition of queer studies’ continued
existence as a field. Can queer studies survive the deidealization of its objects? And can it
support a deep concern with actual queer and trans lives, the disavowed subjects and

predicts, will be the outgrowth of an antinormative framework that obscures a number of issues
pertinent (in Martin’s view) to queer inquiry, including, notably, “concerns about children” (123).
See “The Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory” (2006).
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“unmanageable bodies” that for Martin lie at the core of queer inquiry as well as queer
sexualities? The most unmanageable queer bodies now are not extraordinary but rather
normal and actual bodies, the bodies that might be struggling for and toward a kind of
ordinary and for this reason might appear to be—to recall Warner’s dinner scene—
politically inanimate.22
A theory of ordinary queerness requires the insights and the frameworks of both
feminism and queer theory. Ordinary life is complex, which is to say that its relationship
to politics (survival) can’t be mapped out in advance. In Warner’s dinner scene, the space
once claimed for queer and women of color feminist conversation, strategy, and
survival—the kitchen—is presented as if it had never been politicized or problematized.23
The home and kitchen (where dinner is made) instead deactivate Warner’s implicitly
white and middle-class gay male subjects. Their domestic life connotes political failure
and the decline of sexual publics, small queer worlds in which the “kinds of intimacy that
bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property,
or to the nation” form and flourish (Berlant and Warner, “Sex in Public” 558). For two
decades after the Stonewall riot, Warner recalls, “A public could be mobilized for
electioneering, for partying, or for developing a wide-ranging response to a health crisis”
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Amin likewise suggests that, in our current moment, the “queer relations most likely to disturb
are those, like pederasty, that are at once marked as retrograde and presumed to be politically
useless, if not counterproductive” (Disturbing 29).
23
Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, founded by Audre Lorde, Barbara Smith, and others in
1980, attests to the importance of this space for women of color, whose work the press
exclusively published. Smith recalls, “We chose our name because the kitchen is the center of the
home, the place where women in particular work and communicate with each other. We also
wanted to convey the fact that we are a kitchen table, grass roots operation, begun and kept alive
by women who cannot rely on inheritances or other benefits of class privilege to do the work we
need to do” (“A Press of Our Own” 11).
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(63). These activist and social contexts laid the groundwork for a critique of neoliberal
public culture and its heteronormative genres for community and belonging; they were
transformative, if temporary, queer world-making projects that went far beyond (even as
they were at times deeply concerned with) conventional political aims like legal rights
and state recognition. “Sometimes the question of what queer theory teaches us about x,”
Lauren Berlant and Warner write, “is not about politics in the usual sense but about
personal survival” (“What Does Queer Theory Teach Us” 348). This is something that
queer theory shares with feminism “and other minority projects,” they observe.
Feminism, by virtue of its interest in the seemingly apolitical aspects of everyday life
(housework, for example), had already done much to unsettle and expand the domain of
politics as usual; and, as Jagose notes, “feminist scholarship had already initiated a
radically anti-foundationalist interrogation of the category of woman” as the subject of
feminist activism (“Feminism’s Queer Theory” 160).24 Although Berlant and Warner
gesture to the fact that feminism, like queer theory, is concerned with daily survival and
“knowledge central to living,” they seem to reject the possibility that desiring the
ordinary (or answering its “deceptive appeal,” perhaps with ambivalence or even fear)
can be aligned with queer survival. In response to Martin’s essay, “Extraordinary
Homosexuals and the Fear of Being Ordinary” (1994), Berlant and Warner do not address
the feminist ground for Martin’s worry that queer theory is propelled by “an enormous
fear of ordinariness or normalcy,” which allows for “superficial accounts of the complex
imbrication of sexuality with other aspects of social and psychic life” (123). Martin is
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See Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990) for the most prominent example of this.
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worried about queer theorists framing queerness in a way that stakes its fluidity on the
fixing of the feminine, women, and gender as “stagnant and ensnaring”—like a house one
has to get out of. Martin is worried about the doing of an “average” life becoming
untenable as a queer and feminist practice. Averageness, Berlant and Warner insist, “is
also normative.”
V. Origin Stories
At the risk of making a sweeping generalization about a huge and diverse field, I
will hazard that in order for queer theory to distinguish itself as a new area of inquiry that
was distinct from feminism, it construed the ordinary as the untransformed remainder of
the queer world-making project rather than as one of the spaces in which queer worldmaking happens, most especially for women and for those who stay at home. The stories
we tell about our fields of study matter.25 They inform the ways we read, the modes of
literacy we bring not just to texts and cultural scenes but also to peoples’ lived
experiences. One of the stories about queer theory is how feminism failed or was
inadequate to the task of sexual theory. In “Thinking Sex” (1984), Gayle Rubin argues
that there is an urgent need for sexual theory. According to Rubin, a strictly gender-based
analysis cannot account for certain forms of sexual oppression or discrimination and
hatred on the basis of a sexual preference, practice, or identity. Part of what Rubin is
suggesting is that mainstream feminism has been preoccupied with the oppression of
heterosexual women and lesbians. A need to “separate gender and sexuality analytically,”
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Roach (2019) writes eloquently about the need to imagine Black women’s erotic freedom in
excess of a particular “pattern in black feminist storytelling,” namely the valorization of
publicness (and the rejection of silence) as liberation. See also Hemmings, Why Stories Matter
(2011); and Wiegman, Object Lessons (2012).
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in order to clarify the latter as a discrete “vector of oppression”—not just for lesbian and
gay people but also, in Rubin’s thinking, for a host of other sexual minorities—emerges
in the essay’s call for a new theoretical project.26
Feminism “was” a politics of ordinary life, whereas queer theory would be a
politics of antinormative life. Because queer theory took root in the academy in part by
channeling the energies of queer liberation and AIDS activism, the field’s foundational
gestures and affects were profoundly oppositional. “Queer” became a powerful term
because of its roving applicability and its lack of definition, its territorial expansiveness
and its infidelity to origins. It became a concept-space that could, if needed, self-destruct
to clear the ground for some other term that might be better at accomplishing “queer”
aims or doing “queer” work.27 Early queer theorists wrote as if the meaning of “queer”
were up for grabs and needed to stay that way: “inextinguishable,” as Sedgwick put it, “a
continuing moment, movement, motive—recurring, eddying, troublant” (Tendencies xii).
In two decades, the word “queer” (formerly “strange,” then “homosexual”) had traveled
far beyond the homosexual/heterosexual binary, far beyond the territory of lesbian and
gay sexualities, gender non-normativity, and a coherent ethics and politics that centers the
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Butler (1994) cautions against a definition of queer theory that “depends upon—and enacts—a
restriction of the scope of feminist scholarship and action” to a gender-based analysis, and rejects
the allocation of sexuality to queer theory as its “proper object” (8). Butler pinpoints an emerging
origin story about queer theory as a corrective to the feminist concern with (binary) gender;
feminism is diminished as a single-issue framework, narrowly focused on identity and “sex” as
attribute rather than practice. This story about the field is damaging: it leaves out radical sex
feminism and elides the knowledge produced as Black, Third World, and women of color
feminisms—erasing the centrality of race, class, sexuality, and location to a gender-based
analysis.
27
See Butler (1993) for the argument that “queer” (the term) must be perpetually unsettled in its
meaning and its political utility, “yielding” to other terms if necessary.
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experience of sexual minorities.28 This was a good thing, as it meant that the foundational
white gay maleness of the field could be acknowledged and redressed; it meant
transnational approaches, a decentering of U.S. LGBTQ experiences and subjects, as well
as a heightened focus on Black queer sexualities and genders and sexuality itself as a
formation implicated in the history of transatlantic slavery.29 These particular
deployments of the word “queer” are distinct from the entrenched and institutionalized
field ethos I have been tracing via Rubin, Butler, Sedgwick, Warner and Berlant—a
primarily white queer canon. What remains of this tradition is a general, strong, and
validated (institutionally-supported) stance against the normal and the normative, which
is unevenly productive for queer projects and queer lives. As a stance against the normal
(and who isn’t against the normal, these days?), the word “queer” does some very
different work than it was asked to do—with such electric and specific urgency—in the
activist 80s and 90s. “Queer” connotes the genres of “good” or “it’s not natural” favored
by theory: good as in different, complicated, plural, otherwise, resistant. Ordinary, even
now, is not that kind of good.
Berlant and Warner clarify that they (and presumably other queer theorists) are
not afraid of the normal, as Martin’s essay might suggest: “What we have been arguing
here is that the space of sexual culture has become obnoxiously cramped from doing the
work of maintaining a normal metaculture” (“Sex in Public” 557). This essay was
published in 1998, the year that began with the conclusion of the Clinton-Lewinsky
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On the shifting priorities of queer theory, see “What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?”
(2005) and “Left of Queer” (2020).
29
Hortense Spillers’s work is foundational to this Black queer and trans studies genealogy,
especially “Mama’s Baby” and “Interstices.” See Snorton (2017) on the history of racialized
gender in the U.S.
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scandal by way of a no-sex declaration. Over the course of roughly three decades,
beginning in the year that Butler’s Gender Trouble and Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the
Closet were published (and I was born, 1990), the space of queer academic culture has
become a little bit cramped from doing the work of keeping up a radical, antinormative
stance. Radical, antinormative stances still legitimate queer work.30 Of course, in this
sense, there may be a fear of ordinariness or normalcy among those who are seeking to
gain a foothold in a scholarly conversation that is premised on the value of rejecting
ordinariness or normalcy. This dissertation reconciles what is presumed to be queer
theory’s past and predecessor as, in meaningful ways, its present challenge: reckoning
with the queer desire for an ordinary life. The ordinary, then, cannot be what queer theory
abandoned and thus what feminism does (or did, or failed to do). The ordinary binds
these fields together in a structure of ambivalent desire for a problematic object that will
always be more complicated than its normativity or its averageness suggests.
VI. On Wanting Form
Often within queer studies projects, ordinariness appears as something in and of
the past—the institutional past and not the queer historical past, importantly—the object
that queer theory left behind, dispensed with, or got over, as if to say, it’s not our
problem. Elizabeth Freeman, in an essay in the collection After Sex? On Writing Since
Queer Theory (2011), invokes “the embarrassing reappearance of the ordinary or the
over” as a chance to rediscover what “queer” scholarship is and does (“Still After” 32).
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Graduate students are advised, with good reason, to assume these stances. Here I am thinking
about a recent PMLA cluster, “Cultures of Argument” (2020), which raises the question: what
modes of argument and genres of intervention are available to and required of precarious and
early career academic workers?
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Contributors to this edited volume were invited to reflect on what about their work is not
queer. Freeman discusses her longstanding interest in the desire for form (and the
wedding form specifically, the subject of the 2002 book The Wedding Complex), and she
concludes that, although wanting form may not seem very queer, it is a “powerful” kind
of wanting whose results will often surprise us. Being surprised by how desire works and
less so by the object or the thing that somebody wants is, in a sense, what Freeman offers
as the framework for queer scholarship—a version that is more welcoming of ordinary
objects. Such work might not seem very queer if the desired thing is normative: a
wedding, for example. Freeman helpfully distinguishes between a hegemonic form that
renders people intelligible to the state and to themselves and a queer “pull” toward that
same form whose end results—a way of being in the world—are unpredictable.
Wanting form and wanting a marriage, Freeman implies, are not the same. In
other words, a person might build a queer, “non-normative” life and world with ordinary,
“banal materials” (“Still After” 29). Banal materials combine in ways that verge on queer
eroticism—a lesson for queer scholarship that might locate its queerness more in method
than in object or, as Freeman also puts it, “sex as technique, rather than topic” (32). I
can’t pretend to understand what “sex as technique” looks like in practice. As a
provocation, however, “sex as technique” signals the turn to questions of method and
scholarly affect then underway within the field; sex as technique also signals that queer
theory had greatly expanded its purview beyond the “topic” of sexuality, as I noted
above.31 The question Freeman asks, in essence, is: How do we keep queer theory’s work
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In the fall of 2013, a conference on queer method was held at the University of Pennsylvania,
with the aim of shifting conversations away from proper objects and toward the particular ways in
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surprising and yet recognizably queer? The answer is not to keep pursuing ever queerer
objects of study, expanding the field ad infinitum, but rather to study the pursuit—the
unpredictable ways of wanting and attaching and investing in things that might not seem
that queer according to prior and existing definitions of the concept, which is a tack my
dissertation follows. Allowing queerness to reside in techniques rather than in topics
might require, Freeman supposes, “the capacity to be surprised, not only by radical
transformations but also by the embarrassing reappearance of the ordinary or the over”
(32).
Although she invokes its reappearance (suggesting it had been there before),
Freeman recuperates the ordinary as a thing to be after rather than a thing to be; her
essay’s title is “Still After.” The ordinary is not something to reclaim or celebrate, it is
embarrassing. And yet, as Freeman suggests, the ordinary’s “reappearance” has the
potential to surprise us in a way that “radical transformations” do not, anymore. I admire
Freeman’s attention to desire as a force that bends queer lives, so often theorized as
formless and disruptive, toward the ordinary (order, stabilization, and coherency).32 And I
am compelled by her suggestion that “the ordinary” might be reimagined as a method and
an orientation to queer work in particular. But there is a problem and a desire in her
aligning of the ordinary with the unexpected and the unpredictable. The ordinary is, by
definition, something that we can expect, something defined by repetition. If it surprises
us and deviates, then it ceases to be ordinary.

which queer work is done; see Imagining Queer Methods (2019) and the special double issue of
WSG, “Queer Methods” (2016), both edited by Brim and Ghaziani.
32
For an early meditation on the fluidity, mobility, and instability of “queer,” see Epps, “The
Fetish of Fluidity” (2001).
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Queers are willing “to be warmed by the afterglow of the forgotten” and by the
“tail ends” of the moments they missed out on, Freeman posits, with reference to students
who were too young to experience the radical queer activism of the early 1990s (31).
That feeling of warmth “is something like” what Freeman means by “longing for form,
even…a form so ordinary that it has been discarded” (31). Longing here displaces the
most intensely ordinary forms from the lived present and locates them in the past as
cultural rubbish and/or treasures, less as habitable forms through which identities are
made and more as queer aesthetic objects that exude a certain warmth—like Bishop’s
proto-/crypto-dream-house. The queer aesthetic of an outdated thing that causes us to
cringe and at the same time warms our hearts is recognizable, even banal. These are the
things that Freeman says queers drag around as they catch up to being queer now in the
present. Banal, outdated bits of culture, which cannot be held accountable to present
political standards, might attract us insofar as they are close but not so close that we
confuse them for the forms we can inhabit without shame.
By consigning “the ordinary” to the past as something we long for, Freeman
assuages our anxieties about the ordinary as the defining state of queerness in the present
as something lived. As the way that many queers live now, ordinariness more urgently
connotes a state of failure and exhaustion, an abandoned world-making project; or, as
Maggie Nelson puts it in The Argonauts (2015), “the anxiety and despair so many queers
feel about the failure or incapacity of queerness to bring down civilization and its
institutions” (26). As the over and yet longed for, ordinariness can function as a distant,
non-determining site of investment and attachment (like O’Hara’s having a Coke), which
at worst occasions a blush. There is a difference, put in other words, between the ordinary
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as a cherished queer aesthetic (carrying notes of the outdated) and the ordinary as a mode
of actually doing queer life (cooking dinner for your girlfriend). The latter can be, in
theory, embarrassing and something to reject, because it runs away from queer ideals like
unpredictability, transgression, and the wild. If queers lead ordinary lives, then we are
more like everyone else than we would care to recognize. “The ordinary,” as Ben
Highmore writes, “brings with it one of the most optimistic but also most daunting
phrases from science fiction and horror: you are not alone” (5). Queers are not alone in
wanting or in feeling deeply troubled by an ordinary life.
VII. An Intimate Reception
“Intimate Reception: Reading Ordinary Queerness in American Women’s
Literature” became a dissertation about reading by necessity. It is a premise of this
project that the task of reading itself has long been tied to the pursuit or rather
construction of queer meaning as an oblique and specialized language that only the critic
can comprehend. Put in broader terms, the question how do we read for sexuality and
interpret queer desire? has been central to the project of defining reading itself, such that
the making of queer meaning and the performance of “good” reading are enmeshed in
twentieth-century literary history. We could point to Roland Barthes’s exposition of
reading in S/Z (1970) as one early and not often cited example of this convergence. To
probe the task of reading (a “form of work,” a “labor of language”), Barthes selects a
text, the novella Sarrasine (1830) by Balzac, in which a man desires “a castrato (or a boy
in drag)” (10, 11, 165). “To read is to find meaning, and to find meanings is to name
them,” Barthes proposes in a preliminary section of the book (11). And yet to read this
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particular novella, Barthes claims in the analysis itself, is also to “see that writing is not
the communication of a message which starts from the author and proceeds to the reader”
(151). It is the nature of Sarrasine’s desire for Zambinella, the castrato, which Barthes
does not call “homosexual” or “homoerotic” or “queer,” that teaches us this. Queer
meaning needs the reader to speak it into being, Barthes is saying, even though, in his
own reading, Barthes does not “name” what he finds.
We can amend Barthes’s observation: “in the [queer] text, only the reader
speaks” (151, italics in original). The reader “speaks” that which the author (and
sometimes the critic) leaves unspoken. The texts I take up in this project do not make
queer meaning a secret or a silence to be spoken. As a result, they reconfigure and disturb
the close relationship between the text and the reader that is solidified by secrecy. This
relationship, as Barthes’s work illustrates, is affectively charged: a site for attachment,
identification, and readerly pleasure—or its opposite. Chapter Two, for example,
proposes that Stein’s explicit portrait of “gay” women activates not ardent decoders of
repressed or hidden meaning (there isn’t much of that to speak of) but rather ordinary
readers, who may be bored by Stein’s explicitness and unmoved by her directness. They
were gay? There is no excess, no concealment, no discovery, only Stein’s insistence on
“gay women” having been “there.” Where’s the readerly pleasure in that? My method of
distant, intimate reading (explored throughout but named explicitly as such in Chapter
One) addresses the loss of this affectively charged connection as it attends to the
affordances of reading with and through affective detachment, critical boredom, and nonastonishment.
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One of the things this project has taught me is that reading with a sense of love
(for an author, a text, or a character) isn’t the only way, or even a reliably productive
way, to do queer reading. Yet I have chosen to make my intellectual home in queer
literary studies because of the ways in which attachments of all sorts are taken seriously,
not just with skepticism, and have the capacity to be sincere. To be guided by the ardor of
our attachments: is that queer reading? “Intimate Reception” is a queer literary project
that welcomes figures (authors and characters) who might not be queer enough for ardent
scholarly attachment; in other words, who might not stoke the guiding passions of queer
readers, for whom the heat of an attachment has more “righteousness” (queer rightness)
“than anything intelligibly or objectively ‘true’” (Berlant, Cruel Optimism 122).33 Jewett,
despite her Boston marriage, cuts the figure of a spinster. Bishop shrugged off a lesbian
identity and declined the label “woman poet.” Brooks was straight. Even Stein, the lone
queer icon, cultivated that most vexing of queer objects: a domestic, coupled life. Of
course, these writers have been figures of intense, affectively charged, and sometimes
queer critical attachments (and uncritical attachments—these are writers who garner
fans). It is ordinary to love these writers, not just within queer or otherwise niche cultural
corners but also within established academic fields and cultural circles. In this project, I
receive them on their own terms as my own (like any other critic’s) imaginative
constructions.34 I love them too, but my discovery was that love—a bond that’s structured
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In a chapter that is partly about the legacy of Sedgwick’s thought, Berlant is describing the kind
of attachment that Sedgwick’s work enables and models. See Cruel Optimism, Chapter Four.
34
I am not seeking to revive the long-dead Author (the sole creator of the text) but rather to
recognize that critics deploy their own (queer) versions of authors precisely as unstable
constructions. See Quinn (2007) for a discussion of the reception of Jane Austen and the
persistence of what Quinn calls “fantasies of authorship” in literary studies post-the death of the
author.
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by repetition, returning to objects in order to tell the story of love again and again—does
not enable better reading. There is nothing “mere” or “simple” about the love one has for
one’s objects. Yet reading with love is not the only way to forge a critical intimacy.
While reading the texts I chose for this project (partly because of my love for
them), a readerly ardency felt out of step with ordinary queerness, or with an ordinary
affect, rhythm, pattern, thing (poetic object), or mode of being specific. This project
therefore seeks to greet these queer aesthetic forms with what I call an “intimate
reception” rather than love or opposition. Hospitality, defined as “the friendly and
generous reception and entertainment of guests, visitors, or strangers,” is an accurate
description of my reading method throughout. This reading method is not uncritical; it is
attuned to texts whose queer aesthetic resources exceed the critical framework of resistant
or complicit, politically radical or quietest. Although an audience of one, I am inspired by
the tradition of feminist audience and reception studies, with its attention to the ways that
women interact with media and devalued forms especially, like the soap opera and the
romance, in the course of everyday life.35 My method offers an alternative to critique (or
“oppositional reading”) as well as an option to the side of ardent attachment of the sort
that many queer critics attribute to Sedgwick, whose work I owe a tremendous debt.36

35

Radway’s Reading the Romance (1984) is a commonly cited beginning for this field. The first
“feminist audience study,” concerned with female listeners of daytime radio soap operas, was
conducted by Herta Herzog in 1941. See Cavalcante, et. al. (2017) for a discussion of this
tradition in the context of the contemporary interest in everyday life.
36
See, especially, Sedgwick’s description of “becoming a perverse reader” in “Queer and Now,”
in Tendencies, pages 3-4. Resistant reading has been vital to queer scholarship and queer culture.
Within reception studies more broadly, readers/viewers are understood to engage in “oppositional
reading” through the process of “decoding” hegemonic or dominant content. See Stuart Hall,
“Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse” (1973).

45

“Reception histories” composed of scholarly work and personal records (letters,
biographies, and remembrances) are crucial to an intimate reception in this project. Each
chapter seeks to be in dialogue with past readers’ attachments to authors: critics’ own
“versions” of them, in short. These critics’ fantasies and dreams—of knowing an author
or a character keenly, so much so that we imagine them to speak a character’s longing, as
Barthes would have it, or befriend them, or even become them in a way—are not distinct
from proper scholarship or literary history but rather, as I argue, are constitutive of it. A
“close” connection of reader to text has been essential to queer reading, a means of
touching the queer past by way of fictional and poetic or nonfictional representations. My
readerly intimacy, however, is conditioned by the distance (hermeneutic, temporal, and
affective) that inevitably separates queer readers from the figures we desire in a text:
these figures are “perfect” but “impossible,” to borrow Bishop’s language, not in the
sense that they are undamaged but that they appear to meet our desires. Jewett’s story,
“The Queen’s Twin” (1899), which I take up in Chapter One, is about a woman’s
intimacy with a perfect, impossible figure. Abby Martin believes the Queen of England to
be her distant “twin.” Abby’s relationship with the Queen, who is objectively not her
twin, sustains her daily, domestic life; she lives by virtue of this attachment. Her fantasy
version of the Queen is, in a word, enough for Abby. She is happy living without her and
yet for her, as we observe when Abby cooks dinner for the Queen. Hospitality is central
to the woman-centered worlds of Jewett’s regionalist fiction. Distant friends drop in for
visits after several years away. Abby’s Queen does not show up, although she sets the
table for her. The ordinary and queer figures that I pursue throughout these chapters are
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akin to Abby’s Queen. I share in Abby’s faith that hospitality matters, even for an
impossible guest.
VIII. Chapter Overview
The so-called couple form recurs throughout these chapters, which makes sense:
the trouble with the ordinary is in many ways the trouble with the hetero- and now the
homonormative private, domestic, married couple. However, none of the couples in these
chapters fits that form: a widow’s twin-ship with the Queen of England, in Jewett’s “The
Queen’s Twin”; a married woman’s queer enough orientation to domestic spaces and
patterns in Brooks’s Maud Martha (1953); and Bishop’s close epistolary friendship with
the poet Robert Lowell. Queer “coupled” intimacy takes many forms beyond the married
pair, two people living together or sharing a home, and even two queer people.
Chapter One takes on the problem of connecting to and proving the existence of
the queer past in the absence of identities and erotic or sexual acts. I begin with Sarah
Orne Jewett, whose biography and woman-centered regionalist fiction have been crucial
sites for charting the transition from a nineteenth-century model of female friendship to a
twentieth-century model of homosexual identity. Her stories lack the “sex,” capaciously
defined, that prove queer bonds. Jewett’s “The Queen’s Twin” is a limit case for
recognizing queerness without longing, sex, or stigma—in the guise of a conventional yet
surprising woman’s life. In Chapter Two, I turn my attention more explicitly to reading
and the prominence of decoding as a reading practice aligned with the exposure of queer
desire. By revisiting Gertrude Stein’s reception and her early portrait, “Miss Furr and
Miss Skeene,” this chapter argues that queer meaning in Stein’s work is often explicit. I
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trace Stein’s critical reception from the mid-twentieth century forward, covering three
phases of criticism: biographical, feminist, and postmodern or poststructuralist. Stein’s
reception contains a paradox that is particular to her writing yet indicative of the broader
movement away from reading an author’s work through the lens of their identity that was
encouraged by the New Critics: even in texts where sexuality is unmistakably present,
once the language has been decoded, the meaning of the text remains unstable and
provisional. This interpretive problem distances queer meaning from the mode of being
explicit that, I argue, Stein pursued in much of her writing and her portrait of two women
who are “regularly gay,” most especially.
Chapter Three pairs two of Gwendolyn Brooks’s early, Black woman-centered
texts, Annie Allen (1949) and Maud Martha, in order to theorize a “queer enough”
investment in the ordinary spaces, routines, and objects that enable Brooks’s heroines to
flourish in anti-Black worlds. This chapter argues that desires for the “normative,”
including ideals of womanhood and marriage (and femininity), can result in queer
attachments. Like the queerness of the Queen’s Twin that I explore in Chapter One, the
queerness of Brooks’s women characters does not extend from sexual identity or “sex”
but rather from ordinary living: quiet, domestic, interior life. Chapter Four concludes the
project with a reading of Elizabeth Bishop’s poems and a reconsideration of her
friendship with the poet Robert Lowell. By turning to Bishop’s distant intimacy with
Lowell, this chapter argues, we can more fully understand Bishop’s descriptive
“accuracy” as a queer poetic mode. I connect what Bishop called her “passion for
accuracy” to her perceived reluctance to depict queer sexuality in her poems, and I
conclude that Bishop’s practice as a poet of observation and description is bound up with
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her concern for things that do not want to be seen: a crypto-dream-house, a fleeing
animal, and a vague lesbian lover. Queer and ordinary figures, as these chapters aim to
demonstrate, have not been easy to locate in a literary landscape that demands their
legibility as a disruptive—significant—force. My project turns toward these figures, sets
the table, and welcomes them in.
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Chapter One
Dinner for No One: Sarah Orne Jewett and the Intimacy of Distance
In the absence of identities and erotic or sexual acts, what serves as evidence for
queerness? What is queerness, put another way, without these telling signs? What
distinguishes an ordinary queerness in particular from convention, domesticity, and
feminine expectation? This chapter looks to Sarah Orne Jewett’s work in order to answer
these questions—and to propose that, in some cases, nothing separates the maintenance
of an ordinary life from the experience of queer relationality or intimacy. Jewett is a key
figure in the queer and lesbian past: critics have framed her life and work as emblematic
of the transition from a nineteenth-century model of female friendship to a twentiethcentury model of homosexual identity.37 Readers understand her fiction to depict not just
a “female world of love and ritual,” which was appropriate to and compatible with a
heterosexual life, but also (and in more recent scholarship) a transgressive space of errant
and specifically queer attachments that precedes the codification of sexuality as binary,
either hetero or homo.38 Jewett’s work has been a foothold for narrating this transition
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Jewett’s friendship with Willa Cather especially emblematizes this transition. Herring (2006)
claims that Cather, in her writing of male same-sex relationships, refuses “the historical shift from
passionate same-sex friendship to discernible homosexual (or, for that matter, heterosexual)
identity,” thus preserving the presumed illegibility of the former, prior to the homosexual’s
invention (70). Love (2007) finds that critics “overstate the nature of this historical break” when
they conceptualize the difference (between nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of female
same-sex relationships) “exclusively through the question of sexuality” (Feeling Backward 92).
38
In a widely cited essay, “The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in
Nineteenth-Century America” (1975), Caroll Smith-Rosenberg argues that the “tendency to view
human love and sexuality within a dichotomized universe of deviance and normality, genitality
and platonic love, is alien to the emotions and attitudes of the nineteenth century and
fundamentally distorts the nature of these women’s emotional interaction” (8). Smith-Rosenberg
examines, among other archival documents, the letters women exchanged with intimate female
friends, and she concludes that these relationships were not thought of as deviant but were instead
“considered…both socially acceptable and fully compatible with heterosexual marriage” (8).
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and recovering queer potential in the American nineteenth century, even though her
stories are never about the “sex” that spinsters were having. “Sex is absent from her
pages,” in the words of Richard Cary (“Literary Rubrics” 205).39 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in Jewett’s Dunnet Landing story “The Queen’s Twin” (1899), which I
examine in this chapter.40
“The Queen’s Twin” centers on a widowed woman, Abby Martin, and her “twin,”
the Queen of England, who do not have sex or live together or even know each other. I
argue that this story evades the dominant axes for identifying queerness in the past: erotic
attachments (and sexual acts) and shared identities or affinities. This dichotomy (acts,
identities), through which the discursive invention of the modern homosexual is often

Smith-Rosenberg dismisses the question of sex (i.e. did they or didn’t they) as a non-essential
question, although not for lack of evidence that points to either answer. It is rather that, as SmithRosenberg puts it, “a post-Freudian cultural perspective,” which would dictate classifying
women’s intense and quite possibly erotic friendships as either hetero- or homosexual in nature,
cannot do justice to the “complexities” of nineteenth-century relationships (7). Many early
feminist readings of Jewett’s work refer to Smith-Rosenberg’s essay and describe the worlds of
Jewett’s texts as female worlds of love and ritual, unmarred by twentieth-century or “postFreudian” dichotomies of deviance and normalcy; for example, Hobbs (1984) and Sherman
(1989), although many more could be listed. This mode of historicism unwittingly (or wittingly)
denies to nineteenth-century women (placed “in a particular historical context,” as SmithRosenberg puts it) a desire that can be at once complex, even illegible, and clear, quite
unambiguous: a desire to have sex with women.
39
Cary’s observation, in an essay from the early 1980s, is not uncommon in the scholarship that
predates or is uninfluenced by the rise of feminist analysis (and, importantly, by Foucault’s
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1). The absence of sex in Jewett’s fiction, in this early, biographical
scholarship, confirmed a corresponding absence in the author’s intimate life, as it confirmed a
style of writing based on faithful observation of Maine places, people, and culture (Jewett’s
regionalist métier).
40
According to Bell’s note in Novels and Stories, Jewett never added “The Queen’s Twin”
(published first in the Atlantic in February, 1899) to the 21 stories she originally selected for The
Country of the Pointed Firs (1896), all of them set in Dunnet Landing. Jewett revised “The
Queen’s Twin” for inclusion in another collection of stories, The Queen’s Twin and Other Tales,
also published in 1899. The text included in Novels and Stories, cited in-text throughout this
chapter as “Queen’s Twin,” is that of the book edition. See also Homestead (2016) for the role
that Willa Cather played as editor of Jewett’s Best Stories (1925), in which “The Queen’s Twin,”
“A Dunnet Sheperdess,” and “William’s Wedding” are “interpolated” into Pointed Firs (64).

51

understood, is too blunt for Jewett’s work, which does not represent the emergence of a
coherent lesbian subject or depict what “sex” looked like before it could prove a lesbian
subject.41 In this chapter, I use the word “sex” broadly to mean not just erotic and sexual
acts that we can recognize as “sex” but also a range of erotic desires and orientations to
the world that might not look like sexualities or sexual subjectivities. Critics like Cary,
approaching Jewett’s work without queer studies frameworks, understood “sex” to mean
heterosexual passion (within the marriage plot). For Jewett’s more recent critics, by
contrast, reading with queer studies frameworks, “sex” exceeds not just the marriage plot
but also modern lesbianism. As I argue in this chapter, it would be overstating the case to
claim that “sex” (broadly defined) is wholly absent from “The Queen’s Twin.” Abby
Martin’s distant attachment, however, is not a sexual bond. Nor does it seem to have or
depend upon the potential to become a sexual bond. The queerness of twin-ship thus lies
elsewhere than in sexual desire or erotic queer potential. Jewett’s “The Queen’s Twin” is
a limit case for recognizing queerness without sex, longing, or stigma. Abby Martin is a
decently happy person who does housework and receives a visit from friends (the plot of
the story is a visit). This, quotidian existence, is the site of her connection to her distant,
intimate twin.
Abby Martin, this chapter argues, is a different kind of queer historical subject
who persists in being for someone even without sex or the presence of her beloved. She

41

See Foucault (1978), especially page 43, which aligns the pre-nineteenth-century “sodomite”
with “a category of forbidden acts” and the homosexual, by contrast, with a deviant
“morphology.” Halperin (1998) argues that the construction of distinct erotic identities predates
the emergence of Foucault’s “nineteenth-century homosexual.” According to Duggan (1993),
“the modern desiring subject emerged” during the period 1880-1920, with “the drawing of a line”
between “acceptable” same-sex relationships and deviant, therefore “intolerable” ones (791, 810).

52

thus appears to be an ordinary woman living alone, who is at most a Queen Victoria
fangirl, fantasist, and appropriator.42 I take issue with the readers who frame Abby in this
way, as someone possessed by the idea of being connected to a queen, a famous person
with an extraordinary life unlike her own. It isn’t celebrity that Abby wants, nor an
escape from humdrum life in rural Dunnet Landing, Maine. She wants her ordinary life to
be the site of a profound and, strictly speaking, impossible connection, what I describe as
distant intimacy. Her life becomes a correspondence or a way of being the same (with
someone irreducibly different), such that every mundane action is addressed to her
beloved. Abby Martin’s “lover’s discourse” is not written but rather enacted in her
housework, her everyday life. Instead of writing letters to the Queen, she cooks her
dinner. Of course, the Queen does not turn up to eat it—a letter placed into its envelope
but never actually sent: “This morning, I must get off an ‘important’ letter right away—
one on which the success of a certain undertaking depends; but instead I write a love
letter—which I do not send” (A Lover’s Discourse 23, italics in original). In this
fragment, Barthes’s lover is swayed from normal life and writes a love letter instead of
tending to his important business. This is how Abby lives all of the time, in the space of
Barthes’s “instead.” Instead of leading a normal life, she lives in twin-ship with the
Queen and she persists in living this way without the eros of proximity, the security of
affirmation, or the solace of belonging. The queer love letter-writer does not send their
letter, according to Barthes, which suggests that this—the unsent, unreturnable gesture of
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See Brown, “Regional Artifacts” (2002), for a reading of Abby Martin as an appropriator of the
Queen’s experience.
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love—is a condition of queer life. We cannot know if our beloveds are the people we
think they are. And this for Abby is the foundation of her distant, intimate twin-ship.
Rather than friends who correspond by writing letters (like Elizabeth Bishop and
Robert Lowell, to whom I turn in Chapter Four), Abby Martin and Queen Victoria are
strangers who have never met and cannot physically touch. Yet Abby feels that they are
the same, and she feels closer to the Queen than to her Dunnet Landing neighbors.
Abby’s twin-ship offers an intimacy that her own mostly female world of love and
friendship cannot. In this chapter, distant intimacy is both an object of study (Abby’s
twin-ship) and a method for approaching Jewett’s writing and her critical reception. As a
distant, intimate reader of Jewett’s writing and scholarly archive, I am in conversation
with not only recent, revisionist readings but also older, unreliable, and even inaccurate
scholarship: F. O. Matthiessen’s “critical biography” of Jewett, his distant relative, which
poaches details from Jewett’s fictional writing, and Annie Fields’s edited collection of
her partner’s correspondence, which leaves out the women’s nicknames for each other,
among other things, altering letters without the proper documentation we might expect. I
turn back to these dubious sources not to catch them in their errors, thus proving that now
we know things better, but rather to take them on their terms as intimate records—not just
of Jewett’s life and work but of the relationships that Fields and Matthiessen respectively
forged with Jewett. Matthiessen’s study, notably, has been termed an origin point for gay
and lesbian studies, whereas Fields’s book has been either forgotten or dismissed. Their
versions of Jewett are subjective, incomplete, and full of errors. In the context of queer
history, where love and damage are enmeshed, these works are accurate to the extent that
their creators’ passion allowed.
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Jewett’s “The Queen’s Twin” is a parable of queer and distant intimacy and queer
historical inquiry, the task and sometimes-fantasy of contact across time. My reading of
Jewett’s story works both with and against what Carolyn Dinshaw calls a “queer
historical impulse” to make contact across time, an orientation to the project of queer
history as touch that uses the messy indeterminacies of “sex” as wrinkles in time, as what
allows for disparate subjects and communities to meet (1). Yet Abby Martin cannot touch
the person to whom she feels the closest, let alone have sex with her. Queerness
manifests most powerfully for Abby not as sex, defined capaciously, but instead as
making dinner—setting the table for her twin. Abby’s twin-ship models a distant,
intimate bond of reader to text, one structured less by recognition than by open,
impossible questions. How do we know that Abby is queer? This is a bit like Abby
asking, how do I know if Queen Victoria knows that she is my twin? How can this
distant, absent stranger possibly know what Abby knows? Queer readers have more in
common with Abby Martin than we would care to admit.
Queer studies offers literary critics a number of methods—modes of attachment,
identification, and what Heather Love has called “invested practices” of reading and
reception—for approaching distant figures, writers, characters, and texts across the gulf
of sexual modernity and, in Jewett’s case, the emergence of a lesbian identity (Feeling
Backward 88).43 Dinshaw, in Getting Medieval (1999), follows a “queer historical
impulse” to forge connections between “incommensurate” subjects, texts, communities,
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For example: Nealon’s (2001) “hermeneutic friend,” a reader of pre-Stonewall texts by lesbian
and gay writers; Freeman’s embodied “erotohistoriography” (2010) and “sense methods” (2019);
and Coviello’s (2013) non-anticipatory approach to nineteenth-century modes of queer, erotic
being.
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and cultures, which are nonetheless united by a shared nonnormativity and sometimes
marginality. “Touching” figures the process by which “we in the postmodern era in the
West—indeterminate, contradictory, and slippery as we are—can make relations with
those discourses, people, places, and things in their very indeterminateness” (11, italics in
original). The indeterminacy of “sex” allows disparate historical entities to touch and,
more importantly, allows for distant figures who were queer “back then” to join or
trouble the present queer community, supporting or disturbing current notions of the
“queer.” Just as belonging in the context of queer spaces and communities is endlessly in
flux, queer histories work on the condition that we cannot know what “sex” is, was, and
might have been for people in another time and place—save for messy, indeterminate,
and plural in its meaning.
We don’t have to know what people did or even what they called themselves in
order to feel a sense of close, but still uncertain connection with them. Dinshaw’s queer
historical touch is good for reckoning with the messiness of any attempt to know the
queers “back then” whose ways elude us even as they seem to beckon us, to be some
version of our kind. This method enables the reader to form their own community of the
outcast, weird, or sad that can provide a space apart from or against the norms of queer
community now. Love’s Feeling Backward (2007), in something of that spirit, works
against the model of “touching on the past” that Dinshaw offers in order to foreground
figures and texts that are resistant to the critic’s desire to find them, love them, or fix
them. “Untouchability runs deep in queer experience,” Love writes (40). Love notes that
Dinshaw fails to question what might happen when queer figures do not meet the
historian’s touch: “At stake in this omission may be not only the desire of the queer
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historian for a response from the past but also a tendency to read the queerness of queer
desire as excess rather than lack” (40).
What happens when readers try to touch the queerness of Jewett’s fictional
worlds, as well as the social world in which she lived and made relations with others?
Jewett formed an intimate friendship with the widowed Annie Fields, befriended and
counselled a young Willa Cather, wrote breathless letters to Vernon Lee, and left a body
of work preoccupied with women’s everyday lives.44 Jewett’s earliest readers note the
absence of plot and sexual passion—a lack perceived in Jewett’s life is thus reflected in
her stories. As Cather remembers, Jewett “once laughingly told me that her head was full
of dear old houses and dear old women, and that when an old house and an old woman
came together in her brain with a click, she knew that a story was under way” (Jewett,
Best Stories xvi). Jewett’s queer past is full of niceties and knickknacks: women and
houses. From a perspective that defines the queerness of queer desire as excess, or that
which exceeds and offers an escape from ordinary life, Jewett’s odd couples (women and
houses) are not legible as queer. To be clear, I am not arguing that Abby Martin (or
Jewett, for that matter) has a relationship with her house, but rather that this traditional
space of feminized knowledge, work, and intimacy enables a relationship that life in
lonely Dunnet Landing, Maine, cannot afford: a bond within which Abby Martin lives by
virtue of another and feels that she and the Queen are the same. Abby’s bond is
irreducible to queer erotic desire or to nineteenth-century “sex,” but not devoid of it
entirely.
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For Jewett’s letters to Lee, see Letters (1967), edited by Cary.
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For some critics of nineteenth-century sexuality and intimate life, to come before
is to exceed, not just the definitional frameworks of a particular moment in time but also
our own conceptual frameworks, through which we think back and describe what we are
seeking and/or find. This way of thinking about the past produces extraordinary subjects
who live in excess of their moment and in excess of the terms and categories that were
emerging to describe them. While Abby is not a proto-lesbian, whose twin-ship with the
Queen anticipates this new identity form and category of person, neither is she an
extravagant queer who lives against the grain of what is normal in her world. Jewett’s
reception is a study in the approach to reading absence, first as a flaw or fault in her
writing and later as proof that her Maine regions, lonely and backward, had always been
queer: lacking in men, unstructured by marriage plots and straight, historical time. To put
this differently, what looked like simple lack to early readers (no one gets married, no
one feels passion), now strikes some readers as a space in which extravagant queer
relations can take shape—but not between women. In Jewett’s The Country of the
Pointed Firs (1896), Peter Coviello argues, there are queerer things afoot than “modern”
homosexual deviance.45 To look for “sex” in the nineteenth century, as Coviello suggests
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Coviello frames his reading of Jewett’s Pointed Firs in opposition to Love’s analysis (2009) of
Jewett’s “spinster aesthetics.” Love revisits Jewett’s writing as essentially concerned with “the
experience of a category of person deemed unwanted,” namely solitary women, and therefore
with “the feelings of loss, disappointment, and longing that are internal to female worlds” (313,
italics in original). For Coviello, “Jewett’s imagined world” of Dunnet Landing, Maine, is not
defined by women’s “pain” so much as a “looseness that sponsors the gathering of passion into
unexpected forms” (89). Coviello’s critical framework paradoxically occludes a set of affects at
the core of feminist, lesbian, and (some) queer histories: those a woman “deemed unwanted”
might experience or care about. Coviello is hardly alone in his attention to the non-human and/or
object worlds in Jewett’s work: see Brown, A Sense of Things and “Regional Artifacts”; and
Kuiken, “Idiorrhythmic Regionality,” the latter of which examines “other-than-human material
relics” (specifically, the shell heap) as what structures “spinsterly” life in Pointed Firs for “Poor
Joanna.”
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in his book Tomorrow’s Parties: Sex and the Untimely in Nineteenth-Century America
(2013), “is to see something of the shape sex could take—errant, unlikely, not always
legible as sex—before it quite became the sexuality we now know, or think we know”
(10, italics in original). Crucially, it is not to see sex practices per se (sex acts are not
Coviello’s objects of study) but is to see, instead, styles of erotic being not yet captured
by the terms of modern homo-/heterosexual definition: improvisations and inventions, as
yet nameless shapes for which there were and are no ready labels.
To reside in Jewett’s Country of the Pointed Firs, the “passionate world beneath
the marriage plot,” as Coviello puts it, is to live “in the errancies and extravagances of
attachment that the unjoining of affect from its overcoding by the marriage plot makes
possible” (93). Drawing on a Deleuzian conception of affect, Coviello seeks out
something even “queerer” by way of a turn to object-love, the loves of animals and
plants, than “anguished lesbian exclusion or consoling female homosociality,” a queerer
scene than women longing, women talking by the fire in the evening in their houses,
women lending some consoling form to lonely, rural existence (89). A queer attachment
and an ordinary, specifically feminine life are incommensurate in Coviello’s reading of
Pointed Firs. This antipathy between an ordinary female world and great (or any)
intimate passion structures much of Jewett’s reception, from the work of F. O.
Matthiessen in the early twentieth century through to the present—a constant thread.
Before I turn to Jewett’s “The Queen’s Twin,” I explore her early reception and
her intimate critical archive: Fields’s Letters, Matthiessen’s biography, and Cather’s
writing about Jewett. The twin-ship form in Jewett’s story, which connects and renders
intimate two very different women who are literally strangers, offers a model for what I
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am calling distant, intimate reading. This approach to reading Jewett’s correspondence
and her fiction is addressed to the specific interpretive problem posed by ordinary
queerness: or the passion of an ordinary woman, widow, or spinster, one whose life might
seem allergic to extravagance and excess.
“The events are almost too simple to recount,” Matthiessen wrote of Jewett’s
stories in The Country of the Pointed Firs, “for they are ordinary life in a Maine coast
settlement of the last century” (101). Passion without plot—a heterosexual romance
plot—was inconceivable to Jewett’s earliest readers, who took the author at her word
when she professed her inability to write dramatic action. “I could write you entertaining
letters perhaps, from some desirable house where I was in most charming company,”
Jewett wrote to Horace Scudder, evoking a scenario of women making visits that appears
with striking frequency throughout her stories and novels, “but I couldn’t make a story
about it” (Letters 1967, 29). Feminist readers would look critically upon this selfdescription and contest the version of Jewett who could not depict in fiction what she had
not known herself. By way of at times divergent frameworks, feminist readers thus
recovered in those plots deemed slight or “simple,” scant of young, productive men,
intense and structured and dynamic bonds between the women characters. Feminist work
recovered passion between women as a central Jewett theme and one integral to the
regionalist genre overall.46

46

Fetterley and Pryse (2003) define American regionalism as a women’s literary tradition, whose
“minor” status stems not only from its being woman-made but also from its opposition to
conventions of post-Civil War American literature keyed to national reunification. Amy Kaplan’s
(1991) critical take on regionalist fiction as a mode of “literary tourism” has been especially
influential. “The regions painted with ‘local color,’” Kaplan claims, “are traversed by the
forgotten history of racial conflict with prior regional inhabitants, and are ultimately produced
and engulfed by the centralized capitalist economy that generates the desire for retreat” (256).
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It is not easy to “just read,” as Sharon Marcus would have it, Fields’s Letters of
Sarah Orne Jewett (1911); to read, in other words, without suspecting that some things
have been left out and need recovering.47 We know that Fields made silent changes to the
letters she included. Scholars have shown that Fields not only erred in sequencing the
letters, but also left out extant letters from the years 1877-1882, the period preceding and
including the start of her relationship with Jewett. And Fields redacted those she did
include, removing Jewett’s “intimate” nicknames for her (“Mouse,” “Fuff,” “Fuffy,” and
“Fuffatee”) on the advice of her editor Mark Anthony DeWolfe Howe. It is beyond this
chapter’s scope to analyze and piece together all of the content Fields omitted. It is my
modest aim, instead, to recognize that there is value in this flawed and “unreliable”
collection of Jewett’s letters, which has long been flagged by critics as a “tribute” without
scholarly value (Nagel 12). Fields’s editing results in what Josephine Donovan describes
as a “deliberate falsification” of her relationship with Jewett (109).48 By virtue of this

Seeking to sidestep this critique of regional fiction as complicit in the project of imperial
expansion and its corollary, an erasure of history, Fetterley and Pryse reclaim the region as “a site
of resistance to empire,” and they rename the cultural work of women’s regionalist fiction as
“critique” (235). Arguably, the word “critique” tells us little about the work of regionalist fiction;
what it alerts us to, instead, is a desire on the part of critics to reanimate a literary mode that has
been criticized for being hegemonic and subversive. Regionalist writing, Jewett’s included, has
been slighted, on the one hand, for demurral to convention (to grand narratives, to plots) and then
devalued, on the other, for submission to the dictates of the nation-making work of major (grand
and plotted) literature. My approach to Jewett’s writing skirts both rescue and debunking as
interpretive agendas.
47
See Marcus, Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England (2007).
Marcus rejects the notion that same-sex bonds are recoverable “only through symptomatic
reading” (3).
48
See Donovan’s essay, “The Unpublished Love Poems of Sarah Orne Jewett.” See also
Homestead (2015) and Fryer (1989) on Fields’s editing of Jewett’s letters. The first letter Fields
includes, dated 8 September, 1880, and addressed to “Mrs. Fields,” from Little Compton, Rhode
Island, is exemplary: “—This is not a land where it is easy to write letters. I can’t help being idle,
except in thought, and I think I never knew so quiet a country” (12). Heller’s transcription of the
original letter (www.sarahornejewett.org/soj/let/Corresp/1880.html) reveals that Jewett’s long
dash was, in fact, a Fields addition and a stand-in for the following: “I have been wishing to tell
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joint editorial decision, Donovan suggests, Fields’s Letters falsifies a lesbian bond and
fosters Jewett’s wrongful image “as a passionless ‘spinster’” (107). Omission, by this
logic, is defined as willed suppression of the needed, telling content. Donovan casts the
Fields collection as a text stripped of its passion. Passion, therefore, must lie elsewhere
than in what was deemed acceptable by Fields’s cautious (homophobic) editor. Whatever
appears in Fields’s Letters, Jewett’s warm and intimate gestures of concern and love for
Fields (one of which I will examine as a conclusion to this chapter), could not have been
too wrongly sensual, suggestive, or revealing. Howe must not have felt that Jewett’s
letters as published were objectionable, shameful, odd, or queer. The ordinariness of
queerness was illegible to him. And it remains, I am suggesting, quite illegible to us.
“If you read her letters,” Matthiessen protests in his 1929 biography of Jewett,
“…you are bothered by the too frequent use of the adjectives ‘little’ and ‘dear.’ A faint
odor of rose leaves emerges. You are reminded of her inability to portray passion in her
books…the fever of lust and the thirst of avarice never throb there” (145). Matthiessen,
who researched and wrote Sarah Orne Jewett in Maine over the course of a summer,
would have had access to Fields’s 1911 Letters but not, we can hypothesize, to Jewett’s
original letters.49 Finding wholesome, wearying sweetness in the letters Fields included,
Jewett’s letters serve as further proof that she could not “portray passion” in her fiction:
stories, as Matthiessen put it (echoing Nathaniel Hawthorne and his screed against the
mob of women writers), “scribbled down…out of what she knew” or was presumed to

you how much I like to think about the days I spent with you and how much I missed you after I
came away but this is not a land where it is easy to write letters” (italics added).
49
Matthiessen’s biography, Sarah Orne Jewett, is a loosely factual account of Jewett’s life
derived in part from her own fiction; it does not reveal its sources. As a work of scholarship, it
has consistently come in for criticism.
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have known (53). Matthiessen’s Jewett “knew” and portrayed what he calls “the gentler
emotions,” or what we might now call affection, love, and care detached from “fever” or
pathology, the wrongness and the shame of errant lesbian desire. Does his reaction to the
letters bolster Donovan’s claim that Fields’s edits stripped them of their passion? Or does
it attest to passion never having been there in the first place? Jewett’s passion, I propose,
far from being absent, was instead unrecognizable within Matthiessen’s terms: his fixed
dichotomy of gentleness, good manners, and the minor, on the one hand; intensity,
licentiousness, and the significant (or the opposite of “little”), on the other. The “odor” of
rose leaves, in this framework, signals Jewett’s stale propriety, her keeping to convention,
and her spinsterhood (a “passionless” and most certainly sexless state). A mere aroma
hangs in absence, in the place of what was lacking, quite explicitly, for Matthiessen:
lustful bodies. The handful of “lovers” in Jewett’s fiction, Matthiessen claims, “are
almost invariably wooden and silly,” doll-like, rigid, and unfeeling (145).
Willa Cather—who forbade the publication of her letters either in full or in part—
called Matthiessen’s biography “inadequate,” its author (“that young man”) “modern and
abrupt” (Letters of Willa Cather 502).50 Matthiessen “misinterprets so many of the facts
that he dug up,” Cather wrote, in a letter to Edward Wagenknecht (1934), a fellow “true
lover” of Jewett, that “[Jewett] herself never for a moment graces his pages. It seems to
me that even if I had never known her, I could have reconstructed her from her letters to
Mrs. Fields and her published works” (502, emphasis in original). In William E. Cain’s
more generous description, Sarah Orne Jewett “shows Matthiessen’s determination not to
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Cather specified this in her will. Prior to the selection published in 2013, only paraphrases of
her letters were available to readers.
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be ensnared by the folkways of professional scholarship” (51). This “labor of love and
affection for another kind of life,” in Cain’s words, Travis M. Foster has reframed as one
beginning point for lesbian and gay studies, arguing in “Matthiessen’s Public Privates:
Homosexual Expression and the Aesthetics of Sexual Inversion” (2006), not only that the
project “was profoundly tied” to Matthiessen’s relationship with his partner Russell
Cheney (who, incidentally, contributed the book’s illustrations, which Cather liked) but
also that it offered “an aesthetics from which ‘homosexuals’ can both speak and be
recognized” (249, 237).
Foster’s framing of the biography rests on a particular conception of lesbian and
gay studies as a mode of historical inquiry (in which a gay man renders legible a
woman’s sexuality), the goal of which is recognition and the making recognizable of
“homosexual content.” Matthiessen’s text does not foreclose understanding Jewett
through the lens of modern homosexuality, although neither, I would argue, does it
encourage or seem particularly invested in producing a version of “Jewett herself” who
is, as Foster argues, “recognizably, visibly homosexual” (256). Matthiessen records an
anecdote of unknown derivation in which John Greenleaf Whittier asks Jewett if she has
ever been in love: “‘Sarah, was thee ever in love?’ She answered, with a rush of color,
‘No! Whatever made you think that?’…she laughingly explained that she had more need
of a wife than a husband” (Matthiessen 72). In Foster’s reading of this passage, Jewett’s
blush becomes a moment “of homosexuality” on which Matthiessen’s text is silent or
non-interpretive; in this moment, Jewett’s fiction speaks (or doesn’t speak) for itself.
Matthiessen’s inclusion of this “possibly fictional anecdote” without comment or
analysis, in my view, does not render Jewett recognizable so much as it invites and opens
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space for acts of reading and re-reading Jewett’s complex, blushing performance of
identifying with (and as) a person in “need of a wife.” A person who “had more need of a
wife than a husband” in the later nineteenth century, in short, is not straightforwardly a
lesbian any more than they are someone who desires to be married. Jewett is not
necessarily referring to or speaking from a place of sexual identification (or inversion), an
achieved or even possible erotic or gender identity whose expression is this “need.” What
did it mean to “need” a husband in the first place? What did it mean to “need” a wife?
As Horace Scudder wrote in 1880 of two of Jewett’s early books, the novel
Deephaven (1877) and the short story collection Old Friends and New (1879), “The
motive of love as a passion between the young is almost wholly absent from these
stories” (28). Notably, “the young” in Jewett’s second novel Deephaven are young
women, Helen Denis and Kate Lancaster, who live together for a summer in the imagined
coastal town of Deephaven, Maine. Their holiday is the novel’s plot: they set up home,
they meet the locals, they carve out a shared existence—for however fleeting a summer—
on the fringes of “society and its distractions” (Deephaven 135). Kate suggests,
“laughingly,” that she and Helen copy the Ladies of Llangollen, Eleanor Butler and Sarah
Ponsonby, the eighteenth-century Irish women who set up home in Llangollen, a village
in North Wales. Having each evaded marriage, the Ladies lived together in Llangollen for
50 years.51 For Kate and Helen, by contrast, the summer ends; they must return to their
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See Mavor’s biography (1971) and Hampl’s essay “To Go,” about the Ladies, in The Art of The
Wasted Day (2018). Neither writer categorizes the Ladies’ relationship as a lesbian one. Whereas
Mavor likens the “romantic friendship” to a marriage (complete with “shared beds” and
“passion”), Hampl finds a “stranger passion” in the Ladies’ life of systematic leisure, study, and
retirement: “Not erotic life, but the pleasure of the mind filling like the lower chamber of an
hourglass with the slow-moving grains of a perfect day” (82).
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“distractions” and perhaps even to marriage. Kate’s suggestion is a whim, a dream no less
beyond the two friends’ grasp for having really happened or for being in their history, the
history they know. Jewett’s allusion introduces that which does not come to be for her
protagonists (dwelling in her novel’s fictional world) as that which did in fact come to be
for Eleanor Butler and Sarah Ponsonby. The novel’s past contains the outcome that its
present will foreclose, or rather limit to a summer, to a temporary “haven.” Jewett aligns
her novel’s past with possibility and openness, a freedom from “society and its
distractions” that is no longer available to Kate and Helen in the present. Helen ponders,
in response to Kate’s suggestion that they stay on in Deephaven for the winter and
beyond (just like the Ladies of Llangollen), “‘I suppose if we really belonged in
Deephaven we should think it a hard fate” (135).
In Jewett’s fiction, close relationships arise and take up residence in distances of
various kinds: geographical and temporal, between the living and the lost, the human and
the animal, the garden-tender and her plants, the “local” resident and “foreign” visitor. A
distance often, in a Jewett tale, brings clarity of vision and intensity of feeling.52 Solitude
plus time (“a long spell”) is the formula for intimacy: not belonging, which is difficult or
even impossible to achieve for characters like Abby Martin, but rather living for another,
whether or not they are physically present. In The Country of the Pointed Firs, the
narrator feels the distant “touch” of a dead woman, “Poor Joanna,” and her “hermitage”
on Shell-heap Island, after learning about her story (Joanna is jilted by a man and lives
thereafter in seclusion). Joanna, likewise, is a person that “the world cannot forget”
52

Folsom (1982) identifies what she calls “empathic style” in The Country of the Pointed Firs: a
mode of reading and “imagining the needs, feelings, and intentions of an absent person,” often at
a distance (69).
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precisely because she kept her distance from “the world” and made her own, an act that
places her in kinship with “recluses” across time (Pointed 101-102). Jewett’s relationship
to Annie Fields was structured by long periods of separation—and therefore
correspondence, writing letters to each other when they were in different places. Fields
and Jewett maintained separate households throughout their intimate companionship of
nearly three decades in length. The correspondence that Jewett imagines for the Queen’s
Twin Abby Martin differs in significant ways from her relationship with Fields. And yet,
the need to correspond with someone absent, distant, and longed-for is what structures
either bond.
Imagine a relation of imperfect correspondence, twin-ship, between two women
who have never met, exchanged words, or touched; who are literally strangers, unalike
and unacquainted, geographically removed. Yet there is “something” there between them,
something “different” that connects them and that renders them the same. In Jewett’s
story “The Queen’s Twin,” this relation is not strange; nor is it hidden (something to
hide); beyond polite, sincere acknowledgement; unspeakable or silenced. Abby Martin is
a widow living far out on the fringes of the inland “scattered farms” of Jewett’s fictional
Dunnet Landing, Maine: it is, as Mrs. Todd explains, “‘a dreadful, out-o’-the-way place’”
(“Queen’s Twin” 495). As such, and in this place, she is the Queen of England’s twin.
When Mrs. Almira Todd, an herbalist, returns home “from a long, solitary stroll in the
wild pastures, with an eager look as if she were just starting on a hopeful quest,” her
summer lodger (Jewett’s unnamed Dunnet Landing narrator) knows at once that
something interesting has happened (493). Mrs. Todd has not been out gathering herbs—
witch hazel, as the narrator suspects—but instead has been “off visitin.’” Before
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revealing what or who has kept her out almost all day, Mrs. Todd changes her stockings
to a dry pair (“in case of cold”), makes an evening fire, lays out food for supper, and
inquires of the narrator if what she left for “luncheon” was sufficient (it was). Mrs. Todd,
with an “air of mystery and satisfaction” hanging about her, as the narrator observes, is
taking care of household business. She is also biding her time: “there was a serious
silence before Mrs. Todd spoke again to make a formal announcement” (495). Abby
Martin, the woman she has been to visit, is the Queen of England’s Twin. Abby’s twinship, it turns out, is an “interest” (Mrs. Todd’s word) to which the narrator is receptive.
She is not shocked by Mrs. Todd’s “formal announcement.” On the contrary, she is eager
to meet Abby Martin for herself. In saying, simply, Abby is the Queen’s Twin, Mrs. Todd
affirms the twin-ship as a “real” way of being in relation to another, not a fancy, an
illusion, a belief to entertain with winking smiles and a put-on curiosity. To say she is is
to announce (formally, seriously) what will from then on go without saying, what will
from then on be an ordinary fact of Abby’s life. The narrator asks “eagerly” when she
and Mrs. Todd might go to visit Abby Martin and to see the “beautiful prospect” from a
nearby, tucked-away hill. Like the hill, which once you’ve found it affords a view “as
beautiful as anything in this world,” Abby Martin has a particular and beautiful way of
looking at “the facts” that prove her twin-ship (496).
Abby’s twin-ship is a topic of affectionate and easy conversation, something
about which women speak and that connects them, draws them close. We are given
Abby’s story as one told by Abby herself during a visit from the narrator (who is
spending her summer in Dunnet Landing—she is thus doubly a visitor in Abby Martin’s
home) and Mrs. Todd, a longtime friend. A common device across the Dunnet Landing
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stories, women’s visits open narrative space for other women’s stories. Once inside the
Queen’s Twin’s house, “the slow current of neighborhood talk carried one easily along;
we spoke of the weather and the small adventures of the way, and then, as if I were after
all not a stranger, our hostess turned almost affectionately to speak to me,” to tell the
narrator how she managed to see the Queen in London, many years ago (“Queen’s Twin”
504). By a magnificent stroke of luck (being on board a merchant ship, docked in
London, with her husband and her brother), Abby Martin sees her twin alongside
countless other people, who she scarcely seems to notice. Catching sight of Queen
Victoria, she says, “was a moment o’ heaven.” As she tells the narrator and Mrs. Todd,
“‘I don’t know how to explain it, but there hasn’t been no friend I’ve felt so near to me
ever since’” (507). There is no “friend” in Abby’s world, no person proximate, in short,
who feels “so near” to her as someone who is physically remote. That two close women
will be distant, at some distance from each other, is a structural condition of the world of
Jewett’s story.
A dream of strangers corresponding falls aslant, if only slightly, of the theme of
female friendship often drawn out of the Jewett corpus, especially and in much recent
scholarship on The Country of the Pointed Firs. “The Queen’s Twin,” then, is not a story
about female friendship or even same-sex intimacy of the kind that might be forged in
telling stories, making visits, sitting down to tea together by the fire in the evening—the
kind that makes, as Jewett puts it in The Country of the Pointed Firs, “a golden chain of
love and dependence” between women who take care of one another in their out-of-theway places (110). And yet that kind of friendship thrives within “The Queen’s Twin,”
too, and matters. The framing plot event, the visit, shows us what has been made possible
69

in this lonely, backward place that’s largely desolate of men and thus the stories they
might tell. In sharing her story with the narrator (who has not heard it before) and Mrs.
Todd (who has and who, therefore, invites its repetition), Abby Martin threads her way
into a structure of dependence, love, care-giving and care-taking between women who
have little else to offer but their stories and their attention. Yet, at the same time, Abby’s
story, tucked inside the framing visit, also reveals what life in a lonely, out-of-the-way
place has made impossible. Her twin-ship frames what Love has termed, in a reading of
another Jewett story, “impossibility as lived experience” (“Spinster Aesthetics” 310). As
Mrs. Todd observes of Abby Martin, she is one who “never slips in and lives right along
with the rest” (“Queen’s Twin” 499). There is no chance of sameness here, no way to live
“right” in a manner at once proper and in line with neighbors’ ways and expectations.
Abby’s distance from “the rest” leaves her unchain-able and wrong. Her twin-ship,
therefore, is an answer to this state of being wrong. It is the form in which two strangers
can be bound to one another, not in spite of but by virtue of Abby’s difference from “the
rest.”
Is Abby Martin a lesbian character, therefore different from the rest? What is at
stake in reading the Queen’s Twin as a figure who belongs to that contentious, queer-ish
mode of needing an identity, a category, a history of “our own?” In Melissa Solomon’s
reading of “The Queen’s Twin,” it is the “ardency” of Abby Martin’s desire that “marks
her as recognizably lesbian,” and not the fact that she is another woman’s “twin” (371).
For Solomon, who understands “The Queen’s Twin” as a “paradigmatic text” for
theorizing “lesbian symmetry,” sameness is a product of desire instead of its cause. This
understanding of desire as productive and performative—producing as an effect that
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which would seem to be its source—enables Solomon to reclaim “lesbian symmetry” as a
non-essentialist term detached from static archetypes. Solomon’s essay is most useful
insofar as it suggests that recognizing a desire as a “lesbian” desire does not need the lens
or framework of a fixed and stable form: namely “symmetry.” Solomon takes up “form”
as something that is fashioned by desire, not determining of it, a use of form I find
enabling. Her reading rejects a definition of “lesbianism” and indeed of lesbian history as
a continual production of the same form over time, a mirror-image-making process in
which “one form stands for all subsequent forms thought to see themselves in it” (371).
Would not self-fashioning grind to a halt, Solomon asks, if being or rather becoming a
“lesbian” was a matter of “learning to identify” with that which we can always already
recognize as “lesbian” (371)?
Where I part ways with Solomon’s reading is the suggestion that for Abby, queer
or lesbian self-fashioning is a matter of “investing the very moment of an ‘ordinary’ birth
with the heritage of chosen (royal) affiliation” (360). The queerness of twin-ship then, for
Solomon, lies in Abby’s (commonplace or maybe specifically queer) desire to be royal,
extraordinary, and adored by a nation of people. This reading overlooks the fact that
Abby’s twin-ship undercuts the Queen’s (true) claim to singularity, that is, to being
unequaled. If the Queen is ordinary, too, then she is not alone—she is the same as Abby
Martin. By declining to be better (or less ordinary) than she is, Abby foregoes the
aspirational “good life” project of self-improvement. Insofar as Abby “chooses” Queen
Victoria at all, her choice, I think, is incidental. The Queen’s extraordinary status matters
less than her mundane unreachability: the literal distance that enables Abby’s living, even
thriving, in a fantasized proximity. What Abby wants with such intensity is not a royal
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stature but rather an ordinary life. She wants a way of staying the same, not of becoming
someone else. Twin-ship is not a formative moment of decision and rebirth but rather a
habitable fantasy of being—remaining—the same.
Nevertheless, as Jewett’s narrator relates, affection for the Queen of England may
be “found in distant neighborhoods of New England,” an effect, she speculates, of “some
old instincts of personal loyalty” or perhaps of Queen Victoria’s “own character and
disposition,” which has earned her distant “friends” (“Queen’s Twin” 498). “But to hear
of a twin sister,” Jewett’s narrator concludes, “was the most surprising proof of intimacy
of all” (498). The narrator is excited by the thought of her reception at the home of Abby
Martin, so much so that the idea “of being presented at Court in the usual way was for the
moment quite commonplace” (498). Here, in the midst of the narrator’s anticipation (she
and Mrs. Todd are en route to Abby’s house, walking silently together), we find that
Abby has become less “commonplace” than the uniquely uncommon Queen Victoria.
Abby’s unlikely “proof of intimacy” with the Queen suggests, for Jewett’s narrator at
least, “something remarkably exciting to the imagination,” something new and
irreducible to claiming (or to feigning) royal birth. Twin-ship, then, does not extend from
the “old instincts” of New Englanders with lingering affinities for Britain and its
monarchy. It represents a new imagining of what a “friend” might be: a distant “sister”
who is not, in fact, a sister. How does this happen? What does it feel like? Is it a
fantasy—a mere dream? Bill Brown aligns the Queen’s Twin with the story’s narrator, a
visitor to Dunnet Landing, Maine, who spends the bulk of her time acquainting herself
with the local, eccentric characters and listening to their stories. Abby, like the narrator,
for Brown, “lives her life vicariously” (“Regional Artifacts” 212). Brown highlights
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Abby’s collection of pictures of the Queen, which she displays in her best room. In
Brown’s description of the twin-ship, Abby “devotes herself to accumulating stories and
pictures of the Queen,” in order to make these artifacts “her,” to transform objects into
being, in a manner not unlike, for Brown, the narrator’s collecting of such Dunnet
Landing histories as Abby Martin’s own (212). As Solomon puts it, paraphrasing
Brown’s interpretation of the story, Abby’s “dreams of similitude are fueled by an
experiential void and the hunger to appropriate the experience of another” (366).
If Brown reads Abby as possessing, above all, a desire for experience, then
Solomon recovers Abby’s desire as experience, a full life (one of “thriving”), which, in
Brown’s view, is a “void” defined by stasis and not having a life. Abby inhabits her
desire as an everyday-life structure. She inhabits wanting someone as a way of being with
them. The Queen, as Abby puts it, is “everything to me.” I have dealt with Solomon’s
essay at length because it raises questions crucial to the tasks of lesbian history. What
makes a character “recognizably lesbian?” How might the lens of “lesbian identity”
obscure those forms of being (with) that read like “lesbian” forms and yet lay claim to
other patterns or arrangements of desire? How can a person’s self-invention reproduce a
recognizable and categorizable form—a form that gives to one a sense of being in a past
with others? Jewett and Fields made Cather feel, she wrote to Jewett in a letter (October
24, 1908), as if they shared a common past. Recalling her first visit to Fields and Jewett
at 148 Charles Street, Cather wrote: “It was the first time in my life that I ever felt that we
had any past—of that kind—of our very own, and I went out with an exultant feeling of
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acquisition” (Letters of Willa Cather 116).53 Cather did not feel at home in her “own”
twentieth-century present; rather, she “experienced her own historical moment as
impossible” (Love, Feeling Backward 94). Abby’s life is likewise structured by an
experience of impossible belonging and relation. And yet “impossible” does not quite
grasp the fullness of her life, her sense of contentment and of loneliness, her sense of
living for someone.
If we interpret Abby Martin as a lesbian character, then we run the risk of
slighting her invention of a form for same-sex intimate attachment that—it must be
stressed—cannot be read as offering a site for lesbian sex or, more precisely, for an
eroticism centered on “recognizably lesbian” sexual acts. The old debate in lesbian
studies (did they or didn’t they?) cannot be staged for Jewett’s distant, literally
transatlantic twins, in quite the same way as it has been for the characters Kate and Helen
in Deephaven, for example, or indeed for Jewett and Fields.54 Physical closeness—living
together, as is the case for Kate and Helen—is not even what the Queen’s Twin most
desires, insofar as her twin’s absence is what holds open a space for “something”
between them that is binding and that lets them correspond. There is a clear and
structured mode of wanting twin-ship in this story: what we know is that the Queen’s
Twin wants some way of being where she is and being what she is. The “flush” that
shows on Abby’s face as she relates a lovely dream—and wonders aloud if her twin, too,
has had this same dream, correspondingly—is not the blush of sex or wanting what (she
knows her guests know) she is not supposed to want. It is the blush of queer desire being
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lived as ordinary. Or it is the blush of something impossible being lived as ordinary. If
there is shame in Abby’s blush, it marks “the place where,” as Eve Sedgwick writes, “the
question of identity arises,” a question that is by no means decided (Tendencies 37, italics
in original). Here is the dream that makes Abby blush:
Sometimes I think, now she’s older, she might like to know about us. When I
think how few old friends anybody has left at our age, I suppose it may be just the
same with her as it is with me; perhaps she would like to know how we came into
life together. But I’ve had a great advantage in seeing her, an’ I can always fancy
her goin’ on, while she don’t know nothin’ yet about me, except she may feel my
love stayin’ her heart sometimes an’ not know just where it comes from. An’ I
dream about our being together out in some pretty fields, young as ever we was,
and holdin’ hands as we walk along. I’d like to know if she ever has that dream
too. I used to have days when I made believe she did know, an’ was comin’ to see
me,” confessed the speaker shyly, with a little flush on her cheeks… (“Queen’s
Twin” 508-509)
What does it mean for Abby Martin and the Queen to be an us? Abby alone sustains her
twin-ship. She receives nothing tangible or “real” from the Queen in return for her
attachment. She does not receive expressions of affection, interest, love. There are no
letters from the Queen. And she will never come for dinner, although, as Abby tells her
actual visitors, there was one day she thought she would:
One day I got thinkin’ so about my dear Queen,” she said, “an’ livin’ so in my
thoughts, that I went to work an’ got all ready for her, just as if she was really
comin’. I never told this to a livin’ soul before, but I feel you’ll understand. I put
my best fine sheets and blankets I spun an’ wove myself on the bed, and I picked
some pretty flowers and put em’ all around the house, an’ I worked as hard an’
happy as I could all day, and had as nice a supper ready as I could get, sort of
telling myself a story all the time. She was comin’ an’ I was goin’ to see her
again, an’ I kep’ it up until nightfall; an’ when I see the dark an’ it come to me I
was all alone, the dream left me, an’ I sat down on the doorstep an’ felt foolish
an’ tired. (“Queen’s Twin” 509)
Wanting the Queen to come for dinner and even believing that this will be so
makes life less lonely for a while. The Queen’s anticipated arrival results in Abby
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preparing the nicest supper that she can possibly “get,” the outer limit of her pleasure in
the familiar, difficult work of staying “happy” while she is alone. She feels that Mrs.
Todd and the narrator, who are her guests, will understand this—but why should they?
They are actually there, and that enables a different kind of relation, a different kind of
ordinary. Abby’s housekeeping allows her to rewrite the story of her loneliness, the story
in which she is a dear old woman with only her house for company. Abby’s “hard” and
“happy” work—changing the sheets, picking flowers, and cooking the nicest dinner she
can—might strike us as silly, even sad. Staying home and making dinner for your partner
who never shows up is nobody’s idea of a good time. Yet staying home and making
dinner for her twin who never shows up is Abby Martin’s queer relationship: her ordinary
life. The queer desire that moves the Queen’s Twin to pick flowers and make dinner
enables a distant, intimate bond that’s not the same as friendship or marriage. Mrs. Todd
acknowledges this when she, a visitor in the flesh, admits that “beautiful dreams” like
Abby’s are the “real part” of life. The fact of queerness having been or else becoming
ordinary is a dream that all of the authors in this project have in common. Or maybe it’s
just my dream for them.

Held up alongside Gertrude Stein, Elizabeth Bishop, and Gwendolyn Brooks,
Sarah Orne Jewett (born in 1849, more than twenty years before Stein) feels remote. The
person referred to by late nineteenth-century readers as “Miss Jewett,” “Our Dear Sarah,”
and even “Dear Lady” (how Cather addressed Jewett in her letters) appears by these
names to embody the gaps in knowledge and misrecognitions that are constitutive of the
queer past. These polite, affectionate names are unremarkable yet slanted. There is an air
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of something cherished in Cather’s “Dear Lady” in particular that, while it is not errant or
scandalous, it is not not scandalous either. Whatever that something is, that queerness
Cather intuited in Jewett, is compatible with good manners, writing kind letters, going to
church, with any of Jewett’s daily actions that might not seem “queer” at all and that
were eminently describable in letters and in fiction—with being an ordinary woman.
On a Sunday evening in autumn, 1884, Jewett wrote to Annie Fields: “I wonder if
your pine boughs smell as sweet as mine tonight? Also I wonder if it is going to rain! I
went to church this morning, and have been reading all the afternoon, chiefly the last
volume of Dickens’ Letters, and I thought of you at every turn.” (Letters 1911, 20).55 For
nearly three decades, following the death of Fields’s husband in 1881, Fields and Jewett
lived together and sometimes apart as intimate partners.56 Distance—living apart, often
for months at a time—was an ordinary part of this relationship, as were letters sent
between their houses. There is something formally queer about the long-distance
relationship, or an attempt to answer the question that Barthes posed of “how to live
together” with something other than consistent cohabitation and a shared space.57 To live
apart and yet together is to know that distance joins and that aloneness can at times be a
condition of intimate life.
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It is an irony of the project to recover repressed, encoded, or even “falsified”
desires in queer women’s lives and writing that those silences and gaps—or spaces
occupied by pine boughs or an absent, distant twin—become spectacular and overfull of
indeterminate meaning. The indeterminacy of “sex” has made its presence unavoidable,
its possibility inevitable. Jewett’s “pine boughs” therefore carry the scent of an unseen
erotic desire, wafting through time as from another room. In this chapter and this project
as a whole, I try to resist this kind of reading in order to chart what indeterminate
meaning obscures, precisely as “sex.” If Jewett’s pine boughs are not “sex,” then what
are they saying and what do they prove? The idea that queer love is indescribable and yet,
at the same time, a “telling secret” has proved remarkably enduring (Sedgwick,
Epistemology 67). In a 2019 essay, David Halperin proposes that queer love is something
different to the queerness of love more broadly due to a “very specific refusal of
specificity,” a gesture that results in the expression of “an uncatalogued erotic feeling” in
the gay male poets’ work with which he is concerned (418). I want to suggest that
Jewett’s pine boughs are, in fact, hyper-specific. Halperin’s widely held conception of
queer love cannot do justice to the pine boughs’ expressivity, which calls to mind not
categories of erotic orientation but instead a quiet evening and a scene of letter-writing:
queer desire as it was lived. Far from a refusal of specificity, Jewett’s pine boughs are an
attempt, much like the rose rocks and rock roses that we find in Bishop’s “Vague Poem,”
to render a more precise and passionate language for Jewett’s non-traditional (and new, in
1884) relationship. Likewise, in Jewett’s stories of companioned, distant women, we
observe queer passions curious for being so conventional: beguilingly intimate but never
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inarticulate. Jewett’s pine boughs might not prove or seem like evidence of desire, but
then they are not addressed to us.
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Chapter Two
“They were regularly gay there”: Gertrude Stein’s Explicit Abstraction
How can we read criticism? Only one way: since I am here a seconddegree reader, I must shift my position: instead of agreeing to be the
confidant of this critical pleasure—a sure way to miss it—I can make
myself its voyeur: I observe clandestinely the pleasure of others, I enter
perversion; the commentary then becomes in my eyes a text, a fiction, a
fissured envelope…the infinite perversity of the critic and his reader.
—Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text
In an afterword to the “corrected centennial edition” of Gertrude Stein’s Tender
Buttons (2014), Juliana Spahr suggests that this text, far from being unreadable, cannot be
understood apart from how it has been read—repeatedly and in different ways, thus never
correctly or exhaustively. Most scholarly readers agree that Stein has left “a code that can
be broken,” as Spahr notes, “But that the deciphering does not hold, or that each of these
readings feels so provisional to the work as a whole, has to be part of the point” (112,
113). Spahr’s conjecture is one widely shared, or rather one that the bulk of scholarly
work on Tender Buttons and Stein’s writing more generally supports: Stein’s writing
repels definitive reading or interpretations that stick, yet seems to promise
(inextinguishably) the pleasure of cracking the code. Sometimes Stein’s writing delivers
that pleasure, in however absurd a fashion, as when critics insist that Stein is making
dildo jokes or celebrating orgasms or bowel movements (by using “cow” as a code
word).58 In these moments of provisional code-breaking, pleasure is truth, as what brings
pleasure is only temporary. Surely if any one thing is certain, known, and true about
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See Gass (1978) on Stein’s dildo jokes in Tender Buttons and Turner (1999) on Stein’s “cows”
as bowel movements in her love notes to Alice Toklas.
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Stein’s writing, it is that “truth” remains elusive, indeterminate, and plural because, as
Tender Buttons puts it, “it is so easy to exchange the meaning, it is so easy to see the
difference” (35).
Stein’s true meaning is elusive, the readings of Tender Buttons suggest. At the
same time, as critics have amply shown, it is “so easy to see” the ways in which Stein’s
queer domestic life informed and even inspired the text. How can we square the presence
of definite, unexchangeable queer meaning with a prevailing scholarly sense that reading
Stein’s writing through the lens of sexuality and gender (as with any other lens) provides
at most a provisional truth, and maybe even no truth at all? This chapter argues that queer
meaning in Stein’s work is often explicit—the kind of meaning a reader cannot
“exchange” or endlessly transmute. I trace Stein’s critical reception from the midtwentieth century forward, beginning with readers who claim that Stein’s writing
conceals her sexuality, and continuing through both feminist and postmodern or
poststructuralist critics (three rough phases of Stein scholarship). This chapter argues that
the reader of Stein’s work confronts a paradox that is particular to her writing yet
indicative of the broader turn away from reading an author’s work through the lens of
their identity: even in texts where sexuality is unmistakably present, once the language is
decrypted (and the obvious or familiar meanings exchanged for more transgressive ones),
the meaning of the text remains unstable and provisional (because the deciphering does
not hold). This interpretive problem distances queer meaning from the mode of being
explicit that, I argue, Stein pursued in much of her writing and her portrait of two women
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who are “regularly gay,” “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” (1908-1910), in particular.59 This
chapter frames this early portrait as a blueprint for Stein’s career-long investment in
depicting (her) queer life as ordinary: a definite pattern that repeats, the meaning of
which cannot be exchanged.
Lately the word “truth” has been popping up in essays about the method debates
in literary studies, a set of conversations that explores—depending on who you ask—the
task of reading itself, the value of literary criticism and humanities scholarship more
broadly, the affects and stances (moods and methods) most appropriate to critics’
encounters with literary texts, as well as alternatives to “critical” and/or “paranoid”
interpretive modes.60 This chapter queries how the reader of Stein’s writing in particular,
instead of just “the reader,” can be positioned within these debates. Reading Stein—
actually reading Stein, whose work has always been “not-read,” at times by critics
writing about it—is an activity that challenges our educated sense of what a reader is and
does.61 Her work is hardly alone in this. However, as what Tyler Bradway defines as
“queer experimental literature,” Stein’s writing is uniquely positioned to talk back to the
method debates, which tend to traffic in fantasy versions or character sketches of
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“Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” was first published with a selection of short works in Stein’s
Geography and Plays (1922) and subsequently in Vanity Fair in 1923. The exact date of
composition is uncertain; in citing 1908-1910, I follow Pondrom’s dating in 1993 edition of
Geography and Plays.
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See, for example, Kurnick (2020), Love (2010), and Saint-Amour (2018).
61
Cecire (2015) argues that Stein actively “courts the charge of unreadability” that critics hurled
at her during her lifetime (e.g. Edmund Wilson in Axel’s Castle) with her attempt to fashion
writing as a form of un-waged work, specifically women’s household labor, the products of
which cannot be “read” (293). In a review (1958) of Art by Subtraction: A Dissenting Opinion of
Gertrude Stein (1958) by B. L. Reid, the critic W. H. Gass doubts that Reid has read any of
Stein’s writing, as he offers “not a single analysis of any of her stories, poems, and plays” (236).
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scholarly readers.62 Bradway proposes that queer texts are not produced by reading
methods but rather that certain queer experiments with literary form have the potential to
reorganize the social relations of reading: not only reader-to-text but also reader-to-public
or social world. Bradway’s Queer Experimental Literature: The Affective Politics of Bad
Reading (2017), which is addressed to postwar literature, pursues “a broader genealogy
of queer reading that pre-exists, develops alongside of, and complexly engages with the
emergence of queer theory as an academic discourse” (193). Stein’s reception as a
(queer) modernist writer belongs to this broad history. By examining Stein’s reception, I
shed light on some of the fantasy versions of readers that critics have used to understand
and value reading, in particular the ardent decoder of queer and often erotic meaning—a
reader whose style has been crucial to crafting the Stein we think we know, whose texts
proliferate meaning in excess.
“Queer readings” of Stein’s writing predate the emergence of both feminist and
queer literary criticism. The critic W. H. Gass, for example, not only revels in Stein’s
erotic wordplay but also examines the connection between Stein’s style of evasiveness
and queer sexuality—in the late 1950s. Gass concludes that much of Stein’s writing
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See Kurnick’s (2020) essay on the method debates, which looks at three key texts: Sedgwick’s
essay “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” Best and Marcus’s introduction “Surface
Reading,” and Felski’s book The Limits of Critique. Kurnick argues that these texts are more
concerned with personality than actual critical practice (“what kind of people we are when we
interpret,” rather than, what we are doing when we interpret) and that “they share an inattention
to the seriousness of queer theoretical critique” (350-1). Kurnick proposes that queer theory has
an investment in “making truth claims” despite its poststructuralist foundation and suspicion of
the subject (350). Kurnick further suggests that “paranoid reading,” contrary to its alignment with
queer literary studies, is not the only or even the most important source of queer truth. By
reckoning with the broader tradition of what Kurnick calls “queer truth-telling,” which includes
both “surface” and “nonparanoid” modes of reading and thinking, we can produce a less distorted
picture of literary studies and the work that readers do.
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betrays a motive of concealment: Stein did not want to disclose her sexuality full stop,
especially in her early work, when her romantic life was messy. Yet even Stein’s later
work (produced with Alice B. Toklas at her side) appears to be structured by this motive
irrespective of its subject: “Evasiveness,” Gass writes, “becomes a habit, a style, a
method” (“Geography” 105). Not simply a question of Stein’s psychology, then, evasion
is a formal and aesthetic technique of modernism: a habit, a style, a method, something
the critic can interpret. Gass establishes Stein’s evasion as a mode of representing queer
desires and experiences that might have baffled readers in the early twentieth century but
would never baffle him: “Buttons fasten,” Gass writes, “And because tender buttons are
the buttons we unbutton and press, touch and caress to make love, we can readily see why
they fasten” (“Geography” 77). For Stein to be evasive about sex is thus to reveal
herself—if not to every reader then to the right reader who is also, as Bradway suggests, a
“bad” reader, a reader whose claims are dubious, wild (as Gass’s are), an overly
passionate reader, an obsessive reader, a queer reader.
According to Gass, Stein’s writing “asks for nothing less than a study of the entire
basis of our criticism” (“Her Escape” 238). This claim suggests that reading Stein
amounts to un-learning and learning again the “basis” of our discipline: for what and how
do we read? The reader of Stein, according to Gass, cannot rely on what they know or
thought they knew about their task. Of course, the critic no less than the author can form
habits, styles, and methods. The critic, too, might use a method that is ill-suited to their
object (just as, for Gass, Stein uses coded language for subjects other than sex). Because
he invests Stein’s work with the power to disturb the very foundations of literary
criticism, Gass appears to underestimate the extent to which the field constructs its
84

authors and objects of study. Gass himself, who helped to sketch the earliest critical
portrait of Stein, defines the reading of Stein’s work as an exercise in decoding. Decoding
would shape not just the importance of Stein’s work for feminist critics but also the
importance of reading itself: what reading is and does and for whom. Is Gass an ordinary
reader in addition to a critic?63 Is decoding only what critics do? If we were to read
Stein’s writing purely for enjoyment, could we decode it? Does enjoyment or pleasure
arise at the expense of understanding? Despite the prominence of decoding in Stein’s
critical reception and the presumption that Stein’s writing baffles “ordinary readers” or
those who read without a certain queer perversity or ardency for meaning that is
concealed, I am proposing that Stein’s writing levels the playing field of reading. In other
words, it places every reader in the difficult place of someone who is un-learning the very
basis of their methods, habits, and tendencies. I can’t get over Gass’s faith in the capacity
of Stein’s writing to reshape the way we read, a faith that coexists with what I can only
describe as an obsessive, ardent, and ultimately queer methodological rigidity: Stein’s
Tender Buttons really is, or can be made to be, all about sex. “It is a joke,” Gass insists
regarding the line in Tender Buttons, “Rub her coke,” which might mean anything yet for
Gass means just one thing (“Geography” 101).
Finding a code that can be broken has been crucial to revisionist readings of
Stein’s work as engaged in representing queer desires and erotic lesbian acts: “lifting
belly,” to name one. Stein’s reception has been structured by a basic proposition, often
embraced but sometimes denied: Stein, a lesbian/queer writer, encodes a lesbian/queer
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See Felski (2015) for a discussion of the “ordinary reader,” or one positioned within the
framework of a symptomatic reading as a reader who fails to understand what critics can discern,
pages 66-67 especially.
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experience that in essence reflects her own but is disguised or rendered vague. An
evasive style betrays the presence of secrets that need keeping but that nevertheless
reveal themselves to certain readers like Gass attuned to secrecy as a style. The secret of
queer sex has been nothing if not interpretable within Stein’s work and modernist writing
more broadly. Decades before Eve Sedgwick’s reading of the gay male modernist closet
in Epistemology of the Closet (1990), Gass interprets Stein’s evasion as a mode of quasinaming, seeming to grasp the structural enmity between queer possibility and precise
definition.64 The premise that Stein could not write openly about her queer relationships,
desires, and emotions—or that her particular sexuality could be made legible as secrecy,
and could be exposed through circumvention—has been present in the scholarship on
Stein’s work since midcentury. Stein’s early critics tended to favor biographical and
psychological readings of Stein’s shifting style and voice; their work enabled feminist
readings that were likewise biographical but antihomophobic, celebratory, and
recuperative. Subsequent readers would depart from these “identity politics” readings and
a concern with Stein’s biography and emphasize, instead, her radical break with normal
language. This poststructuralist critical moment, galvanized in part by Language poets’
interest in Stein’s writing and her ethical poetics, shifted the conversation away from
questions of gender and sexuality and displaced the version of Stein that feminist critics
recovered, largely by code-breaking (exchanging “orgasm” for “cow”).65 The meaning of
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Nothing shuts down queer expansiveness quite like a definite category, though at the same time
“queer” achieves a certain stable incoherence in its opposition to the “normative” and “normal.”
65
See Cecire (2019), pages 1-14, for an account of the radical modernist canon as one produced
by Language poet-scholars.
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Stein’s work thus became, for certain readers, a question apart from Stein’s biography as
well as her commitment to depicting queer experiences with radical modernist forms.
With this brief sketch of Stein’s reception, we can situate the reader of Stein as
one confronting a paradox: the radical text that represents queer sexuality, gender, and
desire can also be read as one that refuses representational language per se. The text that
seems to require decoding is also the text that swiftly repels all manner of “this means
that” equations—leaving the presence of specifically “queer” meaning an open question.
The “cow” that registers queer pleasure can as easily be read as a linguistic intervention
that has nothing to do with sex and all to do with language-making. In the latter reading,
the governing logic or “truth” of indeterminacy prevents queer meaning from sticking. In
other words, the formal effect of indeterminacy is severed from the production of queer
meaning as a legible, historical content—or from the forms of indeterminacy that were
and are specific to lived experiences of queerness, including but not limited to Stein’s
own. If we accept that no one stable truth pertains within Stein’s writing, then we risk
eliding the presence of explicit and queer meaning. That no such meaning exists in
Stein’s work could be the strongest and most powerful critical fantasy of all. This version
of Stein cares little for truth, is always winking, frequently playing, caressing nouns and
defamiliarizing common everyday words, so that her reader can never take her chosen
words to mean what they say. Critics love this version of Stein.
What does it mean to fall in love with a writer?66 What does it mean to read the
work of a writer to whom one feels attached, a writer whose work one will return to,
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A question borrowed from the essay “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,”
by Sedgwick and Frank, in Touching Feeling.
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again and again, in order to tell what is essentially the same story? I am convinced that
Gass felt something close to love if not for Stein then for the kind of criticism that her
work allowed him to do, which he could not have practiced otherwise. Her body of work
is singular, different in the way that loved things inevitably are. Here he is describing
Stein’s Three Lives (1909): “the skillful rearrangements of normal order, the carefully
controlled pace, the running on, the simplicity, exactness, the passion … in the history of
language no one had written like this before” (“Geography” 76, ellipsis in original). What
kind of reader-to-text relation does this language—and one’s love for it—enable and
produce? Loving Stein’s language, to put it broadly, has been crucial to securing a more
accurate version of Stein: a serious writer and a queer person who was also ordinary
(flawed, imperfect).67 However, the love that critics like Gass have brought to writing
about Stein’s work has also cast that work in marble, in a way, as doing one thing by way
of one gesture. For Gass, that gesture is evasion. Love is passion in the moment (book in
hand, the perverse reader) but it is also repetition, sustained attention, and return. When
Gass returns to one of Stein’s texts he is returned to what he loves and to that version of
“the critic” that reading Stein’s work has made possible. “Banal or sublime,” writes
Lauren Berlant, “love’s function is to mark the subject’s binding to the scenes to which
s/he must always return” (“A Queer Feeling” 439). Berlant describes this mark, love’s
form, as “a kind of tattoo, a rhythm, a shape, a timing. An environment of touch or
sound…to which you [the lover] turn and return” (439). Stein’s writing returns Gass to
that space where “[w]ords can be moved about like furniture…they can be diced like
67

Stein’s politics, like those of many so-called “radical” modernists, are confusing and potentially
disturbing. See Will (2011) on Stein’s friendship with the Vichy collaborator Bernard Fäy and
Schoenbach (2011) on Stein’s “pragmatic modernism.”
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carrots (Stein cuts up a good number); they can be used in several different ways
simultaneously, like wine; they can be brushed off, cleaned and polished; they can be
ingeniously joined” (“Geography” 79). Although Stein’s language is a force that curves
toward difference and plurality and even, for Gass, depicts change (“the crucial word is
change” in Tender Buttons, he writes), the love it provokes might be more accurately
described as a force that flattens out into sameness: doing the same things with the same
person, regularly, day after day. And this makes sense. If we want to keep on loving
something, then would we really want that thing to be different, ever changing,
perpetually in flux, without solidity or certainty or lasting definition? Perhaps we critics
err in thinking that love enables better readings—and thus better versions of ourselves—
instead of the same ones over and over. Is it a fantasy to think that love as a method can
“dislocate one’s habitual relation to cognition and forms of mastery?” (Love, “Truth”
236).
Reading Stein’s writing is an occasion to interrogate these fantasies while
acknowledging their power to produce a meaningful text and more specifically a queer
text. Insofar as “love” has meant the kind of attention that permits the reader access to
queer meaning, however oblique or buried it may be, reading with love has meant queer
reading—so much so that it can be difficult to conceive of a queer reading practice that is
not inflected by love. It’s worth putting pressure on the idea that we (critics) know what
love does. Reading with love does not secure the critic’s escape from scholarly norms
(one way to make the reading queer), nor does it guarantee that their interpretation will be
“new” and different from those of prior critics. Facing a text that’s tough to love, the
critic becomes far more receptive, open to change and being changed.
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Toward that aim, this chapter revisits Stein’s early portrait, “Miss Furr and Miss
Skeene,” which is difficult to love and even more difficult (even impossible) to decode in
the style of Gass. This portrait has the potential to change the way we understand
“Gertrude Stein.” This text withholds the pleasure of meaning that is concealed, oblique,
and excessive—therefore available to ardent readers like Gass who read between the
lines, decipher the code, and get the jokes. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” gives this
fantasy reader nothing to decode and even less to excavate because it tells its reader
plainly that these women called Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene “were gay.” It speaks,
rather incredibly for Stein, with an accessible voice—a voice that undergraduate students
can understand and even enjoy without much trouble. It is a teachable text that also
depicts “gay” life as something teachable and tellable. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene”
believes, un-Steinly, in the power of representation. The most immediate and ordinary
meanings for the words that Stein repeats throughout the portrait, among them “regular”
and “gay,” cohere and stick in order to tell a single truth about “gay” life, which does not
carry a single meaning even though it can be named: it is there, these women were there,
they did exist to be portrayed. This reader of Stein is someone for whom not any or all
readings are possible. One obvious reading sticks: these women “were gay” and they
were ordinary, “regularly gay.” What I call Stein’s “explicit abstraction” is a mode of
representing queer and ordinary life without evasion or the gay male modernist closet,
preterition. Explicit abstraction in this portrait is Stein’s mode of telling queer truth.
Women “were gay there” in the beginning of the twentieth century, in Paris, where Stein
lived and wrote and was, herself, a stunningly “regular” queer. The reader of Stein’s
explicit abstraction might not fall in love with Stein or experience “a visceral near90

identification” with Stein’s writing “at the level of sentence structure,” which is in part
how Sedgwick describes her queer relationship to reading (Tendencies 3).
It’s worth acknowledging that all interpretations are contextual, including the
ones that seem to be (or are presented as being) intrinsic to texts. When Sedgwick writes
about the “perverse reader” in the essay “Queer and Now” (written in 1991), she is
explicitly connecting queer reading practices to survival as a queer person—and she
names the history of violence against queer people that, for her, indelibly marks queer
writing and teaching, as well as the present AIDS emergency. She is addressing the
“people who do queer writing and teaching” in particular, while drawing from her own
attachment to reading as a child. The reading practices that queer kids (who are also
future academics!) develop, Sedgwick posits, will rub up against the “most accessible
voices” in cultural texts: queer kids hear what others might not. Attaching to books with
that queer excess, or that voice not everyone hears, enables survival, Sedgwick supposes.
I’ve always found this thought convincing, even as I’ve found it compelling to explore
the queerness of a voice that everyone hears in Stein’s explicit portrait. “Miss Furr and
Miss Skeene” feels as if it demands a mode of reading queerly yet without a sense of
astonishment or the shine of meaning in excess—at the same time as it reminds us just
how difficult that would be.
If Stein’s queer “cow” does not mean cow, then does the word “gay” ever mean
gay? Sometimes the unremitting presence of queer meaning goes against the grain of
formal indeterminacy: sometimes “gay” does mean gay. In Stein’s portrait of two women
who “were regularly gay,” Stein makes queer meaning something explicit, something
definite, like truth. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene,” with its unremitting use of the word
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“gay” (repeated 139 times), asks for nothing less than a study of our ways of reading
Stein—and therefore reading, the methods of literary criticism. Unlike the words in
Tender Buttons that can be “broken” again and again to yield the pleasure of yet more
meaning, the word “gay” in “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” encourages one interpretation
to solidify and stick, whether we want it to or not. Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene,
although the nature of their “regular” existence is uncertain, are “both gay,” “just gay,”
“regular in being gay,” and “quite regularly gay.” Stein’s portrait insists that they are
“gay.” “They were gay every day” (“Miss Furr” 18).
“Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” is an extreme example within Stein’s body of work
of Stein’s commitment to being explicit: to saying exactly what she means by way of an
unconventional form, with repetition rather than narrative, or with an abstract pattern
rather than a tightly woven story. Explicit abstraction asks the reader to read literally and
“badly,” to take the word “gay” at face value.68 “In the experimental ferment known as
modernism,” Rita Felski claims, “writers are drawn to formal devices that systematically
block readers from taking words at face value…That we have learned to read between the
lines has everything to do with the devices deployed in modern works of art” (Limits 42).
Felski’s claim is well-supported by the ideas of authors themselves. “Whatever is felt
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The portrait invites what we could also call “asymptomatic reading,” since its “most interesting
aspect” is the thing it renders explicit: the existence of “gay” women. Marcus and Best (2009)
define symptomatic reading as “an interpretive method that argues that the most interesting aspect
of a text is what it represses” (3). This interpretive method presumes that there is a meaningful
difference between an author’s giving the truth away and keeping the truth repressed or
concealed; Stein’s work casts doubt on this presumption, which has been central to queer literary
and specifically modernist criticism. My approach to reading Stein’s work is akin to what Best
and Marcus call “surface reading.” I attend to what is “present” in Stein’s portrait of “gay”
women without going so far as to claim that there is nothing being concealed. Abstraction does
conceal whatever specific details might expose, and yet Stein’s portrait is more usefully described
as being protective of its subjects rather than concealing of them.
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upon the page without being specifically named there—,” as Willa Cather put it, “that, it
seems to me, is created. It is the inexplicable presence of the thing not named…that gives
high quality to the novel or the drama, as well as to poetry itself” (Not Under Forty 50).69
Many of Stein’s texts could be cited in support of Cather’s account: Tender Buttons,
“Lifting Belly” (1915-1917), and A Book Concluding With As A Wife Has A Cow A Love
Story (1923), to name just three. Between the lines, these texts portray the mundane
pleasures of queer domestic, married life and lesbian sex. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene,”
perhaps surprisingly, does not portray these things. Instead of a home replete with objects
and erotic implications, “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” renders an abstract adverbial space
of “there” and “then,” refusing to promise meaning (erotic or otherwise) tucked between
the lines. My reading of this portrait demonstrates that Stein’s commitment to writing
women’s lives is not restricted to the lesbian domestic realm familiar to readers of Tender
Buttons or The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933). A central question this chapter
raises, then, is how this queer and feminist version of Stein—the household genius
Stein—has restricted readers’ sense of her commitment to depicting queer and lesbian
existence in a space distinct from home.
In her lecture, “Portraits and Repetition,” Stein explains that she began her
portrait-writing by making portraits of “anybody” and “any one” (291). These portraits
capture “the intensity of anybody’s existence,” but not by virtue of describing or
narrating what they do, discerning how they might resemble or “remember” anyone else,
or even distilling “a confused thing” into “clarity,” a likeness (298). Most significantly,
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for Stein, a portrait does not tell “what happened,” because “there is something much
more exciting than anything that happens and now and always I am writing the portrait of
that” (312). What is the “something” more exciting than the “anything” that happens?
Portraits of people, Stein concludes, are too bound up with questions of plot: what people
do and what they say and how events might make a sequence. Stein has wondered, she
admits, if it is “at all important” to “be interested in what anybody does” and “in what
anybody says” (291). These doubts compel a change of subject, and the portrait form is
rendered less a frame that holds an image or a story of “existence” than a place unto
itself. It is not simply that Stein takes up objects, places, and spaces as the subjects of her
portraits, notably those in Tender Buttons: “So here we have it. There was the period of
The Making of Americans portraiture, when by listening and talking I conceived at every
moment the existence of some one…this slowly changed to portraits of spaces inclosed
with or without somebody in them but written in the same way in the successive
moments of my realizing them” (307). Stein’s portraits render “spaces inclosed” for
subjects that may not appear—like Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene—and yet the
subjects are “completely held within that inside” (310). The “something” that is more
exciting than the “anything” that happens in a narrative, therefore, is the experience of
holding something totally within a portrait’s language and its form. This protective
gesture manifests a definite location that, for Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene, the home
cannot approximate.
The “regularity” of Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene’s “gay” life is not produced
by domesticity or household rhythms and patterns but is more simply an effect of their
continuing to be. Their world permits their life to continue, to go on, and eventually to
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get boring. Repeating “regularly gay” suggests the pleasure and the dullness of an
ordinary life: a life so stable that, when Georgine Skeene breaks up with Helen Furr (or
rather leaves without explanation), Helen Furr feels neither sadness nor “astonishment” in
response and basically goes on with “gay” life. This could be fantasy or nightmare,
depending on the reader’s perspective. And it could be unremarkable, provoking at most
a shrug. This portrait situates “gay” women in an abstract space and time; they are
engaged in doing abstract things like “cultivating” their voices. Stein avoids all
specificity, including that of a code name. The word “gay” in repetition does not hold a
single meaning or convey a single truth; it does not name so much as embrace. However,
neither does the word permit an endless proliferation of meaning. “Gay” is not a “tender
button” that readers can press again and again. Its prolific use is bound up with the
solidification of “gay” and “lesbian” identities in the early twentieth century, when Stein
composed the portrait, and the contraction of erotic and relational possibilities that this
transition entailed.70 The repetition marks the loss of other configurations of self, erotic
and otherwise, that had no names—and that the word “gay” would not capture, no matter
how many times you heard it.
Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene are based on women Stein knew from her Paris
salon, Ethel Mars and Maud Hunt Squire, American artists known for woodblock prints
who settled in the south of France.71 Little else is known about these women who were
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Dydo (1993) identifies “Miss Mars” and “Miss Squire” as an American lesbian couple. The
women worked as painters, illustrators, and woodblock artists; several sources cite their shared
affinity for makeup and for brightly-dyed hair, e.g. Stone and Souhami. See also the letter Maud
Hunt Squire sent to Stein following the publication of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas,
which she signs “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene,” in Gallup, 268-9.
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together for some fifty years. Unlike the “real” Miss Furr and Miss Skeene, Stein’s
characters do not stay together. Being “regularly gay,” for them, is not a static state, nor
is it tied to coupled life or lesbian marriage and domesticity. Stein’s queer life, in short, is
not reflected in this portrait’s plot but rather in its form: in how things happen
(“regularly”), not what happens (two women meet, live together for a while, and then
break up). The product of a transitional moment (1910), in which Stein endeavored “to
say what you nor I nor nobody knows” in part by doing away with narrative and story
(“what anybody does”) and writing portraits, poems, and plays, “Miss Furr and Miss
Skeene” complicates the neat partitioning of Stein’s career to correlate with her
biography (“Plays” 262). Stein composed “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” having already
met and married Toklas, a choice that radically reshaped not only what Stein wrote but
also how she wrote it—to the extent that, as one critic has suggested, each post-Toklas
composition is in some way a re-telling of this “single love story” (Dydo, Reader 451).
Yet Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene are not a married couple in a home; neither are they
Stein and Toklas blissfully ensconced with “objects,” “food,” and “rooms.” The
presumed alliance of biography and textual content—the presumption, in other words,
that the nature of Stein’s romantic life determined her capacity to represent queer/lesbian
life—breaks down with Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene’s “quite regularly gay”
relationship.
Before returning to the portrait, I survey the critical landscape of Stein scholarship
since midcentury. I propose that Stein’s status as a radical (and queer) modernist writer
has obscured her vital interest in explicit representation, not of sex but simply of being an
ordinary and queer person. Stein herself has always been seen as an extraordinary figure,
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an iconic queer, a writer of unreadably difficult sentences. The challenge that Stein’s
work makes to reading, critics have long connected to Stein’s own torturous journey to
queer identity (marriage, love, a stable existence) and her eventual covert renderings of
lesbian relationships, or “relationships between women of a kind that the standards of the
era would not have allowed her to describe more explicitly,” as Edmund Wilson once
tortuously put it (581). “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” raises the question of Stein’s
“difficulty” anew. Stein’s portrait seeks to represent queer life explicitly—as “regular,”
repetitive, everyday life—without description or conventional narrative form, a concrete
setting. An experimental form enables Stein’s explicit portrayal of two women who
“were gay.” This goes against the grain of our inherited portrait of “Gertrude Stein,” the
queer and radical modernist writer, as well as the portrait of “the reader” who is imagined
to have produced her: a reader inclined to look for queerness as what cannot be explicit.
In the earliest phase of scholarship on Stein’s work, which begins around
midcentury with Donald Sutherland’s 1951 study Gertrude Stein: A Biography of Her
Work, Stein emerges as a writer who is burdened in her early career (1900-1910) with
sexual repression and a painful and tumultuous queer love life, documented in the novel
Q.E.D. (composed in 1903 and published in 1951 with the title Things As They Are). This
early scholarship combines a biographical approach with an attention to Stein’s style as it
shifted and diversified; much of it reflects a greater interest in Stein’s literary personality,
a product of her eventual fame, than in the texts themselves.72 Q.E.D. explores a
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DeKoven (1983) makes this point, citing Sutherland (1951) and Bridgman (1970) as
exceptions: these were critics interested primarily in how to read Stein’s writing. Most of the
criticism to date, DeKoven notes, presents Stein “as someone whose life in literature—her
influence, connections, history, witty remarks—is of greater interest and importance than her
writing” (xxii). Readings at the level of style are a fixture of Stein scholarship. In DeKoven’s
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triangulated and by all accounts disastrous love affair with May Bookstaver and the rival
for Bookstaver’s affection, Mabel Haynes. Q.E.D. was put away into a closet and
“forgotten” for some thirty years, as recorded in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. In
order to use her own experience as material for writing, according to Gass and other early
critics, Stein replaced the “lurid” words that would have exposed her sexuality with
“simple” and “unspecialized” ones from everyday life and speech (“Her Escape” 239).
“Euphemisms and other kinds of verbal substitutions,” in the words of Richard
Bridgman, at once protected Stein from exposure and revealed her queerness to certain
critics who were inclined to pay attention; with this technique, according to Bridgman,
“she moved steadily towards abstraction,” transmuting the particular and the
autobiographical into the universal (56, 57). Sutherland describes a “disembodiedness” in
Stein’s work that is traceable to Henry James and nineteenth-century transcendentalist
writers (9). Gass more usefully pinpoints “the source of the impulse to abstractness” as a
need “to gain by artifice a safety from the world,” and ultimately to write “without the
risks of feeling” the pain in the material (“Her Escape” 239). Gass likens Q.E.D. to a

view, however, a Stein “work” (Tender Buttons, “any of the famous portraits”) does not
constitute a unit of interpretation; this is true for all experimental corpora, whose “division…into
specific works is generally arbitrary, and often meaningless” (xv). A more compelling argument
for reading style, in my view, emerges in the scholarship attentive to Stein’s daily writing
practice. As Perelman (1994) points out, Stein was more committed to this daily practice than she
was “to any particular bit of the product” (130). This was particularly true before the publication
and the popular success of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. When writing goes unpublished
or unsold, Stein reflects in Everybody’s Autobiography (1937), “any word you have written is as
important as any other word and you keep everything you have written with great care” (39).
Stein’s tremendous output (some 8000 pages, much of it unpublished in her lifetime in the form
of “works”) makes concrete her valuing of process over product. In an archival study written with
William Rice, Gertrude Stein: The Language That Rises (2003), Dydo reconstructs Stein’s
writing process through which daily life became material for writing, eschewing printed texts
entirely in favor of the manuscripts, the preliminary notebooks or carnets (used for jottings, love
notes, and quotations), and the manuscript notebooks or cahiers from which the typescripts were
created.
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“graduate essay” and dismisses its “abstract, monotonous, pompous, vague” language as
“not very promising” (239). At its most sensitive, however, Gass’s reading of Stein’s
novel is not far from understanding that abstraction offers “safety from the world” to
queer desires, feelings, and bodies. Specificity is painful. And so, abstraction is
“protective speech.”
Gass makes the counterintuitive claim that a protective language “must be
precise” (“Her Escape” 240). Stein seeks refuge from the pain of intimate life in abstract
language, Gass contends. But, in order to be protective, Stein’s abstraction must be
precise. Protecting the details of one’s intimate life from exposure, then, for Stein,
requires precision rather than vagueness: “Protective language names.” Why would Stein
represent as nameable the very thing that she is trying to shield from being exposed?
Homosexual meaning (“dangerous objects which by craft of language have been
circumvented”) is most legible as secrecy, Gass suggests (240). In other words,
circumvention activates and even produces homosexual possibility. Gass intuits that the
danger of exposure lies, for Stein, not in precision but in vagueness or in leaving things
unnamed. As Eve Sedgwick later clarifies, this is a distinctly modern representational
predicament arising from the public construction of homosexuality “as secrecy”
(Epistemology 73, italics in original). The indirect or inexplicit names for homosexuality
were in fact writable in the early twentieth century, and they index, as Sedgwick argues,
both the love that dare not speak its name as well as the fact of its unspeakability. The
“beast” in James’s classic story “The Beast in the Jungle” (1902), for example, is a sign
of same-sex love as well as a sign of its unutterable nature. The closet is not a form of
concealment so much as a mode of rendering silence or the unsaid word interpretable,
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sometimes spectacularly so. Stein for her part understood the telling nature of the secret.
As she once wrote of Henry James, “The thing to wonder is did he not have to say what
he did not have to say” (“Henry James” 175).
The critical tendency to pinpoint queerness as encoded content persists in feminist
readings of Stein’s work that are attuned to social forces and the governing power of
norms. The feminist phase does not reject the framework offered by the midcentury
critics, which invites us to read Stein’s early writing (including “Miss Furr and Miss
Skeene”) as preoccupied with the portrayal of failed lesbian relationships.73 Neither does
the feminist phase reject the basic premise that biography unlocks a deeper layer of
specifically erotic meaning in Stein’s most “hermetic” texts. The sad queer narrative
inherited from the biographical phase persists in feminist criticism as well but with a
crucial plot development: Stein meets Alice Toklas, and Stein’s life—therefore her
writing—changes drastically and for the better. With Toklas, Stein could leave behind the
anguished love triangles and conventional narrative forms of Q.E.D. and Three Lives, the
latter a rewriting of the former. For many feminist critics, Stein’s marriage to Toklas is an
aesthetic as well as a personal turning point. Domesticity and marriage, or what Stein
called “regular” living, are acknowledged to be the basis of Stein’s radical modernist
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For Catharine Stimpson, one of Stein’s earliest feminist champions, the encoding of “lesbian
experiences” defines Stein’s early work: the novels Q.E.D. (composed 1903) and Fernhurst
(1904-1905), Three Lives (1905-1906, a rewriting of Q.E.D.), and The Making of Americans
(1903-1911). Stimpson argues that during this time “what were [in actual life] lesbian experiences
become, if possible, sadder and sadder,” as Stein subjects them to disguise (499). In Fernhurst,
for example, two women whose companionship is tested by the entrance of an intriguing married
man, remain together. When Stein folds the plot of Fernhurst (based on actual events at Bryn
Mawr College) into the much longer book The Making of Americans, however, nobody ends up
together. “Ada,” Stein’s portrait of Toklas from about 1910, represents for Stimpson “the
beginning of a new writing about sexuality that can be more joyous and erotic in mood, domestic
in setting, and modern in linguistic style” (504).
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style.74 Turning to works like “Ada” (Stein’s portrait of Toklas from about 1910), Tender
Buttons, “Lifting Belly,” and A Book Concluding With As A Wife Has A Cow A Love
Story, feminist critics reframe “verbal substitution” as a conscious gesture rather than a
symptom of repression: by writing a wife who has a “cow” (or sex with her queer
husband—Stein), Stein refuses conventional language and covertly celebrates her lesbian
marriage.
Tender Buttons, written in the midst of Leo Stein’s departure from the apartment
at 27 rue de Fleurus, has been read as Stein’s delighted inventory of this changed
domestic arrangement, difference “spreading” from and through the newlyweds to their
shared objects, food, and rooms, the physical embodiments of language and of love. Neil
Schmitz describes Tender Buttons as “a breakthrough into the possession of this
particular space, the dwelling,” which then “becomes the site of Gertrude Stein’s text”
(164, 174, italics in original). The breakthrough of the Tender Buttons period, however,
was not just about the home becoming the site of radical modernism—a convergence
many critics have addressed.75 It was also about protective speech: Stein no longer
needed it, as she had embraced her queerness (with Toklas) as a structuring pattern for
everyday life. The substitution of words like “cow” for “sex” and “aider” for “Ada”
(itself a name for Alice) continued through the Tender Buttons period. According to
feminist readings, however, these are substitutions steeped in marital pleasure rather than
shame. With Tender Buttons, Stein’s evolution from sad queer to happily married queer
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“Gertrude Stein says,” she writes as Toklas in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, “that if
you are way ahead with your head you naturally are old fashioned and regular in your daily life”
(303).
75
On the convergence of modernity and domesticity for Stein and Toklas, see Perelman (1994),
Blair (2006), Randall (2009), and Wilson (2013).
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is complete: an intimate breakthrough. Stein’s aesthetic breakthrough is “a different
language” altogether, as Marianne DeKoven puts it. Investing ordinary words with a
specifically queer meaning is, post-Toklas, secondary to the new aesthetic project that
domestic life suggested: transforming words into objects, which Stein does in Tender
Buttons, among many other things. When Gass describes this project as an “escape” from
“purely protective language” (and a need for emotional safety), he is referring to the
breakthrough that, according to feminist critics, Toklas is responsible for.
From 1913 until Stein’s death in 1946, Stein and Toklas lived together. Kay
Turner, who has edited a book of household love notes between Stein and Toklas, Baby
Precious Always Shines (1999), describes their relationship as “very rare” and “very
ordinary” (4). Within lesbian studies, it became something of a butch/femme paradigm.76
Unlike many of their lesbian expatriate contemporaries, Turner notes, “Gertrude and
Alice simply married, set up house, had sex, and stayed together, mostly for better, rarely
for worse” (23). It can be hard to wrap one’s head around—fully embrace or fully
reject—the claims that various scholars have made about the overwhelming influence of
Toklas and her ménage.77 In Ulla Dydo’s tidy summary, “Alice Toklas makes writing
possible in making living possible…All Stein’s writings become love stories and all her
work a single love story” (Reader 451). Dydo’s claim reflects the version of Stein that
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See, for example, Newton, “Alice Hunting.”
The question of how much Toklas mattered hinges on the fact that certain kinds of feminized
labor, such as those that Toklas performed (secretarial and household labor, most especially),
have been consistently devalued even as they’ve been recovered and idealized as practices
affording modes of resistance, creativity, and survival for some women. The archetype of Stein
and Toklas, queer and happily married pair, has partly been staked on the erasure of the labor
other people did for them. Another facet, when we consider Toklas’s role as “secretary” and
“typist,” is the question of joint authorship: did Toklas co-create Stein’s texts?
77
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feminist critics recovered. Although her interventions are primarily archival and
concerned with Stein’s writing process, in particular her notebooks, Dydo is writing
against the earlier body of male-authored biographical criticism that downplayed
Toklas’s presence, if it mentioned Toklas at all. Dydo’s description of Stein—a writer
composing to and for Toklas—invites an understanding of Stein’s writing as “the
composition in which we live” (“Portraits and Repetition” 287). The composition in
which “we” live refers not only to the external and observable world of objects (or the
“thing seen” that becomes the composition for Stein) but also to Stein’s domestic
arrangements and the things with which she lived: the “we” referring, far more narrowly,
to Stein and Toklas at home.
Feminist critics produced a version of Stein who was a happily married lesbian,
committed to her home and to the loving wife who managed it. This Stein encodes her
sexuality with joy rather than pain, texture instead of flatness, sound instead of secrecy,
poetic shine rather than prosaic dullness. Feminist readings proved that understanding
Stein’s identity as both a woman who was gender-nonconforming and a lesbian could
give her texts new meaning. A knowledge of Stein as a “practicing lesbian,” as Catharine
Stimpson put it, could even render Stein’s apparently unreadable texts both
comprehensible and fun. They proved that Stein was dedicated to the abstract
representation of specific sexual desires, orientations, and experiences; and that linguistic
innovation (Stein’s desire for a new language) was connected to her experience of being
queer in the world. Many of these feminist readings now feel dated, their claims
predictable and musty. We know that Stein had sex, and we know that she wrote about it.
The rigid one-to-one decoding operations restrict the range of meaning and impart a false
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coherency, a sense that if Stein’s every word can be accounted for as meaning something
in relation to the whole, then we can know what she is saying (at least provisionally).
Nevertheless, the feminist readings of Stein’s work are worth remembering
because they understand that Stein’s linguistic innovation is connected—in an ordinary
way—to her queer life, to how it felt to be queer in the world and, more specifically, at
home. For Stein, we can conclude, this felt like needing other words and other worlds,
not just for “orgasm” or “sex” but also “table,” “roast beef” and “dress,” the objects in
her everyday and relatively privileged domestic life. Stein’s identity mattered to feminist
readings in a way that it would not in the poststructuralist critical phase, the third and
final phase I will examine before returning to the portrait. Key figures in this phase
include the Language poet-critics Lyn Hejinian, Charles Bernstein, and Bob Perelman as
well as the poetry scholar Marjorie Perloff, the only critic to have engaged in a sustained
(across two books) analysis of “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene.” These critics, writing in the
wake of and in some cases contemporaneously with feminist critics, are invested in
recovering Stein’s work as a precursor to postmodern writing and theory and the
Language poetry movement in particular. The starting point of their recovery is a
rejection of identity: a reframing of Stein as someone who chose to “avert her identity” in
order to produce a radically different poetic style, one newly legible within postmodern
frameworks for its apparent dissolution of the subject and whatever forms of
“marginalization” being a subject might involve (Bernstein 487).
Identity is the enemy of the avant-garde artist/writer in postmodernist readings of
Stein. Identity, in other words, is what the writer must surpass in order to become a
radical innovator. Perloff, summarizing what she presents as Stein’s beliefs about
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identity, suggests that “disseminators, those who belong to the ‘school,’ have identity,
personality, something specific to say” (21st-Century 47). For postmodernist readers like
Perloff, Stein’s work is valuable not because it represents a minoritized experience of
gender and sexuality but because it remakes language and unsettles the foundations upon
which literature exists to be valued. These two things were now imagined to be separate
and distinct, whereas critics in the biographical and feminist phases recognized their
close connection. Postmodernist readings of Stein strategically and in some cases
homophobically forget what Stein’s midcentury critics knew: the extent to which identity
matters to writing the world anew or choosing to craft a different language. Identitybased interpretations, which attend to sexuality and gender, are dismissed as “easy
reading” (Perloff, Poetic License 153). The more difficult modes of reading for the
formal effect of indeterminate meaning, on the other hand, are valued. Being explicit—
determining meaning, let alone producing truth—becomes anathema to Stein’s protopostmodernist project.78 Perloff’s Stein does not have “something specific to say” such as
“gay” people or women exist. Instead, Perloff’s Stein depicts the abstract process,
concept, pattern, norm, or structure in the manner of a theorist thinking of anybody and
everyone. This is the framework Perloff brings to Stein’s “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene,” a
text that in her view “is not so much about a love affair as it is about the paradigmatic
process of union and dissolution” (Perloff, 21st-Century 62, italics in original). Perloff
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Ashton (2005) argues, contrary to Perloff’s analysis, that Stein was interested in the
determinism of names. This claim informs how Ashton understands Stein’s famous explanation
(in “Poetry and Grammar”) of the revitalization of poetry, specifically the “rose” that Stein makes
red again by way of repetition. Ashton argues that Stein sought to reinvent poetic language not by
using words as if they were things and sowing indeterminacy but rather by instilling this
determining power of names in ordinary nouns, such as the ones in Tender Buttons. See the
chapter “Making the rose red: Stein, proper names, and the critique of indeterminacy.”

105

cancels out the “love affair,” the homosexual content, by insisting that what matters is a
“paradigmatic process” of which queer love is not a viable example. “Miss Furr and Miss
Skeene,” in this reading, is a portrait of a universal (and a normative?) process rather than
of particular women with non-standard (and queer?) lives.
Perloff’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the word “gay” means “homosexual”
represents a stunning avoidance not just of Stein’s feminist recovery from the 1970s
forward but also of the more immediate emergence within literary studies of queer theory
and specifically what Sedgwick defined as antihomophobic reading. Perloff’s description
of “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” is almost Henry-Jamesian in its avoidance of what Stein,
unlike James, makes explicit in the portrait: “There is no explanation of their mutual
attraction…The mystery of their being is thus left intact,” Perloff writes (Poetic License
153). These claims address a textual world in which “gay” women, or women who like
each other and might choose to live together, do not exist: “gay” cannot mean gay.
Perloff’s reluctance to engage in shallow, surface, or what she calls “easy” readings,
leads her to erase the queer or even just “gay” content from a text that uses the word
“gay” more insistently than any other word.
What Perloff refers to as the “mystery” of Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene’s
attraction is explicable and named within Stein’s portrait. We can account for it, and it
would be harmful—even untruthful—to insist on its mysteriousness. Even if the word
“gay” doesn’t precisely name the women’s desires, it nonetheless insists that they are
nameable. It represents a queer capacity to call things by their names. The Oxford English
Dictionary cites “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” as its earliest example of the word “gay”
being used to mean, as it now means, “homosexual.” The portrait’s vague, schematic plot
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invites this reading of the word: it moves essentially in the style of a modern “coming
out” narrative in which the family home is jettisoned for a space of possibility. An exit
from the home enables a newly “gay” identity, “gay” relationships, and even something
like a “gay” community (or life beyond the private couple form). This aspect of the
portrait matters—in order to access it, of course, we have to take Stein at her word and
join the OED in supposing that Stein’s “gay” really does mean homosexual. The
repetition of the word is also a process of getting to know it, becoming familiar and even
bored with seeing and hearing it over and over. “Gay” defines not just a particular way of
being within the world of the portrait but also what it is to be, or being itself, within the
portrait. To be “gay there” is to exist for Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene.
The adverb “there,” which Stein repeats, refers to no place in particular beyond
the portrait itself. It does not “show” the reader any place, defying its deictic function.
The portrait’s “there” is stripped of context: a “you are here” arrow or star without the
needed map beneath it, which would orient the user. Using adverbs without context thus
constructs an abstract landscape that is familiar without being indexical; the navigator of
this landscape cannot prove that they are anywhere or chart precise locations. Helen Furr
and Georgine Skeene, in being “regularly gay there,” thus inhabit a space beyond the
reader’s capacity for mapping, verification, and visual proof. They disappear as they are
rooted there, located and unprovable, despite the insistent naming. I call this Stein’s
explicit abstraction: a mode of representing existence without normative appearance or a
conventional narrative form (with all the trimmings: setting, details). Abstraction is
Stein’s way of insisting on the existence of her subjects Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene
while yet refusing to accede to normative modes of legibility: in other words, a way of
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being explicit about existence without producing legible subjects of a portrait or a
biography, let alone a love story.
Stein’s “there” is not a place we recognize. The portrait, however, in asking us to
read the word “there” again and again, teaches us how to read it—and how not to. Helen
Furr, who we are introduced to first, resides at home: “quite a pleasant home.” She lives
with Mrs. and Mr. Furr, “quite a pleasant woman” and “quite a pleasant man,”
respectively. Dissatisfied with life at home (she does not “find it gay”), Helen Furr goes
to “a place” where people are engaged in “cultivating something.” Helen Furr meets
Georgine Skeene “there,” and right away (within a single sentence) Helen Furr and
Georgine Skeene are living together: “Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together
then,” the adverb signaling a decisive event (“Miss Furr” 17). For the most part, coupled
life is unremarkable and routine. The women live together “there,” and they are “gay” but
never at “home.” The abstract space of “there” displaces the comparatively specific space
of “home” as someplace occupied, in Helen Furr’s experience, by pleasant men and
women who form couples and have children. “There,” although it refers to no place in
particular, signifies the absence of a home, a woman, and a man—where heteronormative
life is not. The vague male figures in the portrait are peripheral and sinister if mostly
inconsequential. Georgine Skeene visits her brother in another “place” where he has
“quite some distinction.” The women sit with “dark and heavy men” for the duration of a
paragraph, yet all the while they are “regularly gay.” The unnamed men soon disappear
as Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene continue “regularly living,” learning “little things”
and “ways of being gay.” In what is possibly the portrait’s most important vague event,
Georgine Skeene leaves to see her brother and does not return, thus ending the couple’s
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togetherness. Helen Furr continues to be gay: “Helen Furr stayed there where they had
been regularly living the two of them and she would then certainly not be lonesome, she
would go on being gay. She did go on being gay…She learned a few more little ways of
being in being gay. She was quite gay and in the same way” (“Miss Furr” 21).
What does it mean to be gay there as opposed to just gay?79 Sara Ahmed’s work
has usefully illuminated queerness as a mode of being oriented in space: directed, pulled,
extended or not by heteronormative social forms. Ahmed takes up the project of a “queer
phenomenology” in part because this branch of philosophy “reminds us that spaces are
not exterior to bodies; instead, spaces are like a second skin that unfolds in the folds of
the body” (Queer Phenomenology 9). Ahmed describes the lesbian body in particular as
one “that is not extended by the skin of the social” (20). The lesbian body in a public
space, a mundane situation, is not only not made welcome by the norms that govern that
space. It is also and in various ways held back and pressed against itself, to the extent that
it becomes possible to think, that body wasn’t there at all. Defining lesbianism as an
impossibility, whether lived or represented, has been a defining gesture of lesbian studies.
In Impossible Women (2000), Valerie Rohy locates the lesbian at the point of symbolic
impossibility or the breakdown of meaningful language. Traub, an early modernist,
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The claim to being “there” holds special meaning within pre-Stonewall representations of
homosexuality, Christopher Nealon has suggested. The need to imagine oneself “there,” exiled
from the heteronormative world yet found within new forms of sociality and intimacy, reflects the
feeling of “uncertainty” with which queers met the prospect of their future place in history in the
first half of the twentieth century. This uncertainty was a structure through which queers
imagined and made a place in history (their future). See Nealon’s reading of an instance of the
word “there” in James Baldwin’s novel Go Tell It on the Mountain (1951) in Foundlings, 181182. The situatedness or geographical specificity of sexuality has been a topic of concern for
other disciplines and fields, e.g. anthropology. Kahan has argued in a queer studies context that
“the early history of homosexuality must be recognized as what we would today refer to as
situational homosexuality” (Minor Perverts 22).
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describes the “dilemma of lesbian representation” as a matter of “practicing
impossibilities” (Renaissance 6). As Jodie Medd has put it, working in the early
twentieth-century modernist context, “it is precisely in not being there that (the
suggestion of) lesbianism can do so much in specific historical contexts” (4, italics in
original).80 By removing any traces of a specific historical context from her portrait of
“gay” women, Stein declines “suggestion” as a mode of abstract representation. This
refusal of suggestion takes the form of an insistent pointing gesture—they were gay
there—that invites a literal reading. To be gay there is to be someone who is definitely
somewhere, thus already in existence.
The adverb “there” insists on Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene’s existence while
at the same time it refuses to confirm that they are anywhere in particular: “They were
together then and travelled to another place and stayed there and were gay there” (“Miss
Furr” 17). Stein continues: “They stayed there and were gay there, not very gay there, just
gay there.” It is significant that “there” gives way to “then” in the conclusion of the
portrait, its final paragraph. Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene, although they “were gay
there” and “lived together then,” upon their meeting one another, do not stay together for
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In Lesbian Scandal and the Culture of Modernism, Medd examines lesbianism through a series
of legal trials as a scandalous suggestion rather than a stable category with specific content;
lesbianism, Medd suggests, “always lent itself to figuring something else” (19). Medd’s
conception of lesbianism as a suggestion is a critical move that’s meant to shift the focus from
“what lesbianism is” (what lesbians did or didn’t do, etc.) to “what the suggestion of lesbianism
does for and does to” modernist texts and modernist culture (19, italics in original). A minor
problem with the move away from “what lesbianism is,” a well-intentioned, anti-essentialist
move, is that it risks not making the crucial point that lesbianism was, it did exist, and there were
people with an investment in its existence for itself and toward no other cultural aim than that it
was there—in other words, that it was not just or even primarily a vessel, a symbol, a powerful
“cultural agent” for the production of modernist meaning. Medd acknowledges this by claiming a
“desire to bear witness to these women’s relationships and accomplishments” (23).
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long. Georgine Skeene abandons Helen Furr for reasons left unspecified: “Then neither
of them were living there any longer” (22). This conclusion might remind us that the
tending of “gay” spaces is a process undertaken with the constant risk of removal.
Uncoupled life for Helen Furr is situated “somewhere else” and more explicitly in time, a
newly-weighted “then” that renders coupled life a thing of the past. Helen Furr now has a
past and things to be “remembered,” although Georgine Skeene seems not to be among
them. Having been with Georgine Skeene becomes an opening to pluralize what being
gay might mean beyond a regular gay couple:
She remembered all the little ways of being gay. She used all the little ways of
being gay. She was quite regularly gay. She told many then the way of being gay,
she taught very many then little ways they could use in being gay. She was living
very well, she was gay then, she went on living then, she was regular in being
gay, she always was living very well and was gay very well and was telling about
little ways one could be learning to use in being gay, and later was telling them
quite often, telling them again and again. (“Miss Furr” 22)
She remembered, she used, she was, she told, she taught: the portrait ends with Helen
Furr’s insistent action as a person who is uncoupled yet connected to a group of many
others through her telling about “gay” ways. The task of telling other people “about little
ways one could be learning to use in being gay” is pedagogical (or could be), yet the
content of her lessons is opaque to the portrait’s reader, as opposed to Helen Furr’s
listener. The reader does not know what Helen Furr remembers, uses, and relates to other
people, only that she undertakes these social and pedagogical acts.
Helen Furr imparts “gay” lessons as she remains an unlocatable and indefinite
“gay” figure, who is nonetheless surrounded by other people being “gay.” “Telling” is
more than just a habit or an everyday act repeated. Stein’s insistence (“telling them again
and again”), as Elizabeth Freeman notes, “is about the refusal of something regular to go
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away” (Beside You 145). Through punning on the word “telling” as both adjective and
gerund, Stein establishes a mode of “telling” about “gay” life that pivots less on
revelation or exposure than it does on continuity and refusing to go away: “gay” life
becoming ordinary, neither a secret nor a scandal. The point of Helen Furr’s successive
acts of “telling” isn’t exposure but expansion—teaching and learning among many—to
the extent that “gay” life cannot be forgotten, silenced, erased. Telling them again and
again is also a statement of Stein’s style: making “gay” life ordinary is a matter of being
explicit in addition to repeating. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene” makes queer meaning that
is both explicit and abstract, or beyond the point of removal. It declines to tell a story in
which “gay” women are impossible or hidden, silent spectacles—we know that they were
there. No reader can prove that they were not. The repetition teaches the reader, just as
Helen Furr teaches “them,” that being “gay” takes many forms and that, above all, it is
possible to be “regularly gay,” or to go on being a “gay” person (specifically gay, quite
gay, very gay, and only gay) without cohering into rigidity or dissolving into fluidity. The
women’s precise location “there” is not a location we can plot or even describe, and yet
we get used to it: it is an ordinary place.
As simply a fixture of the landscape, “gay” life warrants neither exposure nor
spectacular concealment—and solicits none of love’s extravagant feelings from the
reader or indeed from Stein’s “gay” women. Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene are two of
the least emotional queers in all of literary modernism. That they are engaged in doing
unremarkable things—like staying, traveling, sitting, learning, and working—is the
portrait’s basic assertion. Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene are “gay” by virtue of these
activities, and they are unadorned by feeling, motivation, and reaction. Their flashy
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names, suggesting “fur” and “skin,” are the only decoration they possess, as if their doing
“being gay” displaces their capacity to have identifying qualities or traits. The women
show no signs of feeling anything toward this way of life. They do not feel toward each
other, as two people joined in love, who are “together,” tend to do: neither can be said to
orient the other’s desires, or even to know what those desires might be for. Do we regard
them with suspicion? Do we attempt to read their flatness as a sign of hidden excess? Or
do we celebrate their way of being “gay” and ordinary as an achievement in itself?
Helen Furr “was not astonished at anything,” Stein writes, not even the
unexplained disappearance of Georgine Skeene, who goes “to stay two months with her
brother” and remains there or goes elsewhere, never returning to that place “where they
had been living regularly together” (“Miss Furr” 20-22). Helen Furr is never surprised;
nor is she “lonesome” or upset. She, like Georgine Skeene, is never “happy,” “carefree,”
“lively,” “cheerful,” “amorous,” or any other less anachronistic synonym for “gay.” She
is a bulwark of neutrality, invulnerable to being hurt, unsettled, or disorganized, thrown
out of “regular” life. No change, no turn of events can leave her feeling—anything. She is
immersed in doing things like using her “cultivated” voice and learning ways of being
“gay.” Continuous action seems to foreclose any semblance of reaction to significant
events: “They did not live together then Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene” (22). The
endpoint mirrors the beginning-point, a pair of time-stamped sentences that tells us
almost nothing about what happened yet suggests that so much might have happened
between them. “Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together then” (17). This portrait’s
structural displacement of emotion from “gay” women and their “regular” existence (in
the form of knowledge imparted to Helen Furr by her experience: “she knew she was not
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astonished at anything”) enables Stein to foreground something other than Helen Furr’s
relationship, its failure or its fizzling out. Stein ends the portrait in a way that is decidedly
not tragic and decidedly not happy. In the final paragraph, as in the rest of the text, the
emphasis falls on doing things, what Helen Furr continues to do: an ordinary and “gay”
life toward which the reader might feel neutral or ambivalent or nothing. She is “living
very well.”

I read this portrait as a blueprint for the writing that would follow it: those texts,
like Tender Buttons and the poems in Stein’s collection of short works Geography and
Plays (1922), that feel preoccupied with everyday household objects and activities like
cooking, cleaning, and sex. Reading the writing from this period, as one early critic notes,
“is rather like listening to an interminable tape recording made secretly in a household”
(Bridgman 149). In “Sacred Emily,” for example, we encounter the lines, “Draw prettily.
/Next to a bloom. /Neat stretch. /Place plenty. /Cauliflower. /Cauliflower. /Curtain
cousin. /Apron” (181). The list-like sentences in “IIIIIIIIII.” resemble those in Tender
Buttons: “Coffee, cough, glass, spoon, white, singing,” or “Press in the ink and stare and
cheese,” or “A cape coat, in bold shutters, in bold shutters shutting and not changing
shutters not changing climaxes and feelings and hold over the switch, the binding of a pet
and a revolver, the chosen loan, the owned cake in pieces, the way to swim” (189, 190,
195). These household genius compositions furnish the space, the abstract “there,” that
Stein maps out in “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene.” They fill it with furniture and food and
sound and texture and “feelings” and love. Words surpass their status as names as Stein
transforms them into things: “A language in a bath and in a dressing gown to a precision”
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(“IIIIIIIIII.” 195). Household things afford the language through which Stein is
understood to celebrate her queer existence—and revive the English language, tired
symbols like the rose. Hers are words, according to the writer Sherwood Anderson (who
wrote the preface to Geography and Plays), “that have a taste on the lips, that have a
perfume to the nostrils, rattling words one can throw into a box and shake, making a
sharp, jingling sound, words that, when seen on the printed page, have a distinct arresting
effect upon the eye, words that when they jump out from under the pen one may feel with
the fingers as one might caress the cheeks of his beloved” (Anderson 7). Perhaps what
Anderson is describing is the sort of writing that makes the reader fall in love with
words—and maybe the author of them, too.
The words in Tender Buttons, “Sacred Emily,” and “IIIIIIIIII.” are vibrant, noisy,
and exciting. Readers can throw them into a box and hear a new sound every time; the
meaning can always be exchanged. “Miss Furr and Miss Skeene,” this chapter argues,
does not offer that experience, the pleasure of endless meaning. The world of this portrait
is bare and quiet, akin to Bishop’s proto-dream-house. Helen Furr lives “very well”
within this world, however we don’t know how. The details do not really matter, insofar
as Stein establishes an ordinary place in which “gay” women are not noisy or arresting or
spectacular or scented but simply there. Love them or not, Stein’s portrait insists (and
probably not), they were gay there. With this short portrait of two women who have
nothing and live nowhere, Stein establishes the space that she would later fill and furnish
and transform into a home. Before the house can hold its trimmings, the foundation had
to be laid: “Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together then.”
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Chapter Three
A Queer Enough Love: Gwendolyn Brooks’s “Women, yes”
I give you Maud Martha. Pearl May Lee. The mother of Emmett Till.
Winnie Mandela. Mrs. Small. Annie Allen. Hattie Scott. Queen of the
Blues. Those of my sisters who kept their naturals. Women, yes. Some
with no hallelujahs, no hurrahs at all, no handshakes.
—Gwendolyn Brooks, Report from Part Two
A poet is someone at home.
—June Jordan, “The Difficult Miracle of Black Poetry in America or
Something Like a Sonnet for Phillis Wheatley”
Asked if “other people…consider you to be rather peculiar,” on account of
writing poetry, the poet Gwendolyn Brooks replies: “Oh, all along people have
considered me to be ‘rather peculiar.’ When I was a teen my teen friends wondered, as
they partied and danced, why I was happy to stay in my tiny room and write. They
thought this was very odd and that I was doomed to failure, that I would never have boy
friends [sic], a marriage, children. Even now many who admire the things that have
happened to me do not regard me with entire seriousness” (Part One 134). From
Brooks’s teenage friends’ perspective, who are content to party and dance, writing poetry
is an odd thing to do—and to be happy doing. For these friends, writing poetry and
“failure” (not having a life) are tied together in a particular way: staying at home to write
is tantamount to never getting a boyfriend. By desiring aloneness, time to write, her “tiny
room,” a young Brooks runs the risk of failing to have a heteronormative life. Brooks’s
life did not turn out the way her teen friends predicted it would. She was not doomed.
(Nor were boyfriends, marriage, and children the only avenues for success.)
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Nevertheless, at the time of the above interview with an Illinois historian, 1967, Brooks
was married and the mother of two children. Queerness, then, as Brooks’s teenage friends
foretold it, did not come to be. A queerness legible as a failure to have boyfriends, a
marriage, and children is what might have been but wasn’t for the rather peculiar poet.
This chapter focuses on two of Brooks’s “straight” Black women characters,
neither of whom is lesbian-identified or sexually queer. Annie Allen and Maud Martha,
of the poetry collection Annie Allen (1949) and the novel Maud Martha (1953), are two
ordinary women who have quite conventional lives: cramped, imperfect, and
unremarkable.81 These characters reside in tiny rooms (with distant, disappointing
husbands), literally and metaphorically. Neither is a poet per se, yet Annie Allen and
Maud Martha approach their ordinary domestic lives much as a poet would the page: a
space in need of “shimmering form” (Maud Martha 102).82 Their desire for convention
and stability in their lives, as I argue in this chapter, is a force that curves toward
queerness—that is, away from being trapped in normative structures such as womanhood
and heterosexual marriage, toward creating new traditions, forms, and rituals within
them. Having an ordinary life, for Annie Allen and Maud Martha, is a matter of both
wanting form and of having the space (internal and imaginative, if not always domestic
and material) to create it for themselves.
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The project that became Maud Martha started out as a collection of poems, “American Family
Brown.” According to Melhem, Brooks worked on Annie Allen and “American Family Brown”
concurrently, transforming the “Brown” verses into prose vignettes and narrowing the focus to
one member of the family, Maud Martha Brown.
82
Subsequent quotations from Maud Martha are cited in-text with the abbreviation MM.
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“Conventional” marriage is a source of disappointment for these characters: a
form to reinvent and make anew, not reproduce.83 Brooks depicts heterosexual romance
and its culmination, marriage, as a structure to mistrust, in part because the glowing
images of coupledom available to women in the U.S. at midcentury were overwhelmingly
white, middle class, and suburban. Brooks acknowledges the power of these images in
her memoir: “A truly horrible thing was that I grew up to womanhood and went through
womanhood believing that the gleaming white family life on the motion picture screens
should be my model” (Part One 213, italics in original). Brooks’s revelation equates
being a woman with producing family life. The unnamed value in this formula is
heterosexuality, its privileged rightness overlapping (although not entirely) with that of
whiteness. In place of what we might call heterosexual or straight erotic desire, Annie
Allen and Maud Martha live a wayward sensuality, which lacks a human anchor in the
figure of the husband and gives way to other objects and to ways of reinventing norms of
womanhood and marriage.84 This sensuality extends beyond the romance of the couple
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In The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women’s Fiction (1993),
DuCille examines “the subversive ways in which the marriage convention has been claimed by
black women writers,” from Harriet Wilson to Zora Neale Hurston (3). Brooks’s work falls just
beyond the temporal span of DuCille’s study, which concludes with Hurston’s final published
novel (Seraph on the Suwanee, 1948). DuCille resists an understanding of “convention” as a
stable, transhistorical ideal, positioning the marriage plot (within the novel genre) as a useful,
even emancipatory form, a site of formal experimentation for Black women writers. As
Somerville (2000) points out (with reference to African American domestic fiction), the marriage
plot might figure the attaining of, and not the giving up of, freedom for a woman, insofar as legal
marriage was denied to the enslaved.
84
See Hartman (2019), especially “Wayward: A Short Entry on the Possible,” 227-228.
Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments is an archival project that “augments” and
“breaks open” the compromised resources of the archive and places young Black women in the
cities of New York and Philadelphia at the forefront of a broader “transformation” of Black
intimate life, undertaken at the turn of the twentieth century (1890-1935).
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and suffuses Brooks’s landscapes of domestic ordinariness, activity, and solitude: a space
to “found—tradition,” as Brooks puts it in Maud Martha, rather than to reproduce it.85
The queer aesthetic and political imaginary, to which the work of Gwendolyn
Brooks, as I am arguing here, can add, becomes still richer and more plural, more
hospitable to difference, when its bounds are not determined by queer studies’
longstanding quarrels with, no less than its commitment to, lesbian and gay subjects. Far
from queering Brooks’s characters, that is, re-claiming them by way of an axiomatic
definition of the “queer” as broadly marginal, excessive, and opposed to normal life, I am
extending what I take to be the ever-shifting edges of the category “queer,” against the
notion that this word, “always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage
and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes,” must remain a stable,
faithful sign of sexual alterity and antinormativity (Butler, “Critically Queer” 19). An
urgent and expanding political purpose for queer work, this project argues, is to contend
with queer desires for an ordinary life. The queerness I define as I read Brooks’s novel
and early poems is not an effect of sexuality or sexual identity. It is not a sexual
queerness but a queerness of the everyday and, often, of those structures thought to ruin
or despoil the potential to live otherwise. It is a queerness of convention and of ordinary
need. It is a queerness for the grocery store, the daydream, and the kitchenette—the daily
task, the quiet moment, and the tiny domestic room. It offers no clear “hallelujahs, no
hurrahs at all,” no excess, no grand gestures toward an elsewhere or a space somewhere
beyond. It might not even be there yet.
85

Annie Allen and Maud Martha are not quite what Susan Fraiman (2017) has described as
“outsiders to normative domesticity,” a formulation that suggests a stable notion of the
“normative” as something one may exit, especially if one is queer.
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In this chapter, I return to Annie Allen and Maud Martha in order to highlight
Brooks’s commitment to depicting ordinary, unheroic Black women’s lives. Brooks’s
early work in general and Annie Allen in particular has been slighted for its use of
European poetic forms and Black female protagonists—a combination I understand to
represent Black women’s survival in what Brooks calls “pinchy” spaces, from a
kitchenette apartment (that is literally cramped) to the much broader social climate of
ongoing anti-Blackness that diminishes life chances for Black people living in the wake
of transatlantic slavery.86 Although these texts have been the objects of Black feminist
critique, their central characters described as insufficiently resistant or as offering no
ready, transportable modes of Black resistance, they are valuable precisely insofar as they
insist that self-creation and the shaping of one’s days as a Black woman can be ordinary,
too, as well as difficult, unlikely, or impossible altogether. Before I turn to Annie Allen
and Maud Martha, I account for the critiques that Black Arts Movement (BAM) poets
and readers made of Brooks’s early work, and I propose that Brooks’s “queenhood” as a
poet of Black life, which certain BAM leaders bestowed upon her, cannot be understood
apart from her creation of Maud Martha and Annie Allen, “Women, yes.”
Brooks’s interview above, one reprinted in her memoir Report from Part One
(1972), took place in the summer of 1967 on the heels of a significant event: the second
Black Writers’ Conference held at Fisk University in the spring of that year. This event
would mark a turning point in Brooks’s racial consciousness and even, for some readers
of her work, the beginning of it. “Gwendolyn Brooks post-1967” was a poet of Black life
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This description draws on Sharpe’s In the Wake (2016) and in particular Sharpe’s metaphor (for
anti-Blackness) of the weather.
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and diasporic Black togetherness, a wise adopted mother to the youthful BAM. Brooks’s
aim, post-1967, was to “reach black people” everywhere, “in mines, on farms, on
thrones,” with something like a common language free of technical extravagance, without
what Haki Madhubuti (formerly Don L. Lee, who wrote the preface to Part One) calls
“poetic direction from the Euro-American world” (Part One 183, 14).87 For some BAM
readers like Madhubuti, Brooks’s pre-Fisk work seemed tailored to appease and hail
white audiences—a critique that Brooks accepted yet, in certain ways, took issue with.
Looking back on poet-girlhood in the aftermath of Fisk, where Brooks became (in
her light-hearted self-assessment) “qualified to enter at least the kindergarten of new
consciousness,” Brooks sees herself in 1967 as she had been all along: a “rather peculiar”
person and a “rather peculiar” poet, making innovative work without the framework of a
movement (Part One 86). “A lot of women are now observing that a good many of my
poems are about women,” Brooks remarks in the early 1980s in an interview with
Claudia Tate (Tate 43). Tate asks the poet to expand on the events of 1967, “the year of
transition” (Tate’s words), and Brooks responds by “fighting for [her]self a little bit,”
claiming, in short, that she was doing in the 1940s what the radical Black poets of the 60s
would go on to do: “But it’s crowded back into language like this: The pasts of his
ancestors lean against / Him. Crowd him. Fog out his identity. [Brooks cites two stanzas
from “The Sundays of Satin-Legs Smith,” a long poem from A Street in Bronzeville
(1945), and the closing lines of Annie Allen]” (42, italics in original).88 These “earlier
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Brooks considered Madhubuti an adopted or cultural son. In her dedication to Part One, Brooks
names him as a “clarifier.”
88
The final lines of Annie Allen are: “Let us combine. /There are no magics or elves /Or timely
godmothers to guide us. /We are lost, must /Wizard a track through our own screaming weed”
(60). The call or message in these lines is “crowded” in the sense that it is plural—contradictory
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works,” Tate says to Brooks, “A Street in Bronzeville and Annie Allen, don’t seem to
focus directly on heightened political awareness” (42). Tate asks if Brooks’s newer work
is different. Brooks responds: “Many of the poems, in my new and old books, are
‘politically aware’; I suggest you reread them” (42).89
Dividing Brooks’s writing into pre- and post-Fisk work has given rise to an
important if somewhat inaccurate critical narrative, one that privileges authorial intention
with respect to audience in the later work, as it denies to Brooks this same capacity for
agency with respect to formal choices in the early work. It presupposes formal structure
as a hindrance to a radical and politically aware poetics: speaking to, not just about,
ordinary Black people, Brooks’s near constant concern. In the “early years,” Madhubuti
writes, “the force of her poetic song is strained in iambic pentameter, European sonnets
and English ballads” (Part One 14). As Madhubuti has described them, Brooks’s poems
before 1967 carry “excess weight,” or the burden of poetic material that can serve no
other purpose than to dazzle and impress, and thus to turn away potential readers who do
not care to be dazzled, or at least not in that way—by what Brooks called “the mysteries
and magic of technique” (158). With its technical proficiency and studied,

and open—rather than direct, explicit, clear. The call is fancifully worded, such that fairytale
personae sit beside a “screaming weed,” something wild or out of place. Brooks does not
elaborate beyond, “Granted, that kind of verse is not what you’d take into a tavern,” which is
something she and her young writing workshop students (Madhubuti among them) did in the late
1960s (Tate 43).
89
Critics have revised the narratives of Brooks’s career that situate her early work as apolitical or
insufficiently race-conscious. Shockley (2011) locates what she calls “black aesthetics” in
Brooks’s use of epic form in Annie Allen; her reading complicates the Black Arts-influenced
critique of Annie Allen as a book addressed primarily to white audiences. Thorsson (2015) finds a
thread of Black cultural nationalism running through the poet’s body of work, from Maud Martha
to the more explicitly Black Arts-inflected In the Mecca (1968). Bloch (2016) emphasizes
“formal heterogeneity” in place of a “clean break” between the early and late Brooks, exemplified
by Annie Allen and In the Mecca, respectively.
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unconventional vocabulary, Annie Allen earned the praises of the U.S. poetry
establishment. Critics agree that Brooks intended it to do so.90 In its earliest reception,
Brooks’s treatment of Black girlhood-into-womanhood was hailed as universal and
forgiven its “attempt to come to terms with, and yet avoid, racial bias,” as one reviewer
put it (Smith, “Performers” 534). “Though the materials of her art are largely derived
from the conditions of life in a Negro urban milieu,” Stanley Kunitz wrote, in his review
of Annie Allen, “she uses these incendiary materials naturally, for their intrinsic value,
without straining for shock or for depth, without pretending to speak for a people”
(Kunitz 52). It is not hard to see how such backhanded commendation stoked the ire in
post-BAM appraisals of the book as one intended for white liberals and integrationists—
but not for Black people everywhere.
In Madhubuti’s view, “Annie Allen more so than A Street in Bronzeville seems to
have been written for whites” (Part One 17). This critique of Annie Allen as a book
“written for whites” cannot be understood apart from Brooks’s focus, there and
elsewhere, on Black women. If Annie Allen does not appear to address “the masses of
black people,” as Madhubuti claims, then this is due at least in part to its de-centering of
men as the main figures in and authors of Black life, Black public and private spaces, and
Black consciousness itself. A comment on both works by Brooks’s first biographer
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In a one-page meditation, “Poets Who Are Negroes” (1950), Brooks professes her belief in
“technique” and urges African American poets to “cook” the raw “dough” of Black experience
“until it is unrecognizable.” The “Negro poet…cannot escape having important things to say,”
Brooks claims, and yet they cannot be “content” to present “raw materials” as art. The bare facts
of history, “that inspiriting emotion…found only in the general territory of great drives” (and, we
can add, great suffering), are insufficient, that is, unless they are transformed. The mysteries of
form can render poems “more insinuating, and, therefore, more overwhelming.” Annie Allen puts
this theory into practice, and yet presents another path (in sonnet 4 of the series, “the children of
the poor”) for the embattled poet: “First fight. Then fiddle” (38).
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George Kent is telling. Kent applauds “the portrait of the heroine” in each, and yet he
points to “the remoteness of the male character,” the disappointing husband of Maud
Martha/Annie Allen, as a deficit in both (116). “Even now many who admire the things
that have happened to me do not regard me with entire seriousness,” Brooks said, after
Fisk. The Black Arts Movement would embrace her (Brooks may not have known this
yet), bestowing “queenhood in the new black sun” upon her (Part One 86). “Even now,”
then, is the careful, knowing statement of a poet who is doubly minoritized and multiply
claimed by movements held together and fragmented by the fault lines of identity, whose
critics and admirers are “many” in their number and diverse in their locations with
respect to race and gender, among other social factors.
“Feminized from the moment of its inception as the Black Power Movement’s
‘spiritual sister,’” Cherise A. Pollard points out, “the Black Arts Movement was in no
way feminine” (173).91 In her account of the Fisk Conference, Brooks describes the
“New Black” consciousness she meets there as a new Black man: “He is different from
any the world has known,” she writes, and he is making “something DEFINITE” (Part
One 85).92 Brooks, the elder poet (she turned fifty in 1967), was in her own words
“coldly Respected” by the youthful audience at Fisk. The “heroes” of the conference
included poet and originator of the BAM Amiri Baraka, novelist John Oliver Killens,
playwright Ron Milner, and editors of Negro Digest/Black World David Llorens and
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In “The Black Arts Movement” (1968), Larry Neal describes the BAM as “the aesthetic and
spiritual sister of the Black Power concept” (184). See also Lee’s “Toward a Definition: Black
Poetry of the Sixties (After LeRoi Jones)” (1971). Lee (Madhubuti) includes two women (Brooks
and Mari Evans) in a paragraph-long list of men whose work made up the BAM.
92
In the poem “Malcolm X” (for Dudley Randall), Brooks writes: “He opened us— / who was a
key, / who was a man” (The Essential 90).
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Hoyt Fuller, among others. Baraka arrived toward the end of Brooks’s reading: “when I
called attention to his presence,” Brooks recalls, “there was jubilee in Jubilee Hall” (84).
With characteristic humor, Brooks describes herself as part bemused onlooker, part
electrified participant: “I didn’t know what to make of what surrounded me, of what with
hot sureness began almost to invade me. I had never been, before, in the general presence
of such insouciance, such live firmness, such confident vigor, such determination to mold
or carve something DEFINITE” (85, italics in original). Brooks’s gendering of this new
consciousness is striking, as is her sense of feeling surrounded, even invaded by this
“New Black” way of being and creating with a purpose. Brooks’s words belie the fact
that she had already carved out space, with Annie Allen and Maud Martha, for a
“DEFINITE” albeit unspectacular portrayal of Black womanhood and girlhood. Prior to
Fisk, however, what we might now understand as a Black feminist poetics, or at the very
least a conscious choice to portray “Women, yes,” was not attached (as it would later be)
to an explicit racial politics.
“Gwendolyn Brooks’s post 1967 poetry is fat-less,” Madhubuti writes, “Her new
work resembles a man getting off meat, turning to a vegetarian diet…all the excess
weight is quickly lost. Her work becomes extremely streamlined and to the point” (Part
One 22). The vibrant, erudite vocabulary of Brooks’s Annie Allen is here likened to
unwholesome and implicitly feminine “fat,” which the poet would later trim. The fat-less,
newer work is likened to a man. Euro-American influence manifests as bodily unhealth,
the strain of “excess weight” connoting technical extravagance, linguistic ornamentation,
and thus the absence or the crowding out of “streamlined” racial consciousness. Annie
Allen is a difficult book, singular in its “explosively excessive” use of language—it
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necessitates a dictionary and, as per the poet’s own suggestion, much rereading (Shockley
53, italics in original). The opening poem, “birth in a narrow room,” introduces Annie
Allen, the heroine of “The Anniad,” as a child born to lack. The just-born Annie who is
Black and female cannot think, although she later will, “‘How pinchy is my room! How
can I breathe! /I am not anything and I have got /Not anything’” (Annie Allen 3).93 The
room that opens Brooks’s telling of a poor Black woman’s life is pinching both in size
and prospect, or the view of Annie’s future it affords. Her narrow room is neither lavish
nor extravagant (it will have been, for Annie, stiflingly small, opposed to life, opposed to
breath), and yet the language of the poem is irregular and beautiful, expansive to the
point of neologism—it sparkles. Annie’s future observation, “How pinchy is my room,”
is nothing short of devastating. She resides in what Christina Sharpe has called “the
wake,” “living the history and present of terror, from slavery to the present, as the ground
of our everyday Black existence” (15).
Pinching hurts. To “feel the pinch” is to experience material impoverishment. To
pinch pennies, in turn, is a way to make ends meet. A thing “pinched,” in yet another
usage, has been stolen, thieved, or repossessed (the connotation is informal, even comic).
“Pinchy” sounds a bit too pretty yet delivers painful notes. The word alludes to stolen
life, to stifling holds, and to the words of Eric Garner and others (“I can’t breathe”): “the
history and present of terror.” A word like “pinchy” is indeed a heavy one, although its
burden is as much historical as technical, as much to do with Brooks’s rewriting the epic
hero as an epic heroine—an ordinary Black woman who must live in stolen space, in a
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Subsequent quotations from Annie Allen are cited in-text with the abbreviation AA.
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poetic form that was not made for her—as with Brooks’s stated desire to make “every
phrase” in Annie Allen “beautiful” (Part One 159). In her book Renegade Poetics (2011),
Evie Shockley reinterprets “The Anniad” as an epic with an altered subject, a
“legitimate” epic that succeeds in “representing the life of a young, African American,
working-class woman and offering a critique of the racial and gender constraints limiting
that young woman’s development,” while at the same time earning Brooks the admiration
and approval of the poetry establishment and the Pulitzer Prize (28). In Shockley’s
reading, “fat” and “excess weight” are redescribed as polyvocality: a simultaneous
address to different readers, whose expectations and location with respect to race and
gender vary widely. Shockley understands a poetics of excess as a Black aesthetic
practice—a means of navigating the conflicting pressures, both aesthetic and political,
personal and historical, Black women writers must confront.
In Shockley’s framework, using “white” poetic forms or taking “direction from
the Euro-American world” does not reduce to courting white establishment prestige; nor
does it mean that Brooks cannot address Black readers with her work. Poetic form is not
a trap by which the poem is conditioned or the poet’s voice restrained. A formal choice
can be, in Brooks’s words, “politically aware” and at the same time given over to the
“mysteries and magic of technique.” In part because of genre difference, Maud Martha
being a novel, I am less concerned with “form” as a shared property of Annie Allen and
Maud Martha (a structural resemblance) than I am with “form” as something Brooks’s
heroines desire as they move through daily life—and what Maud Martha in particular
endeavors to create. Maud Martha names its own protagonist’s relationship to form, the
marriage plot, as one of “leaning,” or of incomplete reliance. The novel also lends a name
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to Brooks’s own approach to working with and against poetic forms such as the English
ballad and sonnet. Form is never not a problem, even when it is desired as a “post” on
which to lean, to use Maud Martha’s terminology. A form relieves a certain pressure; it
cannot do all the work. To claim, as Madhubuti does, that Brooks’s early work is
“strained” in its dependence on white forms (“strained” is Madhubuti’s word for the
unfortunate effect iambic pentameter had on Brooks’s early poetry) is not incorrect but
rather imprecise. “Strained” implies a forcing that results in pain and damage: overdoing
it. Maud Martha’s notion of the lean implies a resting, giving way but not completely
(that would be falling): a small dependence, by which post and leaning party may be
changed.
People need “something to lean on,” Maud Martha muses in a chapter titled
“posts,” “something decently constant to depend on” (MM 100). “Was, perhaps, the
whole life of man a dedication to this search for something to lean upon,” Maud Martha
wonders, “and was, to a great degree, his ‘happiness’ or ‘unhappiness’ written up for him
by the demands or limitations of what he chose for that work?” (101). Depending, in
Maud Martha’s thinking—literally hanging down—is not a passive stance but rather a
dynamic posture: “Leaning was a work,” at once a toil and an artwork (something done
or made, a product that is produced by muse and drudge) as well as a stance from which
to make, compose, perform a life as art (101).94 Reliance, or being held, demands
activity. In choosing something to rely on, one accepts the “limitations” of that post,
agrees to work with and within it (and beside it) toward a life. Maud Martha wonders if
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our “happiness” or lack thereof is “written up” by posts, by what we choose to structure
our lives. She chooses marriage (“the plainer, the more plateaulike, the better”), and yet
her story is not “written up” by marriage or its conventionalizing force. “The marriage
shell,” she muses, after she is married, and “not the romance, or love, it might contain,” is
what appeals to her—a structure she has chosen and reimagined as a “post” (101).
Maud Martha’s marriage shell contains, in lieu of romance, “Sunday papers and
shoeless feet, baking powder biscuits, baby baths, and matinees and laundrymen, and
potato plants in the kitchen window” (101). Maud Martha’s husband is not named among
this inventory, an impersonal and largely object-focused sketch of what a woman in her
position has to work with: these are things Maud Martha touches, things of ritual and
repetition. Even the “laundrymen” are thingly in both name and function: they provide
clean clothes, which crop up later in the novel in a scene of silent protest (I address this
scene below). Making biscuits, bathing an infant, tending plants in kitchen windows do
express a kind of love, and yet this love has been detached from the expected and
supposed-to-be desired plot or narrative in which a woman’s every gesture culminates in
marriage. Maud Martha’s “romance” of commitment, care, and comfort is just that: a
love of comfort, care, commitment—loving process, form, and fabric—baking powder on
one’s hands.
Romantic love, Maud Martha concludes, is ever-shifting, fragile, “fallible,” and
so cannot be “heavily depended on.” Maud Martha separates love’s maintenance from the
“work” of being coupled, insisting that “the love of a single person was not enough” (MM
100). It is “enough,” as we will see, to craft the ways in which small daily acts are done
and done again. A structure emptied of the usual “romance” between one person and
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another clears the room for this “enoughness,” or a lessness with respect to what a
marriage might sustain: Maud Martha’s intimate attachment to the concrete and the
familiar, loving what can be expected and what must be done again.95 This way of being
is profoundly and, for several critics, troublingly private—solitary, quiet, decent, and
reserved. As Mary Helen Washington has written of Maud Martha in a feminist analysis:
“She has no women friends” (286). I take up Washington’s critique of what she calls
Maud Martha’s “privateness” below, as I look closely at a scene of silent “retaliation”
against racist treatment. In this vignette, Maud Martha leans on several cherished
household objects and routines by simply calling them to mind, a gesture open to critique
on several fronts due to its lack of expressivity, its non-release of anger, and its faith in
material things (most notably nightgowns) as the markers of humanity. I take this scene
as an occasion to reflect on our attachment to resistance in queer studies and Black
studies, among other “identity” fields, and I suggest that other terms beyond “resistant or
“complicit,” for example, will be needed, if we are to understand and value gestures like
Maud Martha’s lean and her pursuit of what is “enough.”
In the readings that follow (I look first to Annie Allen before returning to Maud
Martha), I take up Maud Martha’s lean as a less militant interpretive position for
observing quiet acts of Black “aliveness” (Kevin Quashie’s word) that may not, in
familiar ways, “resist hegemony and/or exhibit the full agency of the oppressed”
(Weheliye 2). In a critique of biopolitics and bare life discourse that pursues Black
feminist revisions of the human, Alexander Weheliye eschews “the lexicons of resistance
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and agency,” which are widespread in Black studies, ethnic studies, and queer studies.
Frameworks of resistance/agency presume “full, self-present, and coherent subjects
working against something or someone,” and so might misconstrue the “genres” of the
human that are practiced and imagined outside the bounds of liberal-humanist
subjecthood, that is, by those who are excluded altogether from this privileged domain
(2). The word “resistance” is “too broad a term,” Quashie concludes in his re-framing of
Black culture through the lens of quiet, “too clunky and vague and imprecise to be a
catch-all” when the acts or ways of being one endeavors to describe are whispered, nondramatic, inward-looking, reticent (4). Quashie reads Maud Martha’s quiet as the ground
for introspection and attention-paying, her “way of being in the world that is not
consumed by publicness” (52). In her capacity to notice and reshape external forms (as in
the marriage “shell”), Quashie finds, Maud Martha can “experience herself as a source of
power” (60).
Beginning with Maud Martha’s notion of a “post” on which to lean, and
extending Quashie’s claim, what sort of “power” might be felt not just in standing still
and observing but also in leaning, being held? Maud Martha’s idea of a life as a pursuit of
“posts” to lean on presumes a subject and a body that needs rest, needs help, is tired, not
entire, self-sufficient, or upstanding, neither upright nor desiring to stand up straight
(with all that being “straight” connotes). Maud Martha’s lean is a response to social
hardship that is neither passive nor resistant, one that says I will not stand up straight. A
lean creates not quite “resistance” but instead a minor pressure as the body shifts its
weight, allowing something or someone to take this tension for a moment. Leaning is not
the pose of victimhood, and it is not the pose of heroism, wholeness, or pride. It is the
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body, for a moment, at its ease: released from needing to be better or made over,
reinvented, or uprooted from the world. The work of resting is integral to survival in
Maud Martha, as it is in Annie Allen, where exhaustion marks the start of Annie’s
everyday persistence as an “epic” in its own right.
Annie Allen, to which I now turn, is divided into three sections: “Notes from the
Childhood and the Girlhood,” “The Anniad” (a single long poem), and “The
Womanhood.” The “Girlhood” starts with Annie’s “birth in a narrow room,” with the
first line, “Weeps out of western country something new” (AA 3). Just one of Annie’s
eyes “weakly winks /Upon” the objects in the room. The “fruit bowl,” “iron pot,” and
“bashful china child tipping forever /Yellow apron and spilling pretty cherries,” populate
the room, although they reinforce the child’s lack. The just-born Annie “weakly” winking
at the object world suggests the insufficiency and smallness of the life to which she has
been born—a life of domesticity and work. And yet her glimpse of what is there inside
the room foreshadows too the largeness of her childhood imagination: her fierce
preference for the worlds she can invent. Despite the circumstances of her birth, Annie
“prances nevertheless with gods and fairies” (3). She grows up desirous and proud,
believing she should have “the paladin /Which no woman ever had” (19). Predictably,
Annie’s “paladin” does not materialize, and in his place we find a disappointing and
unfaithful husband; this unnamed “tan man” leaves “chocolate” Annie for a woman with
a lighter, “maple”-colored complexion (this theme of colorism is repeated in Maud
Martha).
Annie had hoped to use her “ornaments untried” to win another’s love: “the
paladin /Prosperous and ocean-eyed /Who shall rub her secrets out” (AA 19). Her dreamt132

of man is knowing and a visionary, “mountains in the mind,” yet in reality her husband
“twitches” for a larger, more exciting life (and thus his choice to go to war, to seek the
soldier’s “fervor”). For him, life at home “was little as a sand, /Little as an inch of song,
/Little as the aching hand that would fashion mountains,” a distinctly feminine,
diminutive, and possibly the poet’s own creative hand—that would, if it could, fashion
something (23). Many critics of “The Anniad” frame Annie as a mock-heroic figure,
“whose quest appears to be for an ideal(ized) marriage, whose battlefield is no larger than
a room or two, and whose fate is only victorious insofar as the defeat of her illusions by
her realities evidences her achievement of a clear-eyed, if disappointed, maturity”
(Shockley 37). Understood as such, Annie is the victim of her own outsize desires, as her
“quest” is not to realize a different sort of life but rather to be disabused of the idea that
her childish “Fancying on the featherbed / What was never and is not” makes any
difference in or to a situation of impoverishment (AA 19). As Ann Folwell Stanford puts
it, “Annie has little access to dreams other than those that are potentially destructive to
her well-being” (284), or to that structure of attachment Lauren Berlant has called cruel
optimism. In this reading, Annie’s paladin befits her narrow room, which can yield
nothing but disappointment.
Yet Annie’s lust for normativity is mythic. Her desires, if they were to be
fulfilled, would bring about another world. The things she wants are not attainable or
sensible, but singular, impossible almost by definition: “What was never and is not.” Her
husband, Annie tells her weary mother (hardly satisfied with Annie’s father), “Must be
[made of] gist and lacquer” (AA 10). Annie’s man is archetypal, or the essence of a man,
and at the same time superficial, just a flashy coat of varnish. Annie conjures “gist and
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lacquer” man in answer to her mother, who is cleaning house without her daughter’s help.
Her mother offers her a choice: “‘Get a broom to whish the doors /Or get a man to
marry’” (10). Annie’s shell of a man attests to her rejection of her mother’s lot in married
life: the slow collapse of romance into drudgery depicted in the poem “the parents:
people like our marriage Maxie and Andrew.” Even more, his desirability as such would
seem to promise that no “real” man will ever be enough for Annie Allen. Another option
to the side of wished-for men and “real” men (a disappointment—they need wives to
“whish the doors”) opens up: Annie herself.
Annie’s quest is not to realize her dreams, to find her gist and lacquer man made
real in flesh and blood. Nor is it to exit or escape the tiny room that grows her wanting—
her expansive, inexhaustible desire for a life of her own making, “what was never.”
Annie’s quest is not to exit but to enter ordinariness, or what, in her pursuit of men as
paladins, “is not.” The final stanza of “The Anniad” presents a restful moment, tired
Annie in her kitchenette with not a paladin in sight. Her “aching” hands might fashion
pleasure from her weariness. She is not “done.” The final stanza reads:
Think of almost thoroughly
Derelict and dim and done.
Stroking swallows from the sweat.
Fingering faint violet.
Hugging old and Sunday sun.
Kissing in her kitchenette
The minuets of memory. (AA 29)
The sensuality of Annie’s twenty-four-year-old exhaustion (the penultimate stanza gives
her age) is startling, because her body has been all but absent in “The Anniad” and in
preceding poems. In its place we find imagined things like “berries beyond rot.” The
“Girlhood” poems distance Annie from the disappointments of the adult world. They are
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protective of her girlhood dreams. The poem “throwing out the flowers,” for example,
absents Annie altogether while “The duck fats rot in the roasting pan” (11). By way of
this protection, Brooks enables her young heroine to enter “The Anniad” armed with
what she can imagine and, by poem’s end, to rest, to simply sit with what she feels, her
body present and attentive. In this scene of weary yet still sensual reflection, “Fingering
faint violet,” Annie most resembles the contemplative and solitary Maud Martha, who
dreams of texture, color, and light. Far from dwelling with, as she does in the beginning
of the poem, “What was never and is not,” Annie dwells here with what had been (her
memories) and what is (the sunlight in her kitchenette, her body warmed and tired).
Successive gerunds, four in total, fill the stanza and the room with a continuous,
continuing, and thus unfinished present. Annie’s backward-facing love invites new
“swallows” (or good omens—not to be trusted in the singular). The only missing piece is
what could be or what will be. “The Anniad” ends with Annie “almost…done,” that is,
not finished, still beginning. What remains for her to do? Where does concreteness,
thereness lead? Brooks’s novel might be seen as picking up where “The Anniad” almost
ends.
“Maud Martha is not a cultural heroine, is not a woman’s warrior,” Hortense
Spillers writes, “And so we wind down into an arena of choices that transport us to the
heart of dailiness, of the mundane and the unglamorous, the carefully circumscribed
ambition” (Spillers 1985, 230-231).96 Spillers’s reading of Maud Martha stands apart
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among the scholarship on Brooks’s only novel for its attention to the everyday, the very
“heart” of the text. Barbara Christian, for example, views Maud Martha as a “critical”
observer of her world, who can “see beneath the mundane surface of things” (Christian
252). In Christian’s reading, Maud Martha’s passionate relationship to surface (texture,
color), to the mundane (repetition), and to things (literal objects), cannot be other than a
search for something better, something unseen except by “critical” eyes. Spillers’s mode
of reading being one of recognition, letting things be what they are, she notes the careful
way in which Brooks downscales her protagonist’s capacity for choice to an “arena” of
the minor: slight adjustments and quotidian decisions, women’s work. Yet Spillers’s
point—and why I find her reading of the novel so enabling—is that Maud Martha finds
small ways of choosing not to be a woman or to do a woman’s work by simply using
(first, observing) what is literally there. The mundane surface of her world is world
enough for this protagonist, who is not only not a woman’s warrior (a feminist, as
Spillers notes), but also not, in any way that has to do with being a female character,
“feminine.”
In her essay, “‘An Order of Constancy’: Notes on Brooks and the Feminine,”
Spillers redescribes “the ‘feminine,’ whose very naming broaches more confusion than
we can comfortably settle in the course of a work-day” (not unlike the naming and the
claiming of the “queer”), defining it less as a possession or an attribute of Maud Martha,
a “structure of physical and physiological traits,” and more as an “activity under
concealment,” a sensibility, a stance (Spillers 1985, 223, 238, 242). A mode of private
receptivity, for Spillers, an almost Woolfian and more exactly Mrs. Ramsay-ian
observational faculty, Brooks’s feminine does not conscript a given way of being in
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relation to the external world with its norms and expectations. Rather, in a world
amenable to a “display of its powers,” the feminine opens a “perceptual place” from
which to notice something, rearrange things, and reimagine ways of being. Brooks’s
feminine, in other words, while not quite severed from an experience of gendered life
(being a woman, in Maud Martha’s case), is loosed in Spillers’s thinking not just from
identities and bodies but also from the discursive “place” of having been perceived,
observed, defined, and categorized by others as “feminine.” Not a subject position, then,
so much as a place from which to survey structures through which one is named and
rendered legible: a “name,” as Spillers writes, for “situations” rather than for bodies
(223).
Spillers’s revision of this name, the “feminine,” to designate the act of perceiving
and not the result of another’s perception bears resemblance to the ways in which the
word “queer” has been redeployed to counter homophobic accusation, insult, and hatred.
Queers have been placed within discursive space before we’ve seen the map and have
reclaimed the damaged ground: we’re here, albeit with ambivalence. Spillers’s effort “to
free up the ‘feminine’ from its wonted boundaries,” namely “woman” (and, we might
say, binary gender), while still acknowledging the “elusive claims” it makes on gendered
subjects—and in particular those subjects seeking to throw off, trouble, refuse the claims
that binary gender makes—anticipates the contradiction at the core of queer inquiry (227,
224). What Spillers calls “the paradox of the ‘feminine” (224), in other words, directs us
also to confront the paradoxical desire to reclaim a sense of agency in calling oneself
“queer” while yet resisting any claim to an identity called “queer.” Following Spillers’s
line of thought as well as her aim to learn from Brooks, we can begin to theorize a
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queerness not only of subjects who are queer but also of daily situations that compel a
queer (-ing) stance: the ordinary needs, the minor choices, and the “diverse acts of form,”
through which Maud Martha fashions a life (234).
Spillers acknowledges the looseness of Maud Martha’s tie to sexual identity:
“Insofar as Maud Martha sustains heterosexual mating, she is ‘male-identified,’ but such
identification is much less compelling than the imaginative integrity that keeps her alive
and well” (230). The clarity of straightness, like a stamp on certain spaces or a sentry at
the border, need not function as a sign of its importance. Straightness, even when
obligatory (and especially when obvious), may be superficial: full of fractures, openings,
obliquities. Straightness can be slanted. In Maud Martha, straightness (or what Spillers
refers to as male-identification) is a landscape less compelling than Maud Martha’s
interior life. As Spillers observes: “Gwendolyn Brooks’s feminine landscape is clearly
demarcated by a heterosexual character” (1985, 227). Another version of this essay uses
slightly different wording: “Gwendolyn Brooks’s feminine landscape is clearly
demarcated as a heterosexual territory” (2003, 135). The change from “character” to
“territory” distances Maud Martha from a sexual identity, a boundary-setting orientation
that decides where femininity (and womanhood) starts and ends. In the first iteration,
Maud Martha, defined as a “heterosexual character,” delimits the meaning of the
“feminine,” whereas in the second iteration Maud Martha is nowhere to be found and it is
unclear who or what demarcates Brooks’s “feminine landscape.” The bodies in this latter
landscape—Annie Allen as well as Maud Martha—are less defined by what they appear
to have, a heterosexual identity, and more by how they choose to orient themselves as
Black women in “feminine” space.
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In Maud Martha, things that happen play the backdrop to the heroine’s abundant
inner life: to silent thoughts and introspection, observations, flights, and dreams. The
novel lends the weight of concrete, real objects to her thoughts. Shades of violet in the
mind are no less there than sweat or smoke or sunlight in a literal room. Maud Martha’s
life unfolds less like an ordered story than a scattering of sensory impressions or twists of
consciousness: a novel of “the black interior,” as the poet Elizabeth Alexander has
described it, “a metaphysical space…toward power and wild imagination” (Alexander x).
The novel opens with Maud Martha Brown aged seven; we catch glimpses of her
childhood and adolescence, then her marriage to Paul Phillips, which, like Annie’s
marriage, falls far short of expectations. There are scenes of life away from the Brown
family home, portraits of the “kitchenette folks” with whom Maud Martha and her
husband live, and a description of the birth of baby Paulette. Maud Martha’s “story” ends
in young adulthood: she is pregnant with a second child, and her brother Harry is “back
from the wars.” Maud Martha, although well-received initially, was not hailed by
reviewers as a novel of the Black experience, a novel comparable to Ralph Ellison’s
Invisible Man (1953), for example, published in the very same year.97 Maud Martha is a
woman facing multiple oppressions and “a person caught up in timeless elemental
situations,” in the words of novelist Ann Petry (Jackson 76). She is also ordinary. In the
novel’s first vignette, “description of Maud Martha,” we are told that she appreciates the
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“prettiness” of dandelions “second to their everydayness; for in that latter quality she
thought she saw a picture of herself” (2).
In a vignette entitled “Helen,” ostensibly about Maud Martha’s sister, plot gives
way to contemplation, life remembered and unfinished. Maud Martha sits on Helen’s
bed. She watches Helen, who is nineteen (two years older than Maud Martha), “primp for
a party,” thoughts meandering through scenes of childhood rejection, notably at the hands
of a boy named Emmanuel, who offers Helen a ride in his wagon and refuses to extend
this invitation to Maud Martha, who he calls an “old black gal.” Her thoughts land next
upon their father’s adoration of Helen, who has begun to go on dates, and of whom no
boy is worthy, “he believed” (37). Maud Martha watches her father “at the breakfast
table,” a keen observer of her family’s inner workings (and later of the wider social world
outside her home, of its injustice and its strangeness: courtship, colorism, racism), even
something of a mind-reader. It is enough “to watch her father drink his coffee and
contentedly think (oh, she knew it!), as Helen started on her grapefruit, how daintily she
ate,” to see and know her father’s preference (36-37). Each of these thoughts is taking
place as Helen primps and Maud Martha watches. In either instance, she observes the
performance of “lovely” femininity. Maud Martha herself does not participate. She is,
much like the “teen” Brooks of the interview, the one who stays at home: “always to be
the spectator of the public, never part of it,” as Virginia Woolf wrote in her diary in 1918,
“What a queer fate it is” (222). “I’m much smarter,” Maud Martha tells herself, “I read
books and newspapers and old folks like to talk with me” (35). She does not understand
what makes her older sister so entrancing, what there is to “imitate, that she might imitate
it” (34). Helen’s feminine appeal is absolute and irreducible; Maud Martha cannot
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replicate that “something.” Knowing full well that she cannot does not erase the pain of
feeling undervalued and unwanted as she was by one Emmanuel, who refused her a ride
in his wagon: “Even now, at seventeen—high school graduate, mistress of her fate, and a
ten-dollar-a-week file clerk in the very Forty-seventh Street lawyer’s office where Helen
was a fifteen-dollar-a-week typist—as she sat on Helen’s bed and watched Helen primp
for a party, the memory hurt” (34).
At an impasse with herself, Maud Martha turns to her own love for the unlovely,
manifest in this vignette as her “old house,” what Helen calls a “‘hulk of rotting wood’”
(38). Maud Martha cherishes this home, its aging furniture, its kitchen “that was not
beautiful in any way!” (38). Helen is the “ranking queen” within this family home,
despite her frank disdain for it. Her loveliness and daintiness win out against Maud
Martha’s house-love and intelligence. Maud Martha’s father, with “that zeal of his for
order in all things,” including “human relationships,” prefers the daughter who is
primping for the party (and the boys who are unworthy), not the one who is just
watching, rhapsodizing in her mind about the furniture: “The chairs, which cried when
people sat in them” (38). The weary chairs and tables, cabinets and drawers, are almost
sentient—are less unmindful than her father of Maud Martha’s interest and care. Unlike
the chair in Elaine Scarry’s theory of creation, however, by which made objects are
deprived of their “indifference toward the problems of sentience” and wish the human
user well, Maud Martha’s chair feels pain—it conveys a wish that her hurt might be
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acknowledged, seen, and shared by those who sit around the table, which “grieved
audibly if anyone rested more than two fingers” upon it (38).98
Maud Martha’s silent reverie is broken by her sister’s words. Before this happens,
bringing “Helen” to a close, Maud Martha writes a love note to herself and to the
unlovely kitchen. She “saw herself there, up and down her seventeen years, eating apples
after school; making sweet potato tarts; drawing, on the pathetic table…And even crying,
crying in that pantry, when no one knew” (39). These fragment-scenes from daily life
express not only her attachment to a particular space, a kitchen, but also her attachment to
herself inside this room. This queer communion with unloveliness, nonhuman things, a
kitchen, re-presents to our protagonist the house that might have been: a space to see
herself apart from Helen’s judgments or the standard she as “ranking queen” sets up. The
kitchen is where Maud Martha’s love for the unloved and undervalued may be noticed,
felt, returned. Maud Martha’s love note ends with an ellipsis, and then, a seeming non
sequitur, Helen speaks (and we remember where Maud Martha “is”): “‘You’ll never get a
boy friend,’ said Helen, fluffing on her Golden Peacock powder, ‘if you don’t stop
reading those books’” (39). Helen warns her sister of the queer fate that befalls voracious
readers and, we might add, lovers of unlovely household objects. For Helen, ugly houses
and improper womanhood go hand in hand: the “coiled unlovely pipes” beneath the
kitchen sink remind her of “a careless woman’s underwear” (38). Maud Martha marries
Paul, although she does so in the might-have-been queer future of the ardent teenage
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reader. Later in the novel, we encounter Maud Martha and her husband, “the young
couple,” somewhat comically in bed together, reading: Maud Martha reads Of Human
Bondage, while her husband Paul reads Sex in the Married Life. He falls asleep with his
mouth open (“it was a good thing there were no flies,” Maud Martha notes) and his book
falls to the floor (68). No sex occurs.
Maud Martha chafes against her husband’s way of doing things and lives with
disappointment, with her own ways still unfinished, not yet solid. This last concept,
solidity, is of particular importance to Maud Martha, and it most nearly names the way in
which embedding things in patterns that repeat (for example, household rituals involving
certain objects) can make meaning over time: “What she had wanted was a solid. She had
wanted shimmering form; warm, but hard as stone and as difficult to break. She had
wanted to found—tradition” (102). This chapter, “tradition and Maud Martha,”
juxtaposes Maud Martha’s desire for “a set of falterless customs” with a disappointing
Christmas night at home, “passing pretzels and beer” to Paul and his ill-mannered
friends, the baby put to bed. The “form” of this frustrating evening follows from the form
of patriarchal marriage: Paul, being “head of the family,” and Maud Martha being “wife
to him,” must do what he desires. Silently, Maud Martha plays the hostess to an evening
she would never undertake, mulling over Paul’s attempt to do “his part” for Christmas
and then drifting into memories of “Home,” her childhood traditions. Maud Martha
travels in her mind from major holidays and milestones to ordinary days: “The dinner
table…spread with a white white cloth, cheap but white,” stands out among her memories
of things seen only once a year, as vivid as a Christmas tree on Christmas (106). “This
man,” her husband, “was not a lover of tablecloths” (107). This thought returns Maud
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Martha to the present, breathing smoke from Paul’s friends’ cigarettes and watching “the
soaked tissue” from “the corner Chicken Inn’s burned barbecue drift listlessly to her rug”
(107). This noticed detail is a sign of someone’s carelessness. Maud Martha sees it, an
affront to her attention and concern for the unnoticed, or what she, the silent hostess, has
made clean and will again after the guests have gone away. Paul is not a lover of white
tablecloths or pristine rugs: “he could eat from the earth,” Maud Martha understands
(107). He is resistant to enfolding these unnecessary yet by no means ostentatious
household objects into structures of recurrence and significance: a solid. He buys the
Christmas tree too late and then he cannot get the lights to light; an elbow of Paulette’s
doll, her Christmas present, has been chipped; Maud Martha’s fruitcake is unwanted.
Paul is not a maker of ritual. His lack of care forecloses the establishing of customs, of a
right time to lug in a Christmas tree—a time which, out of context, would seem random,
uninspired, neither “shimmering” nor “warm.”
Maud Martha’s small ambition in “tradition and Maud Martha” is to shape a
Christmas evening—not to slip without a word into the dullness and the cold of an unformed occasion, which her husband’s needs or lack thereof prescribe. To be a
structuring aesthetic presence for an evening in her home would be to compose
something minor and unimportant to the world, and yet possessed of rare distinction:
“hard as stone” and iridescent, with the qualities of light. This composition, though
confined to the “gray” canvas of Maud Martha’s kitchenette, is not the work of failed
resistance; it is an act of “cramped creation,” to borrow Saidiya Hartman’s phrase, a
composition that attests to the continuing “entanglement of escape and confinement” for
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Black women in domestic spaces (227).99 Brooks’s use of the past perfect tense (“had
wanted”) may well lead us to mistake desire focused, concentrated, and restricted by
material conditions to the realm of cheap white tablecloths for no desire at all. Maud
Martha wants a different kitchen table, literally. We must contend with this desire as a
resource for survival and for ordinary change. It’s not resistance or complicity to want to
make a nice home. It’s rather complacency to think that wanting a nice home constitutes
a failure of politics altogether.
In chapter 30 of the novel’s 34, “at the Burns-Coopers,’” Maud Martha takes up
work outside her home as a domestic worker. The first word of the chapter, “It,” refers to
Mrs. Burns-Cooper, a white woman, as she opens her front door, “a little red and white
and black woman” (MM 158). She “appeared in the doorway,” an abstract collage of
color with a gender and a voice. She tells Maud Martha not to use the front door in the
future (“it’s all right this time”), to which Maud Martha gives no spoken answer. We are
made to understand Maud Martha’s presence on that doorstep, her humiliation at the
hands of an abstraction, with a list of concrete objects, a domestic inventory: “There is a
pear in my icebox, and one end of rye bread. Except for three Irish potatoes and a cup of
flour and the empty Christmas boxes, there is absolutely nothing on my shelf. My
husband is laid off. There is newspaper on my kitchen table instead of oilcloth” (159).
This pinchy mise en scène demands Maud Martha’s action; she must work and, more
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Space is something Maud Martha rents. Black families in Chicago at midcentury were forced to
rent substandard apartments (kitchenettes) in segregated neighborhoods. Racial conflicts often
stemmed from housing shortages. Brooks herself faced housing struggles of various kinds
throughout her life. There is a vast and crucial difference between an unowned space as a social
condition, a result of structural racism, and an unowned space as an aesthetic possibility. (See
Bersani and Dutoit, Arts of Impoverishment.) Even so, Maud Martha’s unowned space gives rise
to much aesthetic possibility, just not in works of “art.”
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exactly, must withdraw from her domestic sphere to save it from impoverishment. She
will endure humiliation to put something on her shelf: “I’ll smile at Mrs. Burns-Cooper
and hate her just some” (159). Burns-Cooper, we are told, is laughing with her eyes.
What is Maud Martha doing with her smile and her silence?
Although we enter Brooks’s novel through Maud Martha’s point of view, the
novel’s organizing consciousness, as Megan Ahern points out, is multivalent: it often
threads “an extrinsic perspective” in and through “Maud Martha’s own,” which renders
her sincerity “an open question” (Ahern 315-316).100 In other words, Maud Martha is not
fixed in opposition to that which she “should,” as a working-class Black woman, oppose.
She is not determined by a set response to or set impact of her environment. For
Washington, Maud Martha’s “quiet reflections and mute reactions” are “rich resources”
yet “are also inadequate responses to sexism and racism” (Washington 273). Washington
concludes that walking silently away from this demeaning day of labor, undertaken to
support her family in a moment of financial strain (“My husband is laid off.”), suggests a
lack of consciousness (-raising), an insufficiently transformed Maud Martha: she is “still
thinking in terms that must ultimately defeat her” (283). Maud Martha is thinking, more
specifically, of wearing “clean nightgowns,” loving “one’s baby,” and drinking “cocoa by
the fire—or the gas range” on cold evenings (MM 163).
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Maud Martha represents a clear departure from the sociology-inflected naturalism of the
period, a mode exemplified by Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940). See Walther for a reading of
“Maud Martha spares the mouse,” a vignette in which Maud Martha decides not to kill (but rather
to empathize with) the creature, as rewriting the rat-killing episode in Native Son. See also
Thorsson, who elaborates on Brooks’s vision of the domestic, a place of creativity and generative
anger, not destructive violence.
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When these household comforts signify the standards of the white Mrs. BurnsCooper’s world in wealthy Winnetka, Illinois, as they do in Washington’s analysis, Maud
Martha’s valuing of them for herself—as a measure of her own humanity—cannot be
taken seriously. Rather than underscore the fact of Brooks’s heroine’s enmeshment in
white bourgeois ideologies of womanhood and home, I want to emphasize the subtlety of
her “retaliation” from within those very structures: leaning, then, affords a name for what
Maud Martha does in silence, as she calls to mind “clean nightgowns,” loving her
daughter, and cups of “cocoa by the fire—or the gas range—come the evening, in the
wintertime” (MM 163). The cups of cocoa that she has prepared have not been taken “by
the fire,” as (we might surmise) they would be at the home of the Burns-Coopers, in a
familiar stock tableau of cozy, winter nights in wealthy, white suburban households.
Interrupting this tableau with “—or the gas range,” a literal object in Maud Martha’s
kitchenette, Brooks diminishes the power of the white suburban household as an object of
desire and a normative ideal. Household objects and their meanings, although private and
unspoken in the moment of Maud Martha’s “retaliation,” are integral to refusing Mrs.
Burns-Cooper’s racist treatment. A nightgown is an object no one save Maud Martha and
the laundryman and Paul is likely to see. A clean nightgown, as both a real object
(something worn) and something silently invoked, is elemental to having a life; it is a
post. Merely the thought of one makes possible Maud Martha’s determined exit from a
toxic situation. The “human being” who so values a clean nightgown will not take the
insults or the money of a Mrs. Burns-Cooper, however much her family needs the latter.
Maud Martha’s vow to “never come back” to work for Mrs. Burns-Cooper is also her
refusal of much-needed money: “The wages were very good” (163).
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Maud Martha “knew Mrs. Burns-Cooper would be puzzled” by her choice to
leave the job (163). And yet Maud Martha does not feel the need to speak to her, to
justify her actions, to explain herself. She closes off the workings of her mind and she
denies Burns-Cooper access to “what could be said” but isn’t. This denial is not nothing,
even if it is unsatisfying to readers hoping for more. Maud Martha claims her right to be
the kind of “being” who can act without explaining her decision, even to herself. Maud
Martha narrates her retreat, invoking those who would find fault with her decision to
walk out as executioners: “One walked out from that almost perfect wall, spitting at the
firing squad. What difference did it make whether the firing squad understood or did not
understand the manner of one’s retaliation or why one had to retaliate?” (163). It does not
matter if the “manner” of Maud Martha’s counter-action is made legible, becomes a kind
of rupture or, in retrospect, a victory. What does matter is the knowledge that “clean
nightgowns” are enough.
In this scene, silence spares Maud Martha a painful altercation with BurnsCooper, who is unbearable. A verbal sharing of Maud Martha’s anger and frustration
would have been an unambiguous display of her interior: a legible refusal. Instead, Maud
Martha leans: a working posture of dependence, not a passive stance, and not, as I have
said, a pose of heroism. “Some are wives not heroes,” as Stein wrote (“Lifting Belly” 81).
We see Maud Martha, for a moment, being held by what she loves. Some heroes are not
recognizable as heroes (just as, for Stein, some wives are not the wives of men, are thus
“heroic,” in a way, for choosing marriage as a shell for queer and lesbian desires). Brooks
has her character embrace what many feminist critics would rather have Maud Martha
toss aside. And yet the trappings of a normative gender, Maud Martha’s nightgowns, are
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not the instruments of normalizing violence but the exit-doors to normalized
mistreatment and routine humiliation. They are posts.
Throughout this chapter, “queer” itself has been a post. I have relied on queerness
here in order to mark its shifting boundaries of inclusion and description and to hold two
women characters who might be queer enough. As the concept “queer” has traveled, it
has come to mean in numerous academic contexts that-which-troubles, makes illegible,
refuses to conform. Numerous, specific forms of difference, deviation, perversity,
pleasure, damage, intimacy, non-conformance, exclusion, resistance, sodality,
collectivity, and survival have been made legible by virtue of it. A constant bond between
what’s queer and what’s resistant or beyond the ordinary world, however, risks obscuring
such desires as Maud Martha’s for a nightgown, for a “shell” of normal marriage—to be
in it, not beyond it, as a form to reimagine.
In “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer
Politics?” (1997), Cathy Cohen rejects a “single-oppression framework” for queer
politics (oppression on the basis of one’s sexual identity alone) and calls instead for a
much broader, more inclusive coalition of queers: “all those who stand on the outside of
the dominant constructed norm of state-sanctioned white middle- and upper-class
heterosexuality” (441). “In many instances,” Cohen observes, “instead of destabilizing
the assumed categories and binaries of sexual identity, queer politics has served to
reinforce simple dichotomies between heterosexual and everything ‘queer’” (438). These
“simple dichotomies” remain in place, except in ways that those of us invested in a
“radical” queer politics are apt to find objectionable. In this chapter, I have tried to bring
to light the fallibility of such “simple” and entrenched dichotomies—fallible, in part,
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because of our investments in them. Like the “love of a man and a woman,” in Maud
Martha’s estimation, an attachment to dichotomies of queerness and convention cannot
be “heavily depended on” (MM 100-101). This project leans on this attachment, both
acknowledging its power and describing what it obscures. In Chapter One, I posed the
question, “What distinguishes an ordinary queerness in particular from convention,
domesticity, and feminine expectation?” As Brooks’s characters make plain, the line that
separates the “feminine” from queer relationality has never been easy to plot. My earlier
question raises another, far more difficult question to answer: who and what is queer
enough?
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Chapter Four
Rose Rocks, or Maybe Rock Roses: Elizabeth Bishop’s “Passion for Accuracy”
For several days, I was haunted by the idea that some deep personal
experience might have less poetic truth in it than a description of a china
doorknob. The image of the white doorknob remains with me, though it
never got into my poem...
—Robert Lowell, draft notes for “Skunk Hour” (1957)101
My passion for accuracy may strike you as old-maidish—but since we do
float on an unknown sea I think we should examine the other floating
things that come our way very carefully; who knows what might depend
on it?
—Elizabeth Bishop, letter to Robert Lowell (1964)
There is a myth (and maybe a truth) that passionate women make poor
biographers. If the biographer is in love with, too attached to, or too intimate with their
subject—the person whose life they are attempting to unfold—then how can they
possibly be accurate, let alone objective? How can anyone be sure where the biographer
ends and the subject of the biography begins? This is a problem that the queer and
feminist genres of biography embrace as a corrective to the norms of scholarly rigor and
in response to the material gaps and silences (lack of records), which make accuracy a
fiction, so elusive and desirable. Elizabeth Bishop’s critical archive is in meaningful ways
an intimate one. It is full of words from friends, admirers, students, acquaintances, poets,
and scholars. Many of Bishop’s poet-contemporaries and friends have written about her,
including John Ashbery, Frank Bidart, Randall Jarrell, Robert Lowell, Marianne Moore,
Octavio Paz, Adrienne Rich, and Lloyd Schwartz. A substantial portion of Bishop’s
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Quoted in Kalstone (1989), 186.
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correspondence has been published, along with her notebook drafts of poems (this
chapter looks to one of those poems). She is a poet that seems to many readers to be
present in her poems, yet, to others, she seems detached: “an impersonal but highly
perceptive observer,” as one early critic put it (McNally 190). Bishop’s critical and
cultural reception (or her reception beyond the academy, much of which has been
facilitated by the New Yorker, the publisher of many of Bishop’s poems) has been shaped
by personal connections, intimate attachments, and desires to get closer to her and know
her through her poems, letters, relationships, and the facts of her biography. Bishop is
someone who we encounter in her relationships with others, then, not just because she
wrote and left so many letters to friends but also because the people who knew her
wanted the world to know that they did. This chapter joins in this tradition in its attention
to and use of biographical criticism. It activates the “biographical” less as a method or
mode of reading and more as an object of analysis, in recognition that “the devalued
genre of biography,” despite its questionable status in the academy, “has never abdicated
its role in defining the field of literary and historical study,” in particular queer literary
and historical study, although that relationship is vexed (Micir 139).102
Bishop described her own unfinished biographical sketch of Marianne Moore, a
friend and onetime mentor, as an “effort of affection.” I would argue that the project of
queer biography is always an unfinished and unfinishable effort of affection. In Melanie
Micir’s examination of what she terms “the unfinished aesthetic of queer feminist
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Stories of queer lives and their recovery are more closely linked to gay and lesbian studies
and/or history than to queer theory/queer studies; this reflects queer theory’s critique of stable
identity and its attention to the social and public aspects of sexuality and intimate life. Lipton
(2016) argues that queer literary criticism in fact relies on biographical reading and is invested in
the author as a constructed (rather than stable) figure.
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modernism” in The Passion Projects (2019), the unfinished woman’s life emerges as a
symptom of the losses—and the desires to redress them—that are constitutive of queer
history (134). For Micir, “the act of stepping away from the biographical is the privilege
of those who are already remembered, whose lives are already imprinted upon history”
(140). Bishop’s life has been remembered and imprinted many times over. It exists in
films, a novel, countless essays, and several biographies, in addition to the published
collections of her poems, letters, and prose. In part because of the mainstream recognition
that Bishop achieved during her lifetime, combined with her perceived reluctance, even
refusal to write openly about her sexuality (the latter fact enabling her to become a
“poet’s poet,” or a Poet, full stop), Bishop has not been a major figure for queer and
feminist recovery. She is emphatically not a “lesbian poet.” Neither her own selfrepresentation nor the claims of others looking back supports this designation—or
renders it easy, a good fit. Bishop’s relationships with women did not have to be
uncovered, which is not to say that everybody who knew of her and read her poetry knew
that they were happening: “The infrequency of her public appearances and her
geographic remoteness—living for many years in Brazil, with a woman as it happened,
but we didn’t know that—made her an indistinct and problematic life model for a woman
poet,” as Adrienne Rich recalls of Bishop (“The Eye” 125, italics added). Bishop’s close
friends knew what Rich did not, and those friends would insist that Bishop was never in
the closet. Rich’s description attests more broadly to the “indistinct” position Bishop
occupies in queer and feminist literary history: a poet for whom her sexuality was neither
something to hide nor something to broadcast, claim, and celebrate (as lesbianism was for
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Rich). A poet for whom a “queer” encounter meant an ordinary morning and an accurate
description.
Bishop’s career as a poet begins in the 1930s (notably with Moore’s guidance and
encouragement) and extends through much of the 1970s, the height of Second Wave
feminism and what Bishop called, with an outsider’s polite skepticism, “Women’s Lib.”
Bishop, unlike Rich, who was about two decades younger than Bishop, did not undergo a
radical shift in consciousness, “come out” into the feminist movement, or produce selfconscious poems that were political in nature and concerned with feminist issues. Even
toward the end of her life, when Bishop produced what is arguably her most “explicit”
lesbian love poem (an unfinished draft of a poem, now published), Bishop’s language on
the subject of queer love still cleaves to vagueness. Bishop’s relationship to queerness,
then, remains an unknown entity: a poem still in process, literally and metaphorically.
The draft of Bishop’s “Vague Poem (Vaguely love poem)” (1973?), which I
examine in the conclusion to this chapter, allows us to analyze the critical problems
posed by indistinct portrayals of queer love as ordinary. It is a poem structured much like
many other of Bishop’s poems: we see Bishop as she observes. Unlike the other poems to
which this chapter turns, however, “Vague Poem” does not describe the scene at hand or
what occasions the poem itself. Bishop is looking at a woman with whom she has
presumably just had sex. Instead of describing her, the woman, who is naked in the poem,
Bishop recalls a trip she took to Oklahoma and a rock formation whose name she can’t
quite remember. Was it a rose rock or a rock rose? We might at first glance read this
moment as an avoidance of the subject: proof that Bishop did not want to write about sex
or intimate moments between women in particular and would rather describe an object
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from the natural world, a crystal, albeit one whose name eludes her. Bishop’s leap
between her lover’s naked body and a crystal is indicative of Bishop’s keen awareness of
the problem posed by queer love as an object of attention and description in the 1970s,
when Bishop was in her 60s: an emerging social form that was unfinished, unexamined,
and, to Bishop, ordinary. The language of rose rocks (or rock roses) is her poem’s way of
taking on this problem, not avoiding it. “Vague Poem” asserts that misremembered, even
mistaken names are accurate to queer love and especially its ordinariness, which is so
often recalled as having been impossible or absent.
In Bishop’s poetry more broadly, mistakes enliven whatever is being portrayed.
The most alive thing in a poem, whether an object or an animal, resists a clear portrayal.
It is the thing seen turning its back on the observer. It is the fish that Bishop lets go. It is
the detail in the landscape that you might mistake for something else were you to see it at
all. It is the thing that lives, survives, in being resistant to description, even as it is being
described. This orientation to description is a queer poetic mode of making space for all
the wrongness that was (is) queerness.
This chapter argues that Bishop redefined the project of an “accurate” description
with her passionate concern for things mistaken, misplaced, and damaged. I propose that
Bishop’s practice as a poet of description is bound up with an attraction to those objects
that embody the dilemma of queer self-representation: an invisible house, a fleeing
animal, and a rock that looks like a rose. The objects to which Bishop’s observational eye
is drawn are things resistant to description, things that do not want to be seen or rendered
exhaustively, exposed. Bishop’s poems are not confessional in the way that Sylvia Plath’s
or Anne Sexton’s, for example, are said to be; rather, they are descriptive. They are
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attuned with startling accuracy to places, scenes, and phenomena: the natural word,
domestic spaces, animals, and everyday objects. For the most part, critics understand the
scope of Bishop’s accuracy to stop at sexuality, her lesbian desires and her relationships
with women. It is a commonplace of scholarship that Bishop shied away from writing
openly or explicitly (in published work, at least) about her lesbian sexuality.103 This
critical truism positions Bishop’s queerness as the limit of her accuracy, her “passion,”
rather than an object of it. As a result, no critic of Bishop’s work has fully addressed the
intersections of her sexuality and the “accuracy” of her poetic worlds.
My readings demonstrate that Bishop is less invested in concealing or avoiding
signs of queerness than she is in crafting careful, often partial, sometimes imprecise
descriptions of their opacity and perceived social wrongness. She takes seriously an
object’s queer reluctance to be seen, beginning descriptions of a scene with lines like,
“Everything was withdrawn as far as possible, /indrawn.” Perhaps Bishop saw herself in
things that were receding, disappearing, or that had never been there to begin with, like
her dream-house in “The End of March,” where everything is dubious and distant and
askew: “my proto-dream-house, /my crypto-dream-house, that crooked box” (Geography
III 43). In this way, Bishop approached the postwar poet’s task of paying close attention
to the immediate, everyday world by way of an ethical “passion for accuracy” attuned to
things imagined and withdrawn, obscured from view. The end result of Bishop’s
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On Bishop’s reticence regarding sexuality, see Edelman (1985), Hoff (2008), Paton (1998),
and Spivack (2005). Before sexuality had entered the critical discourse, McNally (1966) found
that Bishop declined “the exhibition of her own personality” in order to craft precise descriptions
(190); in other words, precise description is an affordance of rejecting the so-called confessional
mode.
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accuracy is neither a complete or comprehensive visual picture (a faithful description) nor
an exposure of concealed or latent significance (a confession or a revelation of self). I
argue that this passion for accuracy, which Bishop calls “old-maidish” in a letter to
Robert Lowell, is a queer poetic mode whose definition allows us to more precisely chart
Bishop’s position in the landscape of midcentury and more broadly twentieth-century
poetry, in which she has been something of an outlier.104 Bishop’s approach to
observation and description, a passionate accuracy, falls somewhere in between detached
accounts of the external world and intimate disclosures of an interior subjectivity, the
latter being the aim of Lowell and other so-called confessional poets. Bishop’s queerly
accurate poems, while not about queer life or lesbian life per se, are rather informed by an
awareness that to scrutinize such figures as we would now name as queer can be a fraught
and even potentially dangerous process—it can hurt. Queer means damaged, in addition
to its many other meanings. Bishop’s accuracy, above all, is protective of its objects,
which are so often damaged things.
To shed new light on Bishop’s accuracy, this chapter “reads” the friendship
Bishop sustained for nearly three decades and mostly in writing with Robert Lowell.
Lowell, paradoxically, is both “confessional” poet and mythmaker. He made a myth of
his own life and crafted a fantasy version of Bishop that is both fascinating and sad. His
misogyny, on full view in his review of Bishop’s first book (“Her admirers are not likely
to hail her as a giant among the moderns”), is garden variety and ultimately not worth
bothering much about. Bishop articulates her passion for accuracy (the second epigraph
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Too late for modernism and too early for the New York School, Bishop is most often
categorized as a key figure of the (white and mostly male) “middle generation” between
modernism and postmodernism, in company with Lowell, Randall Jarrell, and John Berryman.

157

to this chapter) in an exchange of letters with Lowell, a poet for whom “accuracy” in its
more straightforward meaning (free from error, factually correct), was not a passion or
even a priority. The Latin root of accurate, accuratus, means performed or made with
care. Lowell’s failure to be accurate in this sense of the term invited Bishop to define
poetic truth for him as being, in meaningful ways, an avoidance of pain. Somewhat
perversely, Bishop’s friendship with Lowell can teach us about her passion and her
understanding of accuracy as one of poetry’s most important, if most often devalued
projects. Their friendship hinged on—as it bridged—conflicting ideas about the truth:
what poets should tell, what friends could be.
Bishop’s correspondence with Lowell has been the subject of much critical and
popular attention—and for good reason. It is enthralling. Reading their letters is like
joining them in their bedrooms, separate but connected. The distance between them sings
with intimacy, a closeness only possible in frequent correspondence and rare physical
proximity. “Distance,” David Kalstone writes, “kept their friendship fresh, gave it a
certain immunity, allowed it an imaginative space outside the abrasions of an intimate
daily life” (135). These friends could not have been more different with respect to what
they needed and imagined in that space, and yet they forged an intimate bond that is both
baffling and moving in its persistence through the years. They were the readers of each
other’s poems and each other’s lives. Even in periods of not writing, disagreement,
tension, and loss, they were attached by physical distance and across so many differences
(of gender, sexuality, and class, to name just three), that it would be hard not to describe
their friendship as some kind of love. Their distant intimacy meant, as Lowell put it in a
letter, something “better than life allows,” an “indispensable” connection (Words in Air
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390).105 And it meant that Lowell was free to reimagine what was real and what was not
in this relationship, including and most infamously his unmade proposal of marriage to
his non-heterosexual friend, which he composed into existence in a letter nine years after
the proposal did not happen. As Lowell tells it in a letter to Bishop (August 15, 1957),
Bishop said to him “rather humorously yet it was truly meant, ‘When you write my
epitaph, you must say I was the loneliest person who ever lived’” (225).106 In this
moment, Lowell writes, he assumed it “would be just a matter of time” before he asked
Bishop to marry him, misreading Bishop’s queer claim to loneliness (and, as Rich would
later describe it, Bishop’s outsiderhood) as an expression of desire for a heteronormative
romance.107 Distance nourished Lowell’s idea of Bishop: the woman who might have
said “yes” to his proposal, had he made it. Without an outcome, there could be neither
inaccuracy nor accuracy, but pure and limitless possibility. Lowell writes of this unmade
proposal as “the might have been for me, the one towering change, the other life that
might have been had” (226, italics in original).
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Subsequent quotations from Words In Air are cited in-text with the abbreviation WA.
In August 1957, Bishop and her partner Lota de Macedo Soares traveled to Castine, Maine to
spend time with Lowell. During their stay, as Lowell wrote to Bishop (August 9, 1957), he was
“living in a state of increasing mania,” with “a headless heart,” seemingly in throes of old
affections newly felt (WA 213). Manic episodes occurred with regularity throughout Lowell’s
adult life. Bishop cut short the visit, and Lowell wrote the very long letter of August 15, 1957, in
an effort to explain his behavior and to admit “the other side, the fact that our friendship really
wasn’t a courting.” Working through these “confused” feelings for his friend as “unattainable and
renounced love,” Kalstone claims, contributed to “one of the most intense moments in his writing
career,” the composition of “Skunk Hour” and other Life Studies poems. See Becoming a Poet,
184-190.
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See Rich, “The Eye of the Outsider.” The sources of Bishop’s outsiderhood were many: there
was her geographical remoteness in Brazil, her lifelong struggles with asthma and alcoholism,
and the loss of both her parents at a young age; there was also, as Rich puts it, “the essential
outsiderhood of a lesbian identity” (127).
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“Elizabeth Bishop is spectacular in being unspectacular,” Moore writes in her
review of Bishop’s first book North & South (1946), “Why has no one ever thought of
this, one asks oneself; why not be accurate and modest?” (“A Modest Expert” 177). The
poet James Merrill agrees with Moore’s assessment in a remembrance of Bishop
published upon her death in 1979. He writes of Bishop’s “instinctive, modest, lifelong
impersonations of an ordinary woman” (259). Bishop was queer but hid it well, Merrill’s
remembrance of her implies. She did her queerness quietly and modestly, in “ordinary
woman” drag. The words that Merrill uses, “instinctive” and “lifelong,” feel almost
violent now; they suggest that Bishop lived with an inherent and abiding homophobia or
that she wanted to pass as straight. Of course, what Merrill meant to say was something
akin to Moore’s “spectacular in being unspectacular.” Merrill is marveling at Bishop’s
capacity to seem as if she were an ordinary woman, not just straight but also boring, when
in reality she was neither. The notion that Bishop was an “ordinary woman” is mistaken,
but it was an error that Bishop embraced. It was her way of being queer. Bishop, finally,
may not be a queer or even a lesbian poet, but she is a poet for whom desire to be
accurate (describe the world with care) converges with desire to make the common
mistake or minor error the very means of someone’s existence.
It is ironic that the word “perfectionism” has attached itself to Bishop’s poetic
practice. Although the label does make sense when we consider that Bishop published
only about 100 poems and took years to finish her lines, the word obscures the care she
took to render mistakes throughout her poems—and to render mistakes with vibrancy, or
as vitality itself. Countless critics of Bishop’s work discuss the “accuracy” of her
observations and descriptions, or the way that Bishop’s poems feel like “records of
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beholding,” every detail seeming to say and to convince the reader, as Randall Jarrell
once put it, “I have seen it” (Costello 5; Jarrell 181, italics in original).108 For Jarrell, this
sense of Bishop’s having seen the things she describes results in “unusually personal”
poems. Lowell, too, another early reader and reviewer of Bishop’s work, found
“personality” to be an effect of accurate descriptions. Bishop, Lowell finds, “is usually
present in her poems; they happen to her, she speaks, and often centers them on herself”
(“Thomas, Bishop, and Williams” 188). The Bishop whose voice Lowell claims to have
heard is not the version of her that concerns me here. Lowell’s Bishop crafts a perfect
description and wins the Pulitzer Prize. I am more interested in the friend who wrote to
Lowell to say that she liked the messy drafts of his poems better (she liked the mistakes,
which gave the poems life).
When I revisit these early reviews, I feel a version of the protectiveness and
possessiveness that Jenn Shapland describes in My Autobiography of Carson McCullers
(2020), a biography-memoir hybrid in the tradition of the feminist and queer recovery
project. McCullers’s life presents a different case than Bishop’s, although the two were
contemporaries. McCullers’s relationships with women had been overlooked and erased,
the meaning of them disavowed because they did not fit the pattern of a sexual identity:
“I took it personally,” Shapland writes (21). When Shapland hears about another
researcher at work in McCullers’s archive, doing a project on the tomboy, Shapland
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See McNally’s 1966 essay “Elizabeth Bishop: The Discipline of Description,” which examines
accuracy as a “cultivated technique” of Bishop’s work, an effect of “remarkably close attention”
and “visual clarity” (189-190). Accuracy, spontaneity, and mystery are the three qualities Bishop
cites as those she most admires in a poem. See “Writing poetry is an unnatural act,” in Bishop’s
Prose. Bishop does not define “accuracy,” though she provides examples of it in the work of
other poets.
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thinks to herself (because, as is abundantly clear to Shapland, Carson was certainly not a
tomboy): “I know her better” (64, italics in original). Jarrell’s Bishop, or the “I” that he
attributes to Bishop’s unusually personal poems, is a figment of the male-dominated (and,
as Rich would have said, tokenizing) poetry establishment’s midcentury imagination.
This “I” is not the Bishop I know whose eye is drawn to things that cannot and do not
want to be seen.
The “personality” that readers like Jarrell and Lowell perceived in Bishop’s early
published work does not extend from stark disclosures of Bishop’s “personal” or intimate
life but rather from Bishop’s relations of intimacy with the objects she describes. It is as
if we catch the poet in the very act of observing, a mundane yet intimate act. “Intimacy”
for Bishop, however, does not mean intensive scrutiny or a mode of observation that
aspires to completeness, but rather a means of being affected by an environment or an
object so as to render it with care. The voice that “speaks” with personality belongs as
much to the object as it does to Bishop herself. As Gillian White points out, Bishop’s
poems “treat familiar language,” or language that seems to speak directly to readers, “as
an object of social analysis” (93). White suggests that Bishop’s poems decline
conventional lyric speakers to an extent that early readers, Lowell among them, did not
appreciate. By attending to the “emphasis on textuality at the moment we are supposed to
hear a voice” in several of Bishop’s early poems, “a signature gesture” of her work (74),
White’s analysis confirms that Bishop worked to distance herself from lyric
subjectivity—to make a game out of the trap of a familiar personality and normative
modes of seeing, speaking, and knowing. The only missing piece in White’s analysis is
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queerness: or the ways in which, for Bishop, “normative language” was inadequate to the
task of lending voice—or not—to queer life and experience.
In the first epigraph to this chapter, Lowell claims to have been “haunted” by a
description of a doorknob, which contains a “truth” in excess of the kind a poet might
locate in “some deep personal experience.” For Lowell, this china doorknob, whether
actual or imagined, threatens the sovereign reliability of the “personal” or the self as a
repository of “poetic truth.” As Lowell notes, the doorknob’s image does not make it into
his poem, but it stays with him and haunts him. It is possible, even likely, that the source
of Lowell’s doorknob is Bishop’s poem, “Cape Breton,” in which we find a “rough-adzed
pole topped with a white china doorknob” (Poems 66).109 Bishop’s poem is arresting and
indeed haunting in its attention to a desolate and vibrant place, a combination found in
many of the places in her poems: Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, on a Sunday. The
characteristics and inhabitants of the place, including puffins, sheep, and humans, are in
various ways resistant to description and to being seen, presumably by Bishop: the
puffins “stand /with their backs to the mainland” and the sea itself is “disappearing under
the mist equally in all directions.” The road that runs along the coastline is both “wild”
and deserted, lacking the usual weekday traffic. However, a bus does pass a schoolhouse,
“where today no flag is flying” from the doorknob-topped flagpole:
A small bus comes along, in up-and-down rushes,
packed with people, even to its step.
(On weekdays with groceries, spare automobile parts, and pump parts,
but today only two preachers extra, one carrying his frock coat on a
hanger.)
It passes the closed roadside stand, the closed schoolhouse,
where today no flag is flying
109

“Cape Breton” was first published in the New Yorker in 1949 and then again in Bishop’s
second book of poems, A Cold Spring (1955).
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from the rough-adzed pole topped with a white china doorknob.
It stops, and a man carrying a baby gets off,
climbs over a stile, and goes down through a small steep meadow,
which establishes its poverty in a snowfall of daisies,
to his invisible house beside the water. (Poems 66)
Everywhere this poem travels, we find disappearing, obscured, and even
“invisible” things described. We also find impossible details like the hanger that holds the
frock coat. How could any observer have seen it? How did Bishop come to know that
there is a house beside the water, if the house is truly “invisible?” From where and for
whom is it invisible or hidden, perhaps by fir trees or the mist? Or is it not a real house?
Is it an imagined house, an invention or a gift that Bishop gives to the lone passenger who
gets off when the bus stops, “a man carrying a baby?” Is it the house she wished had been
there? In the previous stanza (before the bus comes rushing along) we learn,
The road appears to have been abandoned.
Whatever the landscape had of meaning appears to have been
abandoned,
unless the road is holding it back, in the interior,
where we cannot see, (Poems 65)
Bishop’s “interior” is the world beyond the road, a place the poet cannot see from her
particular vantage point. It is not close to her. It is, instead, the place held back from
view, invisible to us; “we,” the readers of the poem, cannot see it.
Bishop’s attention to the doorknob in this poem, seemingly out of place and
useless—if a “useful” doorknob is a movable part attached to a door, exemplifies her
self-avowed old-maidish passion for accuracy. So, too, does her speculative noticing or
construction of a house that is “invisible” to her and to the reader. The latter object
Bishop writes into invisible existence for no other knowable reason than that this man
with a baby needs an endpoint for his journey from the bus stop through a meadow,
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“which establishes its poverty in a snowfall of daisies.” Bishop places what is not there,
what cannot be seen or wishes not to be seen—established—in her poem; she puts it there
for us to not-see, not-observe, and not-interpret. She protects the private meaning of the
house from prying eyes without foreclosing what it might mean or provide to its
inhabitants. The invisible house, unlike the road that looks “abandoned” to the observer,
will not suffer this same fate. In the visual economy of Cape Breton (and “Cape Breton”),
appearance signifies abandonment or a relinquishing of care. The house will not appear at
all and thus it will not be abandoned. Bishop preserves the house invisible. The
doorknob, although visible, is likewise without obvious, articulable meaning. What is
apparent is the wrongness of an object called a “doorknob” sitting atop a “rough-adzed
pole.” Has Bishop named the thing in error? If we return to Lowell’s haunting, then we
can pose the more important question: How can things misplaced become the vessels for
“poetic truth?” How can Bishop describe “invisible” things with accuracy? That she
could do so and did disturbed her friend and fellow poet, Lowell. But why should that
disturb him?
As we observe in “Cape Breton,” Bishop’s accuracy is not about mere factual
correctness or rather the fantasy of this. It is a form of careful looking keyed to things
concealed from view, whether by chance or by desire. A passion for accuracy, then, is
Bishop’s mode of taking care of what she holds up for examination and interpretation: a
practice of not disclosing things and making space for them to be hidden, vague,
protected. Although this passion did result in actual fact-checking at times (the datestamped poem “In the Waiting Room,” for instance), it also allowed for partial vision,
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misrecognition, and mistakes.110 Perhaps what haunted Lowell the most was this idea of
an intimacy between the poet observing and the object being observed that did not have
to be resolved or culminate in revelation.
In a letter to Lowell (March 21, 1972), Bishop voices her distaste for “the
‘confessional’” mode of writing. Lowell’s book of poems and prose, Life Studies (1959),
which was the first book to be labeled as “confessional” by the critic M. L. Rosenthal,
who coined the term, had once inspired Bishop’s praise. In her jacket blurb, she compares
the Life Studies poems to the letters of a Bible seen beneath a reading-glass: “as big as
life and as alive, and rainbow-edged” (Prose 326). In her 1972 letter to Lowell, however,
Bishop cites Life Studies coolly as “perhaps…a necessary movement” toward a poetry
“more real, fresh and immediate” (One Art 562). This movement had, for Bishop,
devolved into poetry as “anything goes…mothers & fathers and sex lives and so on”
(562). Bishop’s letter is responding—her words are careful yet concerned, uneasy, stern,
and disapproving—to some poems not yet published as The Dolphin (1973), a book that
uses altered fragments from Elizabeth Hardwick’s letters to Lowell as if the words were
his. Hardwick and Lowell were married from 1949 until 1972. The Dolphin chronicles
not just the dissolution of their marriage but also Lowell’s infidelity, an affair with
Caroline Blackwood, and his subsequent marriage to Blackwood. The book, as Hardwick
wrote to Robert Giroux, “hurt me as much as anything in my life” (Hardwick and Lowell
xix). Bishop calls the use of Hardwick’s letters “shocking,” a violation of the reader’s
trust: “One can use one’s life as material—one does, anyway…but at the same time one
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Bishop informed the New Yorker that her poem “In the Waiting Room” “conflates two 1918
issues of the National Geographic into one” (Travisano 24).
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surely should have a feeling that one can trust the writer—not to distort, tell lies, etc.”
(One Art 562). Lowell’s semi-autobiographical arranging or deranging, as Bishop put it,
was a source of disagreement for the poets more than once.111 Contemplating Lowell’s
The Dolphin, Bishop feared that readers would trust the altered Hardwick letters to be
unaltered and that this would leave him open to attacks from critics. She was right.112
Bishop writes to Lowell before The Dolphin is published with the hope that he
will try for what he probably deems “impossible” (Bishop uses the word): a “gentle”
rendering of Hardwick’s sorrow, with her letters as she wrote them. “I keep remembering
Hopkins’s marvelous letter to Bridges about the idea of a ‘gentleman’ being the highest
thing ever conceived,” she writes, “—higher than a ‘Christian,’ even, certainly than a
poet. It is not being ‘gentle’ to use personal, tragic, anguished letters that way—it’s
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See Bishop’s “North Haven (In Memoriam: Robert Lowell).” Notably, Bishop objected to
Lowell’s use of her life in a poem, “For Elizabeth Bishop 2. Castine Maine,” published in History
(1973). Bishop read a draft version of the poem in which her mother threatens to kill her. Bishop
writes to Lowell, asking him to change the lines; her mother “never did make” the threat, she
writes: “Poor thing, I don’t want to have it any worse than it was” (WA 243). Lowell removed the
lines from the published version, which makes no mention of Bishop’s mother. Bishop also
expressed concern regarding William Carlos Williams’s use of letters (from a woman named in
the text as “Cress”) in Book Two of Paterson (1948). Bishop did not think these letters were
“made up,” although she found Williams’s use of them “mean,” “emotionally overpowering,” and
detrimental to the poem as a whole. See Bishop’s letter to Lowell of June 30, 1948. Lowell, in his
reply (July 2, 1948), attests to all the prose parts in Book Two, including Cress’s letters, as
“lifted, not made up.” Lowell defends the letters’ effectiveness: they are “terrifyingly” real, he
says, and their use reflects most harshly upon Williams himself. See WA, 38-40.
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See, for example, Rich’s comments in her column for The American Poetry Review (1973);
she calls the use of Hardwick’s letters “one of the most vindictive and mean-spirited acts in the
history of poetry” (“Caryatid” 42-43). Rich attacks Lowell, finding in his failed attempt to
understand another’s suffering an all-too-common exercise of male poetic privilege in the guise
of expertise, or what Rich calls “bullshit eloquence.” In the book’s final poem, Lowell declares
The Dolphin to be “half fiction.” Bishop, to be clear, does not object to this per se, but rather to
the probable confusion, for the reader, of real life with fiction. Fiction must not be (quoting from
a letter of Thomas Hardy) “covertly hinted to be fact” (qtd. in One Art 562). Bishop felt that
Lowell had “no right” to change Hardwick’s letters, although she understood as well that using
Hardwick’s words in any way as poetry, altered or unaltered, would make them into something
else.
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cruel” (One Art 562). Lowell’s manipulation of the letters, “loading the dice so against”
Hardwick, not only betrays the reader’s trust but takes us further from the depth of
feeling that Lowell sought to portray. Lowell, in his reply to Bishop’s letter (March 28,
1972), claims the opposite. He claims to need the letters “cut, doctored part fiction,”
because, that way, “the letters make the book…at least they make Lizzie [Hardwick] real
beyond my invention” (WA 713). On some level, Lowell and Bishop want the same thing
from a poem: a feeling of reality beyond the poet’s crafting. Lowell wagers, misguidedly,
that the use of Hardwick’s letters as “the poignance of the book, tho that hardly makes it
kinder to her,” can achieve this. Bishop strenuously dissents. A “gentle” rendering of
Hardwick’s suffering, in Bishop’s view, would be not only “kinder to her,” as Lowell
says, but also more enabling of this reality beyond the poet’s construction. A gentle
rendering would not entail the use of facts unchanged (“impossible”) so much as it would
the use and therefore the acknowledgement of Lowell’s inability to fully know the facts:
a poetics of uncertainty—a caring, passionate accuracy.
Lowell remains a troubling figure of enduring cultural interest, as The Dolphin
Letters, 1970-1979, published in 2019, makes clear. With this collection, we at last get
Hardwick’s side of her own story in her original letters to Lowell: “You’ll be exhausted
from these letters,” Hardwick wrote to Lowell in October, 1970, from New York
(Lowell’s affair with Blackwood had been going on for months by this point), “But there
will not be more unless you are planning to return to us. I cannot bear it otherwise, it is
degrading, unnecessary and quite destructive for me to keep writing to someone who
doesn’t care for me or for his daughter” (114-115). Lowell, who was living in London at
the time, replies to Hardwick a few days later, “I don’t think I can go back to you,” and
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ends the letter with (concerning a forthcoming trip to New York), “I don’t want to scrap
over details,” those old-maidish, minor things (116, 117). “Insensate beyond belief,” as
Eileen Myles once described him, Lowell was “Filled with much anxiety about his
imagined /Pain” (Living Twice 45). It is not possible or useful to distinguish Lowell’s
“real” pain from his “imagined” pain. Bishop, although troubled by her friend’s unfeeling
manipulation of Hardwick’s letters and his general unconcern for details, empathized
with Lowell’s need to cultivate the “might have been.” So many critics, myself among
them, have been charmed by their refusals to recede, to drift apart, to go about their
separate, very different lives without another word.
Bishop who was a lesbian, a person orphaned at a young age, and a chronically ill
person, writing to Lowell who was a straight man, also chronically (mentally) ill, and
born of privilege—born, as Bishop put it rather cringefully, into a “significant,
illustrative, American” family (WA 247). They just kept writing, and writing, and writing.
They did not recede from friendship, as their letters seemed to bridge as well as sustain
the needed distance. To be receding was to be loved, in some queer way, for these two
friends. “My Darling receding Elizabeth,” Lowell writes in answer to a postcard sent to
mark her literal departure from the U.S. on a ship, which Bishop signed “Recessively
yours.” I picture Bishop on that ship, a tiny pinpoint getting tinier, her back turned from
the mainland like the puffins in “Cape Breton.” How to describe a love or a thing that is
resistant to description is a core preoccupation of Bishop’s poetry, her accuracy. It is also
an interpretive and methodological challenge facing readers of these poems and the
relationships that shaped them. Perhaps I honor Bishop’s practice of preserving things
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unseen in my attempt to hold the meaning and the love in her strange friendship, which is
a love I want to have been there, although I can never be certain it was.
Bishop’s relationship with Lowell allows us to grasp the distant intimacy that
structures observation and description in her poems. In relation to her objects of
description, as to Lowell, Bishop is close but not so close that she can be certain of what
she sees. She is receding at the same time as her object is receding or is hidden from her
view. A pair of poems, Bishop’s “The Armadillo” and Lowell’s “Skunk Hour,” each
dedicated to the other, illustrates that Bishop’s practice of description differs from
Lowell’s and yet extends from the same relational form that made their friendship
possible.113 Lowell modelled his poem “Skunk Hour” after Bishop’s “The Armadillo.”
He carried a copy of “The Armadillo” folded in his wallet, talismanic of the perfection
his Elizabeth Bishop represented. In a letter to Bishop, he claims, “really I’ve just broken
through to where you’ve always been and gotten rid of my medieval armor’s
undermining…I’m dedicating ‘Skunk Hour’ to you. A skunk isn’t much of a present for a
Lady Poet, but I’m a skunk in the poem” (239).114 Both poems, Lowell says elsewhere,
“use short line stanzas, start with drifting description, and end with a single animal” (“On
‘Skunk Hour’” 227). Lowell’s description is partially true: Bishop’s poem begins by
focusing on Brazilian fire balloons and then drifts downward to attend to various animals
on the ground who are impacted by a lantern’s sudden fall, an armadillo among them.
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First published in the New Yorker in 1957, “The Armadillo” was republished with “for Robert
Lowell” added in the 1965 collection Questions of Travel. In a letter to Lowell (August 2, 1965)
Bishop writes: “I finally decided to put your name under the Armadillo poem [in Questions of
Travel], since you have liked it…we may be a terrible pair of log-rollers, I don’t know” (WA 582583).
114
Lowell may be referencing a poem by Moore, first published in 1950, “Armor’s Undermining
Modesty.”
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Lowell believed that these poems were cousins and that he had followed Bishop’s
method. Yet Lowell’s skunk and Bishop’s armadillo are two different animals (though
neither of them is “single”): Lowell is the skunk in his poem.
In Lowell’s hands, a drifting description is a means of exploring the self through
an attention to the external world of Nautilus Island, Maine, the poem’s setting, and its
inhabitants, including a mother skunk:
I stand on top
of our back steps and breathe the rich air—
a mother skunk with her column of kittens swills the garbage
pail.
She jabs her wedge-head in a cup
of sour cream, drops her ostrich tail,
and will not scare. (Life Studies 90)
This final stanza lies in shadows cast by Lowell’s stark confessions given earlier in the
poem: “My mind’s not right” and “I myself am hell.” The scene it depicts, a skunk
determined to forage for food (she “will not scare”), is meant to be looked through, seen
beneath. Underneath it, thanks to Lowell’s loosened self-protective armor, lies the “hell”
that is his struggle with manic depression (bipolar disorder): an “ill-spirit sob in each
blood cell.” Whereas his previous poems, in Lowell’s words, “hid what they were really
about” beneath an “impenetrable surface” (“On Skunk Hour” 227), Lowell’s “Skunk
Hour” unfolds its subject as the external world itself: a private struggle is made
pervasive, panoramic, atmospheric.115 “The season’s ill,” the poem declares. The mother
skunk is overdetermined by the fact that observation in “Skunk Hour” is confessional: we
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Lowell wrote “Skunk Hour” backwards, and before he wrote the first four stanzas of
description, he recalls, the “bleak personal violence” in the poem’s second half repelled him. The
image of a china doorknob, while it did not find its way into the poem, made the completion of
“Skunk Hour” possible. See “On ‘Skunk Hour’” (1962), Lowell’s response to a symposium on
this poem, in Collected Prose. See also Kalstone, 186.
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see Lowell watch the mother skunk, yet what we are “really” seeing is Lowell engaged in
self-examination. Lowell is not this skunk’s companion for the night nor is he in the
night, observing it and searching by the moonlight, mother skunk-like, for an escape or
solace or food. He is the night, he is the skunk, and she is permitted no escape.
Bishop’s armadillo, by contrast, is an animal fleeing the scene. “The Armadillo”
places Bishop (and somebody else, there is a “we”) within the poem as an observer of a
particular place and time. Six of the poem’s ten stanzas describe the “frail, illegal fire
balloons” released near Bishop’s house in Samambaia, Brazil:
rising toward a saint
still honored in these parts,
the paper chambers flush and fill with light
that comes and goes, like hearts.
Once up against the sky it’s hard
to tell them from the stars—
planets, that is—the tinted ones:
Venus going down, or Mars,
or the pale green one. With a wind,
they flare and falter, wobble and toss;
but if it’s still they steer between
the kite sticks of the Southern Cross,
receding, dwindling, solemnly
and steadily forsaking us,
or, in the downdraft from a peak,
suddenly turning dangerous. (Poems 101)
These balloons are vibrant entities, imbued with rhythmic agency. One might mistake
them for stars; the stars, in turn, might really be planets. The fire balloons are not held up
and pinned like specimens to look at. They are instead invited to move, imagined to
“steer” their own trajectories. We see Bishop and Bishop’s companion, most likely her
partner Lota de Macedo Soares, watch the fire balloons recede, flare up, and dwindle,
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only to disappear from view. These “paper chambers” are “like hearts” whose warmth
and love are intermittent or ephemeral and distant. They are not unlike the letters Bishop
sent to distant friends: the light and heart she sent to Lowell.
A fire balloon that falls, “suddenly turning dangerous,” upsets the armadillo, who
appears for just three lines:
The ancient owls’ nest must have burned.
Hastily, all alone,
a glistening armadillo left the scene,
rose-flecked, head down, tail down,
and then a baby rabbit jumped out,
short-eared, to our surprise. (Poems 102).
Sandwiched between a pair of owls and a surprising baby rabbit, this armadillo’s sudden
entrance into the poem is an exit. To appear is to recede. Yet Bishop achieves a moment
of intimacy with this elusive creature, caught in the act of having survived the wayward
balloon, which burns the owls’ nest. The armadillo appears because it has lived through
this event. Beyond this fact, the creature is unknown—and, “head down,” prefers to be
unknown. Bishop’s poem, unlike Lowell’s, offers an exit to its animal and, even more,
suggests “receding” as a means of survival. Fire balloons that crash to earth, that fail to
recede and dwindle and finally to forsake the human observer, are a danger to that
observer and to other living beings. Distant balloons that come and go, dip in and out of
view, are safer. Bishop’s distance from the glistening armadillo likewise allows for
intimate observation at the same time as it preserves the safety of being “all alone.”
Observing objects at a distance and allowing them to escape produces a different
kind of intimacy compatible with loneliness and creaturely autonomy. Whereas “Skunk
Hour” consumes its skunk and choreographs her every movement to reflect Lowell’s “not
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right” mind, “The Armadillo” beholds its creature’s sudden appearance/disappearance as
a reminder that the fullness of the world will always elude the poet-observer and the
reader. Lowell’s friendship did not interrupt the aloneness Bishop sought within her
lesbian relationships that structured everyday life but rather enabled it: a “dream,” as
Bishop mused in a letter to Lowell, “of being a light-house keeper, absolutely alone, with
no one to interrupt my reading or just sitting,” keeping close watch from a distance,
beaming a light that comes and goes (WA 335).
In a frequently quoted letter (known as “the Darwin letter”) to Anne Stevenson,
Bishop invokes a mode of wayward, even useless observation that she attributes to
Charles Darwin:
I can’t believe we are wholly irrational and I do admire Darwin! But reading
Darwin, one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless,
heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic—and then comes a sudden
relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels the strangeness of his undertaking,
sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or
sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in
experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful,
perfectly useless concentration. (Prose 414, italics in original)116
Bishop’s Darwin is the lonely, detail-oriented observer who is impressive not for building
up a “beautiful solid case” (a scientific contribution) but rather for “sliding giddily off
into the unknown” and engaging in a “useless concentration.” Bishop admires Darwin’s
slide away from scientific perfection and his openness to making insignificant
observations—or forgetting about and failing in the pursuit of empirical truth. Darwin’s
undertaking is intimate as well as solitary: he is alone with and receptive to the life forms
he observes. Bishop is often the lonely observer, self-forgetful and forgetful (prone to
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Stevenson is the author of the first book-length study of Bishop’s life and work (published in
1966); she corresponded with Bishop in the course of drafting Elizabeth Bishop.
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errors and expressions of uncertainty and doubt). She is never automatic or heroic—a
machine. Bishop’s mentor Marianne Moore has been aligned, at times unfairly, with such
fantasies and nightmares of empirical precision. Moore and Lowell, two of Bishop’s most
important friends and readers, occupy opposing ends of a poetic accuracy spectrum.
Whereas Lowell is less concerned with being precise than being significant (and mythic,
thus part-fiction), Moore insists that science textbooks and brochures are equal to poetry
because they offer useful—if degraded—information. Moore’s descriptive poems are
“beautiful solid cases” (arguments as well as cabinets: containers for display), in which
elaborate formal structures and far-flung objects and artifacts, from rare animals to
churchyard inscriptions, “attain integration too tough for infraction” (Moore 147).117 The
reception of Moore’s precision is entangled with anxieties about non-normative and
especially queer and feminized ways of knowing. The lonely old woman who is engaged
in making endless observations—for whom precision is a passion—is “the pathological
spinster observer-poet” (Cecire, Experimental 131). The frightening aspect of Moore’s
precision is not that queerness lies beneath it but rather that nothing lies beneath it and is
therefore perfectly useless. “All this fiddle,” as Moore put it, for its own sake.118
Bishop’s Darwin has a lot in common with Moore, who is an observer of the
natural—real and imagined—world. In Bishop’s poem “Invitation to Miss Marianne
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See Moore’s “Efforts of Affection” in The Complete Poems.
In a reading that cuts through the mythology (and misogyny) around Moore and her work,
Cecire links precision to “the myopic and unyielding knowledge practices of women, of the law,
or more monstrously yet, both at once” (Experimental 123). Cecire locates Moore’s precision as a
sign not just of deviant femininity but also of “a sexual unease in technological modernity,” that
is, the fear of the unsexed, of bodies stripped of sexuality (121). Cecire’s Moore is not a sexy
Moore, made queer by way of celibacy (see Kahan, Celibacies); she is, instead, a threatening
Moore, whose fastidiousness in everything from manners to syllables verges on an almost
criminal perversity.
118
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Moore” (1955), the younger poet invites the elder to “please come flying” from her
apartment in Brooklyn to Manhattan: sporting pointed shoes, a black cape, and a black
brimmed hat (Moore famously wore a tricorn). “The flight is safe; the weather is all
arranged,” the invitation reads (Poems 80). Moore’s flight will take her into a realm of
“accidents” and “malignant movies” and “injustices at large,” which Moore will greet
with “a slight censorious frown.” The invitation goes so far as to revise Manhattan for the
arrival of Moore: “Facts and skyscrapers glint in the tide; Manhattan /is all awash with
morals this fine morning” (80). Bishop’s poem is addressed to someone devoted to
“facts” and “morals” and yet is able to hear “a soft uninvented music” with her “beautiful
ears” (81). This unusually sensitive person requires a new, inverted Manhattan
overflowing with morality and music not yet imagined. Although it is fanciful and comic,
Bishop’s poem lends to Moore’s part-witch, part-spinster poet persona a degree of
complication. Bishop’s Moore is both censorious of and sympathetic to the need to
“uninvent” the world and all its normative arrangements “with a grammar that suddenly
turns and shines,” a gesture not unlike a sudden slide into the unknown.
Bishop’s old-maidish passion for accuracy embraces the unknown and forms of
everyday, feminized knowledge. Bishop encloses, in her letter to Lowell in which she
names her passion and asks, “who knows what might depend on it,” “a clipping about
raccoons.” “But perhaps you prefer mythology,” Bishop writes, a reference to Lowell’s
current project, a translation of the Oresteia (WA 553). In Lowell’s letter of August 10,
1964, to which Bishop’s letter and raccoon clipping are responding, Lowell tells her that
he loved a recent interview she gave in London with Edward Lucie-Smith, who “had a
good eye for you and your idiom and knew how to use a quote” (549). Lucie-Smith, to
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Bishop’s displeasure, describes her as “immaculate.” To Lowell (August 27, 1964), she
admits to having used the word “immaculate” during the conversation, which would
explain its vexing appearance in Lucie-Smith’s description of her. Without explicitly
saying as much, it’s clear that Bishop disagrees with Lowell about Lucie-Smith’s “good
eye.” The word “immaculate” does not describe her or her “idiom” with accuracy. And
yet, the very objection to the word might seem to underscore the charge in Lucie-Smith’s
unwanted description. Did Bishop’s old-maidish passion for accuracy exude a kind of
immaculacy? Was this a part of her successful impersonation of an ordinary (unmarried,
therefore spinsterish) woman? Old-maidish rhymes with prim severity as well as frigid
purity. Unblessed with marriage and/or love, the lonely Old Maid’s lesser “passion” is to
worry over details, watch the weather, go to church. Perhaps “immaculate,” for Bishop,
went too far in joining sexlessness or flawlessness to deviance and lesbian sexuality.
Bishop distances herself from Lucie-Smith’s and, by extension, Lowell’s ideas of her
immaculacy. This was the wrong word to describe a queer, old-maidish but not sexless
orientation to the world.
“Old-maidish” might describe a love that is unrecognized as such, a love
invisible or ordinary, trivialized, impossible: a word for what Bishop had earlier named,
in a letter to the poet May Swenson (September 6, 1955), “the tender passion” of one
woman for another (Poems, Prose, and Letters 807). Bishop’s Pulitzer Prize-winning
book of poems North & South – A Cold Spring (1955) had just been published (the first
collection was republished with the second). The final poem in the second book, “The
Shampoo,” had been declined for publication first by the New Yorker, Bishop’s mainstay,
and then by Poetry. With the exception of Swenson and one other friend, as Bishop
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noted, nobody had “even mentioned” this small poem, whose final stanza finds its
speaker offering to wash the hair of a “dear friend” (Bishop’s partner, Lota de Macedo
Soares). The silence led Bishop to wonder if “there was something indecent” in the poem
that she had “overlooked.” Moore, like the others, made no reply to “The Shampoo” in
her letters. Moore, with her “determined obliquity,” as Bishop wrote to Swenson, “never
can face the tender passion” (809).
“The Shampoo,” a queer love poem that is concerned with private, intimate, and
domestic caretaking ritual, is neither indecent nor immaculate. Perhaps Moore did not
know what to do with it. The final stanza reads:
The shooting stars in your black hair
in bright formation
are flocking where,
so straight, so soon?
—Come, let me wash it in this big tin basin,
battered and shiny like the moon. (Poems 82)
This poem begins with “still explosions.” These are lichens growing in “shocks.” The
“shooting stars” in Bishop’s dear friend’s hair are layered against this backdrop:
something sudden, loud, extreme is rendered quiet, calm, unthreatening. The rhyme
scheme used in all three stanzas further arrests the “still explosions.” At the same time, it
insists that these explosions can be heard and heard repeatedly as rhyme. The pattern
insists, in other words, that there is something happening here—a relationship, a life has
been happening here—and it is structured, growing, alive. The lichens grow; the stars are
flocking. These are living things, “arranged” but far from static or held in place. The
rhyme scheme does not tame or moderate “explosions” of emotion. Rather, it works to
make us attuned to quieter, less spectacular gestures that take place in daily life, again
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and again, where few might see them. Bishop’s Dickinsonian dash confirms the poem’s
domestic setting and confirms that Home is a space in which “explosions” do take place.
The most “indecent” part of the poem could be Bishop’s unvoiced dash. The pause before
the invitation is a long and powerful moment, one in which we are compelled to hear the
silence that does not speak, that does not convey the presence of a subterranean truth.
Bishop’s pleasure is explicit; it is in every word displayed: “the shooting stars in your
black hair,” the basin “battered and shiny like the moon.”
“The Shampoo,” therefore, is not secretly a love poem but rather openly a love
poem. It is an assembling of objects animated by desire. These things demonstrate and
signify love—they are also, at the same time, loved things. “It’s all about water and stars
and a bowl,” Kathleen Spivack writes, “Or so it seems” (508). The title of Spivack’s
essay neatly encapsulates her approach to Bishop’s work (and to Bishop herself, whom
she knew in Boston in the early 1970s): “Conceal/Reveal: Passion and Restraint in the
Work of Elizabeth Bishop, or: Why We Care about Elizabeth Bishop’s Poetry.”
Following this approach, there is no need to “care about” the water, stars, and bowl (the
tin basin), because these things are present solely to conceal the poem’s real subject: the
lesbian love to which the poem makes, for Spivack, “no indication.” In a sense, Spivack
is correct: this poem does not indicate. “The Shampoo” makes a world of something
ordinary and habitual, something so minor it seems like nothing. In likening the lover’s
hair and the tin basin to the stars and moon, the stuff of galaxies, Bishop’s poem lends to
this love an astronomical expansiveness that “love” itself (the word) might fail to
indicate—a love in need of other words and other places to be “real” in, to be “there” in.
In this way, Bishop did not share Moore’s commitment to obliquity, the relentless
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accuracy of her “octopus of ice.” As she wrote to Swenson, Moore’s fastidiousness she
found “amazing, and sad, too.” Bishop’s accuracy involves a certain gentleness of telling,
the product of a “well-taught skepticism” that relations of the tender passion—lacking not
just social sanction but also their own vocabulary, as the phrase “tender passion” makes
plain—could be describable in full.119 However, as I hope even this brief reading of “The
Shampoo” makes clear, a poem “all about water and stars” and a basin, and that uses
phrases like “dear friend” instead of “lover,” is a love poem. In such a poem, ordinary
things convey the vital and queer and thus, to editors at midcentury, “indecent” sense of
being loved. When writing of what Bishop refers to as the tender passion, finally, it was
more accurate, more caring and more truthful, not to say too much.
To end this chapter, I turn to Bishop’s most explicit queer love poem: an
unfinished draft, “Vague Poem (Vaguely love poem),” published posthumously in the
New Yorker in 2000 and subsequently in the controversial collection of archival material
edited by Alice Quinn, Edgar Allan Poe & The Juke-Box: Uncollected Poems, Drafts,
and Fragments (2006).120 “Vague Poem” is a useful text with which to study Bishop’s
process (the words and phrases that might have been cut from a completed version,
notably “sex,” remain in the draft) and Bishop’s evident desire to observe and describe a
moment of queer, lesbian intimacy, or the very thing her work is not supposed to have
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In Tendencies, Sedgwick connects “a well-taught skepticism about the representational
adequacy of language” with feeling “simply, homosexual” (207, italics in original).
120
See Elizabeth Bishop in the Twenty-First Century: Reading the New Editions (2012) for essays
by Lloyd Schwartz, Jonathan Ellis, Jeffrey Gray, and Charles Berger concerning Edgar Allen
Poe. Helen Vendler criticized Edgar Allen Poe for bringing what she calls “repudiated poems” to
light. There is no evidence that Bishop repudiated “Vague Poem” or sought to prevent its
posthumous publication.
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depicted.121 Unlike the other poems I’ve read throughout this chapter, Bishop’s “Vague
Poem” does not describe the moment or scene that, we can hypothesize, inspired Bishop
to write it. The poem grazes over this moment with the line, “Just now, when I saw you
naked again” (Poems 325). In the structure of “Vague Poem,” however, we find the
characteristic distance of the observer (Bishop) to the observed, which I traced in
readings of Bishop’s “Cape Breton” and “The Armadillo”: the first four stanzas of the
draft are preoccupied with memories of a trip to Oklahoma, while the fifth and final
stanza is concerned with the vague lover and her body, which in hindsight seems to be
the poem’s true yet withheld subject.122 Bishop’s concern, however, is less the lover’s
body than the pursuit of accurate language with which to describe it and the ordinary
moment of its encounter, “just now, when I saw you.” In order to meet the task of
rendering an ordinary moment and a queer relationship “forming,” Bishop recedes from
view and distances the lover who holds her gaze. Bishop’s distance from the addressee
throughout the opening stanzas (the lover is absent altogether), is the condition of her
intimate address to “you,” the lover, in the poem’s final stanza. Like the invisible house
in “Cape Breton” and the fleeing armadillo, “Vague Poem” protects the lover from view
while still establishing her presence and her intimacy with Bishop. Although it leaves the
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As Bishop’s friend the poet Lloyd Schwartz recalls, this phrase appeared on a handout given to
her poetry students in 1975 entitled: “IF YOU WANT TO WRITE WELL ALWAYS AVOID
THESE WORDS” (qtd. in Twenty-First 64, italics in original). One can see a facsimile of this
handout in Prose, ed. Schwartz. Other words and phrases on the list include: “potential,” “more
importantly,” “kind of,” “sort of,” “cope - as an intransitive verb,” “charisma,” “thrust,” and
“stance.”
122
Bishop traveled to Oklahoma once in 1973 to give a reading and once again in 1976 to receive
the Neustadt Prize.

181

task unfinished, “Vague Poem” shows us Bishop’s desire to depict queer love with
accuracy:
The trip west—
—I think I dreamed that trip.
They talked a lot of “rose rocks”
or maybe “rock roses”
—I’m not sure now, but someone tried to get me some.
(And two or three students had.)
She said she had some at her house.
They were by the back door, she said.
—A ramshackle house.
An Army house? No, “a Navy house.” Yes,
that far inland.
There was nothing by the back door but dirt
or that same dry, monochrome, sepia straw I’d seen everywhere.
Oh she said the dog has carried them off.
(A big black dog, female, was dancing around us.)
Later, as we drank tea from mugs, she found one,
“a sort of one.” “This one is just beginning. See—
you can see here, it’s beginning to look like a rose.
It’s—well, a crystal, crystals form—
I don’t know any geology myself . . .”
(Neither did I.)
Faintly, I could make out—perhaps—in the dull,
rose-red lump of, apparently, soil
a rose-like shape; faint glitters . . . Yes, perhaps
there was a secret, powerful crystal at work inside.
I almost saw it: turning into a rose
without any of the intervening
roots, stem, buds, and so on; just
earth to rose and back again.
Crystallography and its laws:
something I once wanted badly to study,
until I learned that it would involve a lot of arithmetic,
that is, mathematics.
Just now, when I saw you naked again,
I thought the same words: rose-rock, rock-rose . . .
Rose, trying, working, to show itself,
forming, folding over,
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unimaginable connections, unseen, shining edges.
Rose-rock, unformed, flesh beginning, crystal by crystal,
clear pink breasts and darker, crystalline nipples,
rose-rock, rose-quartz, roses, roses, roses,
exacting roses from the body,
and the even darker, accurate, rose of sex— (Edgar Allen Poe 152-153)
The sight of Bishop’s lover sparks a memory of a rose-shaped crystal or, more accurately,
her failure to remember the crystal’s name: is it a rose rock or a rock rose? Bishop’s
memory of her trip is also a search for “accurate” language: a small gap or lapse in
memory that could lend a loose precision to a description of her lover. On this dream-like
trip out west, Bishop is given a “sort of” rose rock (barite rose, also known as rose rock,
is the Oklahoma state rock) whose rose-shaped structure is barely perceptible. Like this
rose rock, we can speculate, the intimacy or “rose of sex” referred to in the final stanza is
“just beginning” to form. The rose rock forming is a metaphor not only for the lover but
also for a queer relationship in the flush of its invention.
The lover’s naked body is “the thing seen,” in Steinian terms, and the thing seen
makes the composition.123 It creates the need for a name. However, the body is not what
we, the readers of this poem, see. The lover, like the “sort of” rose rock, is an unfinished
figure—a distant, intimate addressee. Put another way, “Vague Poem” does not describe
the lover to which it is eventually addressed but rather explores the poet’s desire
(complicated, uncertain, and ambivalent) to describe a love that’s forming and a lover
who most likely does not want to be portrayed. Bishop can barely see the rose rock, while
the person who has brought it to her cannot describe its appearance or account for its
formation. The most appealing characteristic of the rose rock seems to be that its apparent
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See “Composition as Explanation.”
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or surface qualities can give only the faintest clues as to its “secret,” internal structure: a
“powerful crystal at work inside.” If the rose rock is a metaphor for queer relationality or
intimacy more broadly, then queer bonds in Bishop’s thinking do not lack a definite
structure (on the contrary, they are crystals), but rather possess a “powerful” pattern that
is “trying” to exist and even, perhaps, to show itself, to lend its shape to everyday life.
The vagueness in “Vague Poem,” finally, is a meaningful lack of knowing, part and
parcel of the unseen forms at work within queer bonds. The vague, unfinished lover
attests to Bishop’s desire to describe a queer relationship with accuracy as something that
is “forming” rather than altogether formless.
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